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Abstract
This study investigates the broadcast/multicast authentication problems in wireless
sensor networks (WSNs), particularly sensor nodes broadcast authentication and
outside user authentication, and proposes efficient and secure solutions for them.
The low cost and immunity from cabling have become motivations for many
applications of WSNs, for instance, the forest fire alarm, the intelligent traffic
system etc. However, the sensitive nature of communication in these applications
makes authentication a compulsory security requirement for them. The conventional
security solutions are unfeasible for WSNs due to the unique features of sensor
networks. Designing a new security mechanism for WSNs, on the other hand, is a
challenging task due to the nature of WSNs.
This research proposes a solution to the above mentioned authentication
problems in the form of an authentication framework for wireless sensor networks.
The proposed framework is comprised of two authentication protocols: one for sensor
nodes broadcast authentication and the other for outside user authentication. The
latter also facilitates a third type of authentication, i.e., base station to sensor nodes
broadcast authentication. These protocols can be applied in WSNs independently
tackling individual security problems to achieve different level of security. However,
deployed as a unified framework, they ensure a high degree of security with efficiency,
providing a single solution to all three authentication problems in WSNs. The
performance evaluation results showed that the proposed framework is the most
efficient solution when compared to the existing authentication schemes for WSNs,
giving a reasonable trade-off between security and efficiency.
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Part I

Chapter 1
Introduction
Chapter Overview: This chapter presents the scope of this
thesis. It briefly introduces wireless sensor networks, authen-
tication problems in wireless sensor networks and the adopted
approach to address the problems. The major contributions
made by this thesis are also highlighted in this chapter.
1.1 Wireless Sensor Networks
A wireless sensor network (WSN) is a wireless ad hoc network consisting of a large
number of small low cost devices called sensor nodes or motes. A sensor node is
a self-contained unit typically consisting of a battery, transceiver, micro-controller
and sensors. These sensor nodes are tiny resource constrained devices with the
limitations of low battery power and communication range and small computation
and storage capabilities. They are usually deployed in open environments where they
collaboratively monitor the physical and environmental data such as temperature,
pressure, vibration etc., and report/relay the sensed data to other sensor nodes over
a wireless network. The final destination of this data is a base station also called
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a sink node which is a powerful device, e.g., a laptop. The base station acts as a
gateway and links the WSN to the outer network e.g., the Internet.
The recent advancements in embedded technologies as well as in wireless
communications have broadened the prospects for many applications of WSNs.
These applications include, but are not limited to, environmental monitoring, ocean
reading, forest fire alarm and military applications [ASSC02]. In some WSN
applications, the data collected by the sensor nodes is valuable for different types
of users such as research organizations, universities, businesses or individuals, called
outside users. The outside users of the sensor nodes data are usually equipped with
resourceful devices like notebooks, mobile phones etc., in order to query the sensor
nodes. Hence, a typical WSN scenario involves three entities: a base station, sensor
nodes and outside users as shown in Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1: A Wireless Sensor Network
1.2 Applications
The low cost and the immunity from cabling have become motivations for many
applications of WSNs [ASSC02, CK03, CES04, Xu02, Sto05, BHUW08, FHB+08,
APM05], for instance,
• Disaster handling: (Forest Fire Detection, Flood Detection, Earthquake
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Detection and Surveillance etc.)
Example (Forest Fire Detection): In a forest fire alarm application, the sensor
nodes are deployed in a forest to detect a fire event and inform authorities
about event and the exact location of event.
• Road safety: (Intelligent Traffic System)
Example: In a traffic application, the sensor nodes are deployed along the
roadside to monitor the status of a road and traffic on the road. These sensor
nodes sense an accident, a traffic jam or a dangerous road condition, such as
ice on the road, and alert other traffic approaching this location. A driver can
use the accident prevention service of this application to access data which
helps him to safely drive on the road. Whereas an insurance company or road
patrol can use the post-accident investigation service which is helpful for them
to judge the causes of an accident, for instance, a driver’s driving style at the
time of accident.
• Monitoring huge structures: (Structural Health Monitoring)
Example: In a structural health monitoring application, the sensor nodes are
intended to monitor the structural health of bridges, tunnels, huge buildings,
etc. The sensor nodes are assumed to monitor any damages or cracks in
structures and report them so that precautionary measures can be taken.
• Environmental monitoring:(Ocean Reading, Habitat Monitoring, Weather
Forecast, Monitoring Glacier Behavior, Precision Agriculture etc.)
Example (Ocean Reading): WSNs are deployed under the water for oceano-
graphic data collection, pollution monitoring, offshore exploration, disaster
prevention and assisted navigation. Underwater sensor networks also help
in detecting underwater oilfields or reservoirs, and assist in exploration for
valuable minerals.
• Healthcare: (Tracking and Monitoring Doctors and Patients inside a Hospital,
At-Home Health, Drug Administration, Elderly Care etc.)
Example (Elderly Care): This application aims to improve the life quality of
the elderly people through smart environments. It closely monitors changes in
a person’s vital signs and provides feedback to help maintain an optimal health
status. It can also alert medical personnel when life-threatening changes occur.
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• Military applications: (Enemy Tracking, Monitoring Enemy Forces, Equip-
ment and Ammunition, Detecting Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Attacks,
Battlefield Surveillance etc.)
Example (Enemy Tracking): In an enemy tracking application, the sensor
nodes are deployed in the battlefield to detect the presence and location
of enemy’s tanks, vehicles or personnels in the battlefield and track their
movements. The soldiers obtain this information from the sensor nodes which
helps them to safely position themselves in the battlefield.
1.3 Security Concerns
The popularity of WSNs has increased as potential low-cost cable-less solutions to a
variety of applications. For instance, a WSN is the best solution for the applications
of ocean reading, volcano monitoring, forest fire alarm, intelligent traffic system
and battlefield applications, where running wires or cabling is usually impractical
or too costly. However, the vulnerability of wireless communication and the ad-
hoc nature of deployment open the door for a wide variety of malicious attacks,
making security a key concern for these applications. In particular, the wireless
medium enables anyone to interrupt the in-channel communication. It compromises
the secure communication of the data collected by the sensor nodes which is an
important security requirement of the above mentioned applications of WSNs. On
the other hand, the resource constrained nature of sensor nodes, i.e., limited power,
computing and storage resources, does not allow to use complex security solutions
and raises a need for highly efficient security solutions for WSNs. This restriction
has significantly impacted the field of application security. For such applications, the
efficiency of a security scheme is as important as its security. Any security scheme
which is computationally expensive, no matter how secure it is, does not suit resource
constrained sensor nodes. Among the broad domain of security problems faced in
WSNs, this thesis focuses on authentication problems.
1.4 Authentication
Authentication is a process by which one verifies that someone is who he or she
claims to be. Authentication enables a receiver of a message to confirm the
• claimed message sender or origin of a message (source authentication),
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• contents of a message has not been modified (message integrity/authentication).
Based on types of communication, authentication may be classified as follows:
• Unicast or point-to-point authentication, where an entity authenticates
itself to a single entity.
• Multicast authentication, where an entity authenticates itself to a small group
of entities.
• Broadcast authentication, where an entity authenticates itself to all entities
in the network.
1.4.1 Authentication in Wireless Sensor Networks
Beneson [BGK04] distinguished between the insider security and the outsider
security in WSNs as follows:
• Insider security addresses secure communication between the sensors and
between the sensors and the base station(s).
• Outsider security addresses secure communication between the WSN (sensors
and base station) and the outside user.
Authentication is a crucial security requirement in WSNs which is a part of both
insider and outsider security. In the absence of a strong authentication mechanism,
an adversary can frequently generate dummy data packets and make the sensor
nodes relay them to deplete their energy. Moreover, a fake or modified message can
cause the sensor nodes to accept wrong information and may result in serious attacks
against the sensor network. For example, it is important for the base station to send
some crucial information, like the current time for synchronization, to all sensor
nodes in the network. An adversary can modify a time synchronization message or
send forged data to desynchronize the network or to disturb the receiver’s clock. A
countermeasure to this kind of attacks is authentication. Authentication in a typical
WSN can be classified into three categories as follows:
• Base station to sensor nodes authentication
• Sensor nodes to other sensor nodes authentication
• Outside users to sensor nodes authentication
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The base station to sensor nodes authentication has been widely addressed by
the current authentication schemes for WSNs [PST+02, LN04, LNZJ05, DG06,
CKDZ08]. Therefore, we focus on the other two authentication problems of
the sensor nodes to other sensor nodes authentication and the outside user to
sensor nodes authentication. This thesis only deals with the broadcast/multicast
authentication since the typical point-to-point or pairwise authentication in WSNs
have been studied in detail. In the fist authentication problem, the sensor nodes
need to authenticate their messages to either a set of sensor nodes or all sensor nodes
in the network. However, in the second authentication problem, the outside users
authenticate themselves to a set of sensor nodes (in their communication range) only
and not all sensor nodes in the network. Any solution to broadcast authentication
can also be used to address multicast authentication problem in WSNs. Therefore,
broadcast and multicast are treated in the same way in first authentication problem
and referred as broadcast in rest of the thesis.
1.4.1.1 Sensor Nodes Broadcast Authentication
Sensor nodes are usually applied over an area for the purpose of collecting some data
or monitoring a critical phenomenon. Whenever a sensor node detects a critical event
which needs attention, it informs all other sensor nodes (broadcast message) or a
group of sensor nodes (multicast message) in the sensor network. These broadcast
and multicast messages can be treated in the same way in WSNs. Provision of
broadcast authentication in sensor networks is a much harder task than provision
of pairwise authentication. The reason is the constrained resources available at
sensor nodes. On the other hand, secure broadcast of messages by the sensor
nodes is an essential security requirement in WSNs. This feature is compulsory
for many attractive applications in civilian and military operations, such as forest
fire alarm and enemy tracking. Unfortunately, the problem of sensor nodes broadcast
authentication has not gained attention by the existing research work so far. To the
best of our knowledge, our work is the first one to identify and address this problem
and propose a solution for it.
1.4.1.2 Outside User Authentication
Sensor nodes usually collect a variety of data. The data collected by the sensor nodes
is of interest to different types of users such as research organizations, universities,
businesses or individuals. For example, the humidity level in an area might be
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a useful piece of information for a farmer. An individual may be interested to
know about the weather in his surroundings. A researcher may be interested in
environmental data collected by the sensor nodes. An oil company might be keen to
obtain ocean reading data. On the other hand, the deployment and maintenance cost
of a large scale WSN makes it difficult for everyone to deploy own sensor networks
to collect data of their interests. The users of the sensor nodes data, thus, pay the
deployment agencies of the large scale WSNs to obtain this data. Therefore, owners
and users of the networks are different for some large scale WSNs. NOPP (National
Oceanographic Partnership Program) [NOP] is an example of such large scale WSNs
to observe earth, ocean and atmosphere. Hence, the sensor nodes data in these large
scale WSNs is valuable and only the subscribed users, who have paid for the data,
are allowed to obtain it. Apart from these commercial applications, there are many
army applications which gather sensitive and confidential data which should be
accessible to authorized army officers and soldiers only. These facts raise the issue
of authentication of a legitimate user in WSNs. User authentication is a process by
which the system verifies the identity of a user who wants to access the sensor nodes
data. A user authentication mechanism is necessary to prevent unauthorized users
from accessing sensor nodes data. Providing a secure user access to sensor nodes
data requires two basic tasks:
1. Authentication allows only legitimate users of the data to access it.
2. Session Key Establishment enables secure transmission of confidential sensor
nodes data to users after authentication.
As a part of this research, we aim to address the problems of user authentication
and session key establishment under the heading of outside user authentication.
1.5 Scope and Adopted Approach
To address the above mentioned authentication problems, this thesis proposes an
authentication framework for WSNs using identity (ID) based signature schemes.
The proposed framework is comprised of two authentication protocols; authenticated
broadcast by sensor nodes protocol to address the problem of sensor nodes broadcast
authentication and outside user authentication protocol to provide a secure user
access to sensor nodes data. The aim of this research work is to design efficient and
secure authentication protocols to address the authentication problems in WSNs.
The proposed authentication framework is discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
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1.6 Research Questions
More specifically, this thesis is concerned to answer the following research questions:
• How useful is the proposed authentication framework in aiding secure commu-
nication in wireless sensor networks?
– How useful are the ID-based signatures to handle the authentication
problems in wireless sensor networks?
– To what extent is the proposed authentication framework able to
handle the problem of sensor nodes broadcast authentication, a problem
neglected by the existing security solutions?
– What are the advantages of the proposed solution to user authentication
over the existing solutions for same the problem.
• Has the proposed authentication framework improved the performance and
security over the existing solutions?
– Is the proposed solution of sensor nodes broadcast authentication problem
efficient and secure?
– Is the proposed solution of user authentication problem more efficient
than the existing solutions as well as secure?
• To what extent does the proposed authentication framework support scalabil-
ity and dynamism, the two required features of security schemes for wireless
sensor networks?
– Does it support large scale sensor networks?
– Does it allow adding/removing sensor nodes and users to/from sensor
networks?
These questions are investigated in detail in this thesis. The security of the
different components of the proposed framework is analyzed formally and informally.
In addition, the experiments are performed on the actual sensor nodes to measure
the efficiency statistics. The experimental results show the performance advantages
of the proposed framework over the existing solutions while providing scalability
and dynamism.
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1.7 Thesis Contribution
This thesis makes the following main contributions:
1. Proposes an authentication framework for WSNs using ID-based signature
schemes which is comprised of two components: sensor nodes broadcast
authentication and outside user authentication.
2. Highlights for the first time the need of authenticated broadcast by sensor
nodes and gives a solution to the problem in the form of a sensor nodes
broadcast authentication protocol.
3. Proposes for the first time to use ID-based Online/Oﬄine signature schemes
in WSNs to provide authentication. Online/Oﬄine signatures, described in
next chapter, are used to provide sensor nodes broadcast authentication in
this work.
4. Implements for the first time several ID-based Online/Oﬄine signature
schemes, a cryptographic primitive new to sensor nodes devices, on real sensor
nodes and evaluates their performance.
5. Securely modifies an ID-based signature scheme to obtain an efficient ID-
based Online/Oﬄine signature scheme for WSNs and implements two different
variations of it for further efficiency improvement.
6. Designs a new secure and efficient cryptographic ID-based one-pass authenti-
cated session key establishment protocol mainly for WSNs.
7. Formally analyzes the security of the newly designed cryptographic ID-based
one-pass session key establishment protocol as well as its performance.
8. Proposes a user authentication protocol which, as compared to the existing
user authentication protocols, not only authenticates the users but also
establishes a session key between the user and the sensor node after successful
user authentication.
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1.8 Overview and Structure
Part I
The first part of the thesis is an introductory part which discusses the scope of the
thesis, some background knowledge and a literature survey of the existing work.
• Chapter 1 has given an overview of the scope of this research thesis after
introducing WSNs and the authentication problems faced in WSNs. It has also
described our adopted approach to provide a solution, i.e., an authentication
framework, and an outline of the major contributions made by this thesis.
• Chapter 2 provides background knowledge about the security problems and
requirements in a WSN together with the constraints in WSNs. It also
introduces the cryptographic terminologies, primitives and approaches used
in this thesis.
• Chapter 3 provides a brief literature survey of the security solutions that have
been proposed to handle authentication problems in WSNs and highlights their
shortcomings which become motivations for this research work.
Part II
To address the shortcomings identified by the survey of existing authentication
schemes, an authentication framework is proposed for WSNs in this thesis. The
second part of the thesis focuses on the proposed authentication framework by
introducing it and describing its both authentication protocols in detail and
concludes the thesis in the end.
• Chapter 4 introduces the proposed authentication framework after highlighting
the motivations behind this work. It also describes the security goals of the
proposed framework, threat model and trust model used by the proposed
framework together with the assumptions made by it.
• Chapter 5 discusses the first authentication protocol in detail that is the
authenticated broadcast by sensor nodes protocol. The details of security and
performance evaluations of this protocol are also given in this chapter which
include the details of experiments to evaluate the online/oﬄine signatures on
sensor nodes, the modification of an ID-based signature scheme to an ID-based
online/oﬄine signature scheme and the security of online/oﬄine signature
schemes.
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• Chapter 6 discusses the second authentication protocol in detail that is the
outside user authentication protocol. The details of security and performance
evaluations of this protocol are also described in this chapter which include the
formal security analysis of the newly designed cryptographic ID-based one-pass
session key establishment protocol and its performance evaluation.
• Chapter 7 concludes the thesis by presenting an overview of the contributions
made by this research work. It also suggests the possible directions for future
research.
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Chapter 2
Security and Cryptography: A
Background
Chapter Overview: This chapter describes several background
concepts necessary for the understanding of this thesis. The
first part of the chapter presents an overview of wireless sensor
networks security including security objectives, types of attackers
and security attacks in wireless sensor networks. It also
highlights the constraints in wireless sensor networks which are
barriers to provide security. The second part of the chapter
reviews the cryptographic tools, primitives and notions and
describes the computational assumptions used in this thesis.
2.1 Security in Wireless Sensor Networks
The particular characteristics of WSNs offer an advantage to any adversary who
intends to compromise security. For instance, the sensor nodes use radio-link
as a communication medium which is in fact insecure. The broadcast nature of
13
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communication medium makes WSNs more vulnerable to security attacks than wired
networks. On the other hand, provision of security in WSNs is a challenging task
since the resources in sensor nodes devices are not sufficient for executing complex
security protocols. This section reviews the particular characteristics of a WSN and
security concerns in a typical WSN.
2.1.1 Characteristics of Wireless Sensor Networks
A WSN can be seen as a special case of ad hoc networks. A wireless ad hoc network
is the one which does not rely on a fixed infrastructure, such as routers or access
points. Instead, the nodes in an ad hoc network organize themselves on the fly to
provide pathways for data to be routed from other nodes. They do not have a fixed
topology. The routing decisions in an ad hoc network are made dynamically based on
the network connectivity. WSNs share some common features with ad hoc networks,
such as they have random network topology and infrastructure-less architecture.
Besides, sensor networks possess some characteristics which are different from ad
hoc networks and traditional wired and wireless networks. The following are the
main characteristics of WSNs.
• Resource limitation: Typical sensor nodes are usually tiny resource constrained
devices who have very limited computational capability, storage capacity,
communication bandwidth and on-board energy available. In general, the
sensor nodes are significantly more resource constrained devices than typical
mobile devices. The battery power is the most scarce resource in sensor nodes
among other resources. It is a usual assumption about sensor nodes that
once they are deployed, their batteries cannot be replaced or recharged since
the sensor nodes are often inaccessible. Thus, the lifetime of a sensor node
depends on the lifetime of its battery. Table 2.1 shows the specifications of
a few commercially available sensor nodes (MICA2 [MIC], Tmote Sky [Tmo],
SmartPoint [Sma]).
• Nature of deployment: In order to achieve the highly accurate sensing results,
the sensor nodes are usually densely deployed with certain level of redundancy.
The number of sensor nodes in a sensor network may be several orders
of magnitude higher than the nodes in an ad hoc network. Sensor nodes
are usually scattered randomly in inaccessible environments where they self-
organize into an infra-structureless network.
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Mica2 T-mote Sky SmartPoint
(Crossbow) (Moteiv) (Ambient System)
Processor 8MHz 8MHz 16MHz
RAM 4KB 10KB 10KB
Flash 128KB 48KB 1MB
Data Rate 40Kbps 250Kbps 250Kbps
Range 100m 50-125m 50m
Frequency 2.4GHz 2.4GHz 2.4GHz
Battery 2×AA batteries 2×AA batteries 2×AAA batteries
Table 2.1: Commercially available sensor nodes
• Unattended after deployment: The WSNs are usually deployed in an open air
environment where they are left unattended without a constant supervision.
This fact allows easy physical access for anyone to the sensor nodes. Moreover,
most often WSNs operate in harsh and even hostile environments, such as
extreme weather and natural disasters, that may affect their performance.
• Dynamic network topology: The sensor network topology is unknown prior to
the deployment. Moreover, the sensor nodes fail due to depletion of energy or
physical damage and new nodes are added to the network. Node addition and
node failure make the network topology dynamic.
• Communication: A sensor node usually has a limited communication range
and every node may not be in direct communication range of the base station.
Therefore, the sensor nodes send their collected data through intermediate
nodes to the nodes closer to the base station who ultimately forward the data
to the base station. Hence, the sensor nodes do not only collect data but also
relay data for other nodes that are further away from the base station. The
communication paradigm in WSNs is mainly broadcast where a message sent
by a sensor node can be received by everyone in the communication range.
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2.1.2 Security Goals
The goal of security services in WSNs is to protect information (authenticity,
verification, integrity, confidentiality, access control, and freshness) and resources
(availability) from attacks and misbehavior in the presence of a resourceful adversary.
Authentication enables each message sender in the sensor network, including
the base station, sensor nodes and outside users, to prove its identity to the receiver,
i.e., the legitimacy of the source of a message. It allows the receiver of the message
to check that received messages are actually originated from the claimed source.
Message Integrity verifies the genuineness of the received message contents.
It must be implemented to ensure a receiver that the contents of received message
have not been modified in transit by an adversary.
Verification empowers each sensor node in the network to attest the legitimacy
of the received message. It is important to note that authentication does not
imply verification in WSN environment. A legitimate message sender may send an
authenticated message to the sensor nodes, however, the sensor nodes may not have
access to authentication information of the message sender or may not be capable
of performing efficiently the computation that is required to verify authentication
information. This capability is ensured by the verification property in WSNs which
enables sensor nodes to verify authenticated messages. Verification can be seen as
a counterpart of authentication where authentication presents the proof of identity
and verification implies the ability to attest the proof of identity. In sensor networks,
it is essential for all three entities to have the ability to confirm that the message
received was actually sent by a trusted sender and not by an adversary.
Freshness means that a received message is new and a recent one. Freshness
could mean both data freshness and key freshness. Data freshness implies that the
received data is recent and it ensures that no adversary has replayed old messages.
Key freshness implies that the session key established between the two parties in
each session is fresh and it is unique for each session.
Confidentiality prevents unauthorized parties or adversaries from accessing the
data being sent to the authorized parties. The confidentiality objective is required
in WSNs environment to protect data traveling between the sensor nodes, between
the sensor nodes and the base station, and between the sensor nodes and the outside
users from disclosure. A confidential message should not reveal its contents to an
eavesdropper.
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Access Control ensures that only the authorized sensor nodes are involved
in providing information to network services and only an authorized user obtains a
certain type of data according to his access privileges. User access control is required
in those applications of WSNs which collect a variety of data. For such applications,
the users have different access privileges for different types of data due to the data
security and privacy reasons.
Availability ensures the survivability of sensor network services to authorized
parties when needed despite the presence of internal or external attacks.
2.1.3 Attackers and Security Attacks
2.1.3.1 Attackers
• Mote Class VS Laptop Class. Depending on the resource capabilities, an
attacker in WSNs may be categorized in either mote class or a laptop class.
A mote class adversary uses a similar mote (sensor node) to launch attacks
against the sensor networks and is less powerful in terms of resources with
fewer capabilities. A Laptop class adversary, on the other hand, uses a more
powerful device (e.g., a laptop) with higher resource and processing capabilities
than the network nodes in order to attack a WSN.
• Insider VS Outsider. A further classification within the above two classes
is based on the access level. An adversary may be insider or outsider. An
insider adversary is the one who becomes a part of the sensor network, e.g.,
by compromising the legitimate sensor nodes or adding his own sensor nodes
to the network. The insider adversary is a big threat as it has direct access
to the network. The outsider adversary, on the contrary, does not belong to a
WSN and has no or less direct access to the sensor network.
2.1.3.2 Major Security Attacks
An attack can be defined as an action taken to harm a resource of value such
as data in case of WSNs. The need of security solutions comes mainly from
possible attacks. If there are no attacks, there is no need for security schemes.
Usually, the probability of attacks within the WSNs is higher than in any other
type of network due to the unique nature of WSNs. Attacks against WSNs may be
categorized as passive versus active attacks. Passive attacks include eavesdropping
on or monitoring the communication exchanged within a WSN. Active attacks, on
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the other hand, involve some modifications of the actual data or insertion of the false
data into the communication channel. This section lists the major attacks against
WSNs described in [CP03, PSW04, WAR06, DC08].
• Attacks Against Privacy: A privacy attack is aimed at obtaining confidential
or valuable information.
– Eavesdropping. Since radio links are insecure, an adversary having
the appropriate equipment may easily eavesdrop on the communication
to obtain sensor nodes data (see Figure 2.1). By eavesdropping, the
adversary can also overhear other secret information such as user queries
and routing information. The adversary may use this information for
malicious purposes, for instance, to know the interests of his business
competitors from their queries to the sensor network. Furthermore, by
stealing routing information the adversary can launch attacks against
routing protocols.
Figure 2.1: Attacks Against Privacy
– Traffic Monitoring. If user queries to the sensor network are encrypted,
adversary can not know them. However, by monitoring the traffic flow
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(Figure 2.1), he can guess the nature of queries. He can also find out the
location of the base station by monitoring traffic. The ultimate goal of
the adversary is to launch attacks against base station to make the base
station unavailable.
Countermeasures to these attacks are data encryption which hides the
communication contents, and bogus traffic which deceives traffic monitoring.
• Attacks Against Data Aggregation:
– False Data Injection. During the data aggregation process, an intruder
can add fake sensor readings by injecting data packets or alter original
sensor readings by modifying the packets. It can affect the overall data
aggregation results as shown in Figure 2.2. A countermeasure to this
attack is authentication which prevents from injecting fake data packets
or modifying packet contents.
Figure 2.2: Attack Against Data Aggregation
– Message Replay Attack. A replay of a data message originally sent by
a legitimate sensor node will have the same effect on data aggregation
process as the above mentioned attack. A countermeasure to avoid a
message replay attack is to ensure the freshness of data, for instance, via
attaching a timestamp with each message.
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• Impersonation Attack: This attack is an attempt by the adversary to deceive
sensor nodes by impersonating a legitimate sensor node or an outside user
(Figure 2.3). The ultimate goal of this attack is to send fake messages on
behalf of a legitimate sensor node or obtain sensor nodes data on behalf of a
legitimate user.
Figure 2.3: Impersonation Attack
• DoS Attack or Spam Attack: The Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack or spam
attack is an attempt to make a system or a service unavailable. One example
of DoS attacks is making the base station unavailable. In this DoS attack,
the attacker frequently generates dummy data packets (spams) and makes
sensor nodes relay them towards the base station as shown in Figure 2.4. The
ultimate purpose of the attacker is to deplete the battery power of the sensor
nodes closer to the base station. The nodes closer to the base station fail sooner
because they relay more data packets than other nodes. This causes the base
station to be disconnected from the sensor network and hence, unavailable.
There are also other types of DoS attacks, for example, the one against
the sensor nodes storage. In this attack, the attacker forces sensor nodes
to store fake packets and run out of storage. The wireless communication
medium makes it much easier for an adversary to launch a DoS attack. A
countermeasure to most of the DoS attacks is authentication which blocks
spams or fake data packets.
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Figure 2.4: Denial of Service Attack
• Attacks Against Routing Protocols:
– Hello Flood Attack. After the deployment of a WSN, the topology
discovery phase starts. In topology discovery phase, the sensor nodes
send HELLO messages to present themselves to neighboring nodes. This
helps sensor nodes to find their neighbor nodes and build their routing
tables. In hello flood attack, the attacker uses a powerful transmitter
and gives fake information about his location. The attacker pretends to
be a neighbor node to those sensor nodes who are actually far from the
attacker. Because of the signal strength, the sensor nodes accept attacker
as their neighbor node (Figure 2.5). The intention behind this attack is
to disrupt the topology discovery process of sensor nodes.
Figure 2.5: Hello Flood Attack
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– Sinkhole Attack. In sinkhole attack, the attacker gives the wrong routing
information to the sensor nodes in order to route all or nearly all traffic
via an intruder node as shown in Figure 2.6. In this way, the adversary
obtains a control over the whole communication in the network. Sinkhole
can result into a variety of other attacks such as selective forwarding.
Figure 2.6: Sinkhole Attack together with Selective Forwarding Attack
– Selective Forwarding Attack, Black Hole Attack. In selective forwarding
attack, an intruder node selectively drops some of the packets routed via
it and forwards the rest, as described by Figure 2.6. The intruder node
does not drop all packets to lower the risk of being detected otherwise
the surrounding nodes may conclude the intruder as a dead node. If all
the packets are dropped by the intruder node, the attack is called a black
hole attack.
– Wormhole Attack. In this attack, the adversary uses an out of band low
latency channel between two parts of the sensor network, which are in
fact not close to each other, to route traffic. The sensor nodes, that are
far from the base station, mark this route in their routing tables as the
preferred (shortest) route to reach the base station. Figure 2.7 describes
how a wormhole attack works. The wormhole attack can create a sinkhole
where all traffic is routed via the intruder nodes considering them as the
shortest routes. The aim of this attack is to pretend to be a node closer
to the base station presenting a shortest path to the base station.
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Figure 2.7: Wormhole Attack
– Sybil Attack. In this attack, a single intruder node adopts multiple
identities as shown in Figure 2.8. Consequently, an intruder node with
multiple identities presents multiple paths passing through the single
physical node. Sybil attack can also result in different attacks such as a
sinkhole attack.
Figure 2.8: Sybil Attack
– Replication or Clone Attack. This attack is the one in which one or more
intruder nodes copy the identity of an existing legitimate node. As a
result, there are more than one sensor node in the network having the
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same identity, as shown by Figure 2.9. This attack enables the replicated
intruder nodes to impersonate the legitimate sensor node and participate
in network communication on behalf of the legitimate node.
Figure 2.9: Replication or Clone Attack
A countermeasure to attacks against routing protocols is the ability of the sensor
nodes to accept routing information only from the legitimate entities in the network,
for example, the base station or other legitimate sensor nodes. It ultimately arises
the need of authentication. Secure authenticated routing protocols are also required
to avoid routing via intruder nodes.
2.1.4 Constraints in Wireless Sensor Networks
A wireless sensor network is a special type of network which presents more
constraints than the traditional wired and other wireless networks. These constraints
make it impossible to employ the existing strong but complex security solutions to
the WSNs. In order to design efficient and useful security mechanisms for WSNs, it
is important to understand the constraints in WSNs. These constraints are:
• Resource Limitations: The primary challenge of security in WSNs is max-
imizing security while minimizing resource consumption. The resources in
this context include energy (battery power), processing (CPU cycles), storage
(memory) and the communication bandwidth.
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– Limited amount of energy. WSNs operate under very strict energy
constraints (available energy usually 2×AA batteries). Hence, security
needs to limit the energy consumption to maximize the life of the
individual node as well as the entire network lifetime.
– Limited processing capability. Sensor nodes processors are very slow
(up to few MHz) and they do not support some arithmetic and logic
operations. Hence, they cannot perform very complex cryptographic
operations.
– Limited storage capability. The memory available for security is very low
(only a few KBs). This requires that any security scheme designed for
sensor networks should consume as less memory as possible.
– Limited bandwidth. Wireless links have low communication bandwidth.
The security schemes should consume as little bandwidth as possible.
• Unattended Operations: The sensor networks are usually deployed in an
environment open to adversary. The unattended operations of sensor networks
after deployment provides an adversary with a greater access to the sensor
nodes than the typical PCs located in a secure place. The fact that the sensor
nodes are not equipped with tamper resistant devices provides a complete
freedom to an adversary in compromising a sensor node and obtaining all data
and security material stored on it. Therefore, a security scheme should still
protect against possible attacks, even if a few sensor nodes are compromised.
• Nature of Deployment: The topology of the sensor network is not known
prior to the deployment. Hence, the security schemes cannot benefit from
the knowledge of neighboring nodes. Moreover, ad hoc deployment implies no
maintenance or battery replacement after deployment which results into node
failures. A security scheme should continue to provide services even in the
presence of nodes failure.
• Unreliable Communication: Another serious problem to sensor network
security is unreliable communication. Due to unreliable communication, the
packets in sensor network may drop or get corrupted and latency is high.
Broadcast communication paradigm is another difficulty for security in WSNs.
The wireless communication medium makes it much easier for an adversary to
launch a DoS attack against any security scheme.
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2.2 Cryptography
One essential aspect of security is that of cryptography which is necessary for
secure communications. Cryptography does not only protect data from stealing
or alterations but also provides necessary authentication. This section describes in
detail the cryptographic concepts, notions and primitives used in this thesis.
2.2.1 Notations and Conventions
We let denote {0, 1}∗ the set of finite binary strings of arbitrary length and {0, 1}k
the set of binary strings of length k. Let G denotes a group containing a set of points
under a certain group operation and Fp denotes a finite field of integers modulo a
prime number p. Zn denotes a set of integers modulo n which forms a finite additive
group of n elements. We define Z∗n to be the subset of Zn containing elements
relatively prime to n which forms a finite multiplicative group. For instance, Z∗10 =
{1, 3, 7, 9} [Mao03]. If n is prime, then Z∗n = Zn\ {0}. If Z is a finite set, then t ∈R Z
denotes that t was chosen from Z uniformly at random.
An algorithm which runs in polynomial time is called a polynomial time
algorithm. The output of a deterministic algorithm is always unique whereas that of
a probabilistic algorithm is a random variable. The adversary Ad is computationally
bounded with some limitations. In fact, the adversary is a probabilistic polynomial
time (PPT) algorithm. A security parameter k for a cryptographic algorithm is
typically length of the key used by the algorithm. The success probability of an
adversary is formalized as too small to matter, i.e., a negligible function of the
security parameter k. A function (k) (usually a probability function) is negligible,
if it approaches zero faster than the reciprocal of any polynomial p expressed in
terms of k, for large enough k, i.e., (k) ≤ 1
p(k)
. Informally, it implies that the
probability of an event is negligible if the event happens with a probability less than
the inverse of any polynomial expressed in k. A reverse of the negligible function is
the non-negligible function.
2.2.2 Cryptographic Primitives for Authentication
The two cryptographic primitives usually used for authentication in WSNs are:
• Message Authentication Code
• Digital Signature
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2.2.2.1 Message Authentication Code
A Message Authentication Code (MAC) [BCK96] is a symmetric key cryptography
based primitive to provide message authentication. In order to protect a message
M via a MAC, the sender and the verifier(s) first need to share a secret key, known
as MAC key. The message sender then generates the MAC value of M by passing
M through an algorithm, similar to a hash function, called MAC algorithm. A
MAC algorithm takes two inputs, a message M and a MAC key K, and outputs a
MAC value, i.e., MAC = MACK(M). The message M together with the MAC
value is sent to the verifier(s). To authenticate a message, a verifier uses the same
MAC algorithm and the shared MAC key and generates a MAC value of the received
message. The computed MAC value and the received MAC value are then compared
against each other to authenticate the message. Figure 2.10 shows how MACs work.
Figure 2.10: Message Authentication Code
The security of a MAC lies in the secret shared MAC key K. Given M and
MAC, it is hard to find K. Without MAC key, one cannot generate a correct MAC,
and thus messages that look authentic. A MAC is efficient and fast to compute
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on sensor nodes and reduces the memory consumption. However, it cannot provide
source authentication in broadcast scenario where the same MAC key is shared
among more than one sender and one verifier to generate and verify MAC values.
2.2.2.2 Digital Signature
A digital signature [RSA78] is a public key cryptography (PKC) based primitive to
ensure authentication. Digital signatures provide a method to assure that a message
in fact originates from the person who claims to have generated the message (source
authentication) and the contents of the message have not been altered in transit
(message authentication or integrity). In contrast to a single shared MAC key, each
user now owns a matched pair of private and public keys. The private key is kept
secret by the user whereas the public key is made available to everyone. A message
signer creates a signature for a message using his private key whereas a message
verifier verifies the signature for the message using the signer’s public key. Thus,
a digital signature scheme provides a way to sign a message so that the signature
can be verified publicly by anyone. Other than public and private key pair, every
user owns a certificate. A certificate is an electronic document which associates a
user’s identity with his public key in public key cryptography settings. A certificate
is usually issued by a trusted Certificate Authority (CA) and is digitally signed by
the CA. It usually contains identity information of the user it identifies, his public
key, expiry date and other information. Certificates help to prevent the use of fake
public keys for impersonation.
Figure 2.11: Digital Signature
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The security of a digital signature lies in the secrecy of the signing key (private
key). The intuitive security notion for digital signatures is the impossibility to forge
a user’s signature without the knowledge of his private key. Figure 2.11 illustrates
the use of digital signatures.
2.2.3 ID-based Signature
In 1984, Shamir introduced a novel type of public key cryptography named
as Identity-based cryptography or ID-based cryptography [Sha85] to replace the
traditional certificate based public key cryptography. Implementing the traditional
public key cryptography based signature schemes have the following requirements
which do not suit WSNs environment:
1. Managing the public key infrastructure (PKI) is cumbersome (particularly in
a WSN environment).
2. Public keys should be stored on each receiver to verify signed messages
(increased storage overhead).
3. To avoid storage overhead, signed certificates can be sent along with the signed
message to obtain public keys (increased transmission overhead).
4. Receivers should validate the signed certificate before using public key
(increased computation overhead).
In contrast to certificate based public key cryptography, ID-based cryptography
replaces a user’s public key with his unique public identifier (ID), such as email
address, phone number, physical IP address etc., which uniquely identifies him. The
corresponding private key is generated by a private key generator (PKG), a trusted
third party. The PKG generates a master secret key msk and a master public
key mpk (called Setup phase). The PKG then computes the private keys for users
corresponding to their IDs by using the msk (called Key Extract phase). The users
obtain their private keys and other system parameters from the PKG via a secure
channel. ID-based cryptography allows anyone to generate others’ public key (public
information) from a known ID information without a certificate. Consequently,
the ID-based cryptography dismisses the need for certificate transmission and
verification to obtain the public keys and, hence, reduces the transmission and the
processing costs. For these reasons, we choose to use ID-based signature schemes to
ensure authentication in our proposed framework.
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In an ID-based Signature (IBS) scheme, a message signed using a signer’s private
key is verified using his ID information, as shown in Figure 2.12.
Figure 2.12: ID-based Signature
Definition 2.1. An IBS scheme consists of four algorithms as follows:
1. System Setup (SS): Given a security parameter 1k, it outputs a master
secret key SKPKG and system parameters SP .
2. Key Extract (KE): Given a user’s identity IDi and the master secret key
SKPKG, it outputs a corresponding private key DIDi, i.e.,
DIDi ← KE(IDi, SKPKG).
3. Signature Generation (Sign): Given a message m and a signing key DIDi,
it outputs a signature σ, i.e.,
σ ← Sign(m, DIDi).
4. Signature Verification (Verify): Given a message m, user’s identity IDi,
a signature σ and system parameters SP , it returns 1 if the signature is valid
or 0 if not. Namely,
0/1← V erify(m, IDi, σ, SP ).
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2.2.4 ID-based Online/Oﬄine Signature
The notion of Online/Oﬄine Signature (OOS) was first introduced by Even,
Goldreich, and Micali [EGM90]. An online/oﬄine signature is a special case of
a digital signature which divides the process of message signing into two phases,
the oﬄine phase and the online phase. The oﬄine phase is performed before the
message to be signed becomes available. To achieve performance efficiency, the
most complex computations of signature generation process are performed in the
oﬄine phase. The partial signature obtained as a result of these computations
is known as the oﬄine signature. Once the message to be signed is known, the
online phase starts. In this phase, the oﬄine signature computed during the oﬄine
phase is retrieved and some minor quick computations are performed to obtain the
final signature of the message. The online phase computations are supposed to be
very efficient and fast. Since the oﬄine phase computations are independent of
the message to be signed, they can be performed by any other resourceful device.
The online/oﬄine signature schemes are particularly useful for resource constrained
application environments, for instance smart card applications and WSNs. In WSNs,
an online/oﬄine signature scheme enables a resource constrained sensor node to sign
a message as soon as possible, once it has some critical event to report due to the
efficient online phase.
A categorization of online/oﬄine signature schemes is direct and indirect
online/oﬄine signature schemes. The first type of online/oﬄine signature scheme
takes a message and directly signs it in two phases without the involvement of any
other signature scheme, for instance the online/oﬄine signature scheme described
in [XMS05]. The indirect online/oﬄine signature scheme, on the other hand,
takes a signature scheme which is not an online/oﬄine signature scheme and
provides a way to convert this signature scheme into an online/oﬄine signature
scheme, for instance the online/oﬄine signature scheme described in [RMS08]. The
online/oﬄine signature scheme of [RMS08] also represents a class of online/oﬄine
signature schemes which allows to securely reuse the same partial oﬄine signature
to sign more than one message.
An ID-based Online/Oﬄine Signature (IBOOS) scheme is an ID-based version
of online/oﬄine signature scheme which signs a message in two phases: an Oﬄine
phase and an Online phase, as shown in Figure 2.13.
Definition 2.2. An IBOOS scheme consists of five algorithms as follows:
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Figure 2.13: ID-based Online/Oﬄine Signature
1. System Setup (SS): Given a security parameter 1k, it outputs a master
secret key SKPKG and system parameters SP .
2. Key Extract (KE): Given a user’s identity IDi and the master secret key
SKPKG, it outputs a corresponding private key DIDi, i.e.,
DIDi ← KE(IDi, SKPKG).
3. Oﬄine Signing (OffSign): Given a signing key DIDi
1 and system
parameters SP , it outputs an oﬄine signature S, i.e.,
S ← OffSign(DIDi , SP ).
4. Online Signing (OnSign): Given a message m and an oﬄine signature S,
it outputs an online signature σ, i.e.,
σ ← OnSign(m,S).
1In some IBOOS schemes, the signing key is used in online phase rather than in oﬄine phase
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5. Signature Verification (Verify): Given a message m, user’s identity IDi,
a signature σ and system parameters SP , it returns 1 if the signature is valid
and 0 if not. Namely,
0/1← V erify(m, IDi, σ, SP ).
2.2.5 Cryptosystems Used
Before we give examples of some IBS and IBOOS schemes, we describe the
cryptosystems used by these schemes as well as by other cryptographic schemes
in our thesis in order to understand these schemes.
2.2.5.1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography
The Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is said to be ideal for implementing public
key cryptography on resource-constrained systems. The reason behind is the fact
that for the same level of security ECC permits shorter key sizes than other types
of public key cryptography. In particular, ECC uses a considerably shorter key size
and offers the same level of security as RSA offers using much larger ones. A 160-bit
key in ECC is determined to have the same level of security as a 1024-bit key in
RSA. Because of its smaller key size, ECC outperforms RSA on 8-bit processors
[GPW+04] and results in less power consumption and higher speed.
An elliptic curve E is defined in a standard, two dimensional x, y coordinate
system by an equation of the form y2 = x3 + ax + b, where 4a3 + 27b2 6= 0. In this
equation, x and y are variables and a and b are constants. These quantities (x, y, a
and b) are not necessarily real numbers, instead they may be values from any finite
field (F). An example of a finite field is integers modulo a prime number p, i.e., Fp.
All points of the form (x, y) which satisfy the above equation plus a point at infinity
O lie on the elliptic curve. The set of points on an elliptic curve forms a group G
under a certain addition rule, written as +. The point O is the identity element of
the group. A group G generated by a point P will be {O,P, P + P, P + P + P, ...}.
The point P is called the generator of G. The order of a group is the number of
elements in the group. The order of a point P is the least positive integer n such
that nP = O, where nP denotes n times addition of P .
Point multiplication is simply the multiplication of a scalar k with any point
P on the elliptic curve to obtain another point Q on the same curve such that
Q = kP . It is the main cryptographic operation in ECC based cryptographic
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schemes. The point multiplication is achieved by two basic elliptic curve operations,
point doubling (e.g., 2P ) and point addition (e.g., 2P+P ), and is feasible to compute
by the sensor nodes [GPW+04]. The point multiplication operation itself is fairly
simple and possible to compute, however, its inverse called the elliptic curve discrete
logarithm is very difficult to compute and is thought to be intractable. It is defined
as: given two points P and Q on an elliptic curve, where Q = kP for some random
unknown integer k, compute the value of k. The security of ECC based schemes
depends on the hardness of elliptic curve discrete logarithm (ECDL) problem. The
ID-based signature schemes we will use to evaluate our authentication protocols are
based on elliptic curve cryptography.
2.2.5.2 Pairing Based Cryptography
The Pairing Based Cryptography (PBC) is a class of elliptic curve cryptosystem,
but have very different features than the conventional elliptic curve cryptosystem.
PBC revolves around the idea of construction of a mapping between two useful
cryptographic groups. A pairing function is a computable map satisfying certain spe-
cial properties which allows the construction of interesting cryptographic schemes,
particularly ID-based schemes.
A pairing function eˆ maps a pair of typically elliptic curve points to an element
of the multiplicative group of a finite field and is of the form eˆ : G1×G2 → GT . Here
G1 and G2 are the two cyclic groups of prime order q written in additive notation
(+) with identity element 0, while GT is a cyclic group of the same order q written
in multiplicative notation (×) with identity element 1. The pairing map or bilinear
map eˆ satisfies the following basic properties:
1. Bilinearity : For all P ∈ G1, Q ∈ G2 and a, b ∈ Z∗q,
eˆ(aP, bQ) = eˆ(P,Q)ab = eˆ(bP, aQ).
2. Non-degeneracy : There exist P ∈ G1, Q ∈ G2 such that eˆ(P,Q) 6= 1.
3. Computability : There exists an efficient algorithm to compute eˆ(P,Q) for all
P ∈ G1, Q ∈ G2.
Shamir proposed the idea of ID-based cryptography and described an ID-
based signature scheme in 1984 [Sha85]. However, the first practical ID-based
encryption scheme was found using pairing based cryptography in 2001 [BF03],
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making it a popular choice for ID-based cryptography. Although pairing function
has many desirable features for securing WSNs, it has been one of the most
expensive cryptographic operations for resource constrained sensor nodes in terms
of computational and memory requirements. Computation of a single pairing
operation on a standard MICA2 [MIC] sensor node takes time almost equal to
the computation of six elliptic curve point multiplication operations on the same
node [OAG+11, ADLO10]. Therefore, pairing based cryptographic schemes are
not considered efficient for resource constrained sensor nodes as compared to
conventional non-pairing based elliptic curve cryptographic schemes. The ID-
based online/oﬄine signature schemes we initially selected to evaluate sensor nodes
broadcast authentication protocol are using the pairing based cryptography.
2.2.5.3 Computational Assumptions and Definitions
The security of cryptographic schemes is generally reduced to a computational
assumption (intractable problem). Following are the computational assumptions
and other security definitions which will be used in this thesis.
Definition 2.3. (ECDL Problem and Assumption). Let G be a group of
prime order q generated by P . Given an instance 〈P, aP 〉 where a ∈R Z∗q and
P ∈ G, the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm (ECDL) problem in G is to compute
a ∈ Z∗q. We say that the ECDL assumption holds in G if the ECDL problem in G
is computationally hard to compute. In other words, the ECDL assumption holds in
G if there is no algorithm running in polynomial time at most which can solve the
ECDL problem in G with a non-negligible probability in security parameter k.
Definition 2.4. (CDH Problem and Assumption). Let G be a group of
prime order q generated by P . Given an instance 〈P, aP, bP 〉 where a, b ∈R Z∗q
and P ∈ G, the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem in G is to compute
abP ∈ G. We say that the CDH assumption holds in G if the CDH problem in G
is computationally hard to compute. In other words, the CDH assumption holds in
G if there is no algorithm running in polynomial time at most which can solve the
CDH problem in G with a non-negligible probability in security parameter k.
Definition 2.5. (CDH Solver Algorithm). A CDH solver (challenger)
algorithm C is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm which can compute the
function CDH(P, aP, bP ) = abP ∈ G with a non-negligible probability.
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Definition 2.6. (Valid Diffie-Hellman Tuple). Given P ∈ G and a, b, c ∈R
Z∗q, the tuple (P, aP, bP, cP ) is defined as a valid Diffie-Hellman tuple if
• c = ab, in elliptic curve settings of Section 2.2.5.1.
• eˆ(aP, bP ) = eˆ(P, cP ), in pairing based settings of Section 2.2.5.2.
Definition 2.7. (Existential Unforgeability under Adaptively Chosen
Message and ID Attacks (euf-cma-ida)). An ID-based signature scheme is
secure against existential forgery on adaptively chosen message and ID attacks or
(euf-cma-ida)-secure, if there is no polynomial time adversary Ad allowed to ask the
signer for signature on any message of its choice that outputs a new valid ID and
message-signature pair with a non-negligible advantage [CC03].
2.2.6 Examples of IBS and IBOOS Schemes
We now present an IBS scheme [BNN04] proposed by Bellare et al. called BNN-
IBS scheme and an IBOOS scheme [XMS05] proposed by Xu et al. We named this
IBOOS scheme [XMS05] as X-IBOOS scheme for convenience. The IBS scheme is
based on ECC while the IBOOS scheme relies on PBC.
2.2.6.1 BNN-IBS Scheme
The BNN-IBS scheme has four algorithms: Setup, Key Extract, Sign and Verify.
Setup. This algorithm sets up the system parameters which are (E/Fp, G, P ,
q, p, P0, H1, H2). The Setup algorithm performs the following steps:
• Specify the parameters E/Fp, q, p, P and G, where
– E/Fp is an elliptic curve E over a finite field Fp,
– q is a large prime number and p is the field size,
– P is a point of order q on the curve E and,
– G is a cyclic group of order q under the point addition “+” generated by
P .
• Choose a master secret key s ∈R Z∗q uniformly.
• Compute the master public key as P0 = sP .
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• Choose one cryptographic hash function H1 = {0, 1}∗ ×G→ Z∗q.
• Choose another cryptographic hash function H2 = {0, 1}∗ ×G→ Z∗q.
• Output the system parameters {E/Fp, G, P , q, p, P0, H1, H2} and keep s
secret.
Key Extract. This algorithm computes the private keys corresponding to the
IDs using the well known Schnorr signature [Sch91]. Given an identity IDu of a
user U , the corresponding private key su is generated as
• Choose at random ru ∈R Z∗q and compute
• Ru = ruP
• cu = H1(IDu, Ru)
• su = ru + cus
The user U obtains (Ru, su) via a secure channel. Here, su is the secret information
whereas Ru is public. Note that (Ru, su) is actually a Schnorr signature of the
message (identity) IDu signed with the master secret key s of the PKG. Finding a
valid triplet (IDu, Ru, su) without the knowledge of s is equivalent to forging the
Schnorr signature.
Sign. For a user U with identity IDu and private key su, this algorithm signs a
message m as follows:
• Choose at random y ∈R Z∗q and compute
• Y = yP
• h = H2(IDu, m, Ru, Y )
• z = y + hsu
The tuple 〈Ru, Y, z〉 is U ’s signature on message m.
Verify. Given the signature tuple 〈Ru, Y, z〉, U ’s identity IDu and the message
m, this algorithm verifies the signature as follows:
• Compute cu = H1(IDu, Ru)
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• Compute h = H2(IDu, m, Ru, Y )
• Check whether the following equation holds
zP
?
= Y + h(Ru + cuP0)
The signature is accepted if the answer is yes and rejected otherwise.
Correctness. The correctness of the scheme follows from
zP = Y + h(Ru + cuP0)
= yP + h(ruP + cusP )
= yP + h(ru + cus)P
= yP + hsuP
= (y + hsu)P
The BNN-IBS scheme was later on improved by Cao et al. [CKDZ08] to reduce
the signature size of the BNN-IBS scheme. The signature generation process is
the same in both the original BNN-IBS scheme and the Cao’s modified scheme,
however the signature itself and the signature verification algorithm are different.
The signature and the signature verification algorithm of the modified Cao’s scheme
are as follows:
U ’s signature on message m is now the tuple 〈Ru, h, z〉 in modified Cao’s scheme.
Verify . Given the signature tuple 〈Ru, h, z〉, U ’s identity IDu and the message
m, the Verify algorithm verifies the signature as follows:
• Compute cu = H1(IDu, Ru)
• Check whether the following equation holds
h = H2(IDu, m, Ru, zP - h(Ru + cuP0))
The signature is accepted if the answer is yes and rejected otherwise.
Correctness. The correctness of the Cao’s modified scheme follows from
h = H2(IDu,m,Ru, zP − h(Ru + cuP0))
= H2(IDu,m,Ru, (y + hsu)P − h(Ru + cuP0))
= H2(IDu,m,Ru, yP + hsuP − hRu − hcuP0)
= H2(IDu,m,Ru, Y + h(su − ru − cus)P )
= H2(IDu,m,Ru, Y )
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2.2.6.2 X-IBOOS Scheme
The X-IBOOS is a direct online/oﬄine signature scheme which signs a message in
two phases without the help of any other signature scheme. This scheme has five
algorithms: Setup, Key Extract, OffSign, OnSign, and Verify.
Setup. This algorithm sets up the system parameters which are (G1, G2, eˆ, q,
P , P0, H0, H1). Here G1 is a cyclic additive (+) group of a prime order q generated
by P . G2 is a cyclic multiplicative (×) group with the same order q. Let eˆ: G1×G1
→ G2 be a bilinear mapping with the following properties:
1. Bilinearity : eˆ(aQ, bR) = eˆ(Q,R)ab for all Q,R ∈ G1, a, b ∈ Z∗q.
2. Non-degeneracy : There exist Q, R ∈ G1 such that eˆ(Q,R) 6= 1.
3. Computability : There exists an efficient algorithm to compute eˆ(Q,R) for all
Q, R ∈ G1.
The two hash functions chosen are defined as H0: {0, 1}∗ → G1 and H1: {0, 1}∗×G1
→ Z∗q. For a random number s ∈ Z∗q, the master public key is computed as P0 =
sP . The master secret key is s which is kept secret.
Key Extract . This algorithm computes the private keys corresponding to the
IDs. Given an identity ID, the corresponding private key DID is computed as
• DID = sH0(ID)
OffSign . This algorithm computes the partial oﬄine signature as follows:
• Pick two random numbers r, x ∈ Z∗q
• Compute S = 1
r
DID and R = xP
• Output the oﬄine signature pair (S, R)
OnSign . Given a message m and the oﬄine signature pair (S, R), the OnSign
algorithm computes the online signature as follows:
• Compute σ = H1(m,R)x+ r
• Output the resulting signature triplet 〈σ, S,R〉
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Verify . Given the signature triplet 〈σ, S,R〉, the message m and the identity
ID, this algorithm checks whether (P0, σP −H1(m, R)R, S, QID) is a valid Diffie-
Hellman tuple by checking if eˆ(σP − H1(m,R)R, S) = eˆ(P0, QID). If true, the
signature is accepted otherwise rejected.
Correctness : (P0, σP −H1(m, R)R, S, QID) is a valid Diffie-Hellman tuple since,
eˆ(σP −H1(m,R)R, S) = eˆ((H1(m,R)x+ r)P −H1(m,R)xP, 1rDID)
= eˆ(H1(m,R)xP + rP −H1(m,R)xP, 1rDID)
= eˆ(rP, 1
r
sQID)
= eˆ(P, sQID)
= eˆ(sP, QID)
= eˆ(P0, QID)
2.2.7 Security Proofs
In this thesis, we will use game-based reductionist proof technique to show the
provable security of our cryptographic session key establishment protocol in the
random oracle model.
2.2.7.1 Provable Security
Provable security is a methodology which uses mathematical tools to ensure that a
cryptographic algorithm or protocol is secure.
According to Menezes [MvOV96],
“A cryptographic method is said to be provably secure if the difficulty of
defeating it can be shown to be essentially as difficult as solving a well-
known and supposedly difficult (typically number-theoretic) problem, such
as integer factorization or the computation of discrete logarithms. Thus,
“provable” here means provable subject to assumptions.”
In computational complexity approach of provable security (the one used in
this thesis), a proof constitutes the cryptographic protocol, adversarial model and
reductionist argument. First the cryptographic protocol is defined. Then the
adversarial model (also known as security model) is defined which specifies the goals
and the capabilities of the adversary. Finally, a reductionist argument is applied to
show that if an efficient attacker is able to break the cryptographic protocol, then
one can construct another efficient algorithm to break the underlying well-known
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and supposedly intractable problem, for example integer factorization, elliptic curve
discrete logarithm etc.
2.2.7.2 Reductionist Security Proof
An algorithm which uses the attacker as a sub-routine to break an intractable
problem is called a reduction [Poi05]. The proofs in provable security provide
reductions from an intractable problem (integer factorization or elliptic curve
discrete logarithm etc.) to an attack against a cryptographic protocol. A reduction
of an intractable problem P to an attack against a cryptographic protocol CP
implies that if an attacker A breaks CP then A can be used as a sub-routine to
break the problem P .
2.2.7.3 Game-based Security Proof
Game-based method is an approach to construct verifiable security proofs for
cryptographic protocols or algorithms. In game-based security proofs, the security
model is written as a game or a sequence of games and reductionist security proofs
are sequences of game transformations. The security model, in game-based security
proofs, is expressed as a game or a sequence of games played between a polynomial
time attacker and a challenger. The attacker asks queries to the challenger who will
reply the attacker’s queries. A security model defines:
• the random oracles (defined in next section) to which the attacker has access,
• the challenger’s response to the attacker’s queries,
• the winning condition for the attacker achieving to which is the only way to
break the protocol.
The attacker can ask as many queries of his choice to the challenger as he
wants. At some stage, the challenger gives a challenge to the attacker and the
attacker outputs his guess to the challenge. If the attacker’s guess is correct, the
protocol is regarded as insecure. If the attacker manages to break the security of
the protocol with non-negligible probability, the challenger can use this attacker
as a sub-routine to break the underlying intractable problem with non-negligible
probability. A security model is described in Section 6.6.2.2 which will be used to
prove the formal security of the session key establishment protocol proposed in this
thesis in Section 6.3.3.1.
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2.2.7.4 Random Oracle Model
In cryptography, a random oracle is a data structure (a theoretical black box) used
in security proofs. A random oracle is a mathematical function that responds to
every query asked. It is a pseudo-random function which maps every possible query
to a random response from its output domain. More precisely, it maps elements
from a set of bitstrings to uniformly and independently sampled bitstrings [Poi05].
The random oracles are instantiated with cryptographic hash functions in practice.
A random oracle model is a popular model used in the security proofs of the
cryptographic protocols. A random oracle model uses a hash function as a random
oracle which produces a truly random value for each new query asked by the
adversary. It produces the same results only if the same query is asked repeatedly. In
random oracle model, the adversary is given a complete access to the cryptographic
protocol, but as a black-box and he can ask a query of his choice which is answered
correctly by the random oracles in constant time [Poi05].
2.3 Concluding Remarks
The particular characteristics of WSNs make them prone to a variety of security
attacks. On the other hand, resource constrained nature of the sensor nodes is
a hurdle in applying complex cryptographic primitives to secure wireless sensor
networks. A MAC is efficient to compute for sensor nodes in terms of resource
consumption but it cannot provide source authentication in broadcast scenario. The
traditional PKC based digital signatures, on the other hand, require public keys
to verify a signed message. ID-based cryptography gives a solution to the public
key and certificate management problem. ECC is efficient to implement PKC on
sensor nodes when compared to RSA and PBC. Provable security ensures that a
cryptographic protocol is secure and it posses the required security properties.
Chapter 3
Authentication in Wireless Sensor
Networks: A Review
Chapter Overview: This chapter provides a detailed review
of the existing research work related to authentication problems
in wireless sensor networks including broadcast authentication
and outside user authentication. While reviewing the existing
authentication schemes, it highlights their limitations in the
context of both authentication problems.
3.1 Introduction
Authentication is the act of proving one’s identity. The provision of authentication
in WSNs is a challenging task due to the nature of the network. This chapter reviews
the existing solutions to authentication problems in WSNs in detail with the main
focus on two authentication problems, i.e., broadcast authentication and outside
user authentication. Furthermore, existing key establishment protocols to establish
a session key between a user and a sensor node are also the focus of this survey.
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In traditional networks, authentication is achieved via digital signatures, i.e., via
PKC. However, PKC had been thought too resource hungry to use in WSNs because
of its large processing and storage requirements. So, for a long time, the security
solutions for the WSNs were considered only by using symmetric cryptography. In
2004, Gura et al. [GPW+04] showed the possibility of both ECC and RSA on 8-
bit processors with ECC demonstrating a performance advantage over RSA. Since
then PKC has also become a part of WSN security schemes. The following sections
discuss the previously proposed schemes of broadcast authentication and outside
user authentication and their inadequacy to address certain issues.
3.2 Broadcast Authentication
The existing work in the area of broadcast authentication in WSNs can be catego-
rized as symmetric cryptographic schemes (MAC based schemes) and asymmetric
cryptographic schemes (digital signature based schemes). All the existing broadcast
authentication schemes, except the two of them, provide a solution by assuming
the broadcast sender either a base station or any other resourceful device but not a
sensor node.
3.2.1 Schemes Based on Symmetric Cryptography
In WSNs, authentication was conventionally provided through Message Authentica-
tion Code (MAC), a symmetric cryptographic approach. In a typical pairwise MAC
based authentication scheme, the MAC generated by a sender is verified by the
receiver using the same MAC key shared between the two. This approach provides
an efficient solution to the pairwise authentication problems in WSNs. However,
the typical pairwise MAC based authentication approach cannot be applied to
the broadcast settings in WSNs due to the presence of compromised nodes in
the network. In a broadcast scenario, the MAC key used to authenticate the
broadcast messages needs to be shared among all potential receivers. This facilitates
any compromised broadcast receiver node, with the possession of MAC key, to
successfully modify the messages sent by a legitimate broadcast sender. Moreover,
the compromised node can send fake messages on behalf of a legitimate sender.
Therefore, a typical MAC based authentication scheme can only provide mutual
(pairwise) authentication in WSNs and cannot handle the broadcast authentication.
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A solution to this problem was given by µTESLA1 [PST+02], a symmetric
cryptographic scheme described later, which first addressed the problem of broadcast
authentication in WSNs. The major symmetric cryptography based broadcast
authentication schemes for WSNs are variations of µTESLA scheme. These schemes
can be further categorized depending on the type of broadcast senders. One category
is where the broadcast sender is either the base station or any other resourceful
device while the second category assumes the resource constrained sensor nodes as
the broadcast senders.
3.2.1.1 Schemes with Resourceful Broadcast Sender
The broadcast authentication schemes in this section assume the resourceful devices
as the broadcast senders and the resource constrained sensor nodes as the receivers.
µTESLA [PST+02] was mainly proposed for the base station to sensor nodes
broadcast authentication. µTESLA is a MAC based symmetric cryptographic
protocol which introduces asymmetry through the delayed disclosure of MAC
key. In µTESLA, the MAC key used to authenticate broadcast messages is not
shared among the broadcast receivers before the actual broadcast. A broadcast
message is sent along with a MAC generated by a MAC key. This MAC key
is initially unknown to all broadcast receivers. After some delay, when every
broadcast receiver has received the broadcast message, the MAC key is sent to
all broadcast receivers who use the received MAC key to authenticate broadcast
message received earlier. This delayed disclosure of MAC key helps to avoid the
attacks launched by the compromised sensor nodes. µTESLA protocol works in
multiple phases: Sender Setup, Broadcasting Authenticated Packets, Bootstrapping
New Receivers, Authenticating Packets, and Nodes Broadcast. The following is the
detailed description of µTESLA protocol.
Sender Setup. Each MAC key in µTESLA is a key from a key chain of length n
generated by applying a one-way hash function to the previous key. In sender setup
phase, the broadcast sender first generates a sequence of MAC keys (key chain). To
generate the key chain, a sender randomly chooses the last key Kn and calculates
the rest of the keys by repeatedly applying the one-way hash function F to the
previous keys as follows:
Kn−1 = F (Kn), Kn−2 = F (Kn−1), . . . . . . . . . , K0 = F (K1)
1Micro Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication (µTESLA)
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Due to the one-way hash function F , it is possible to compute Ki−1 from Ki
but the revers is computationally infeasible. Hence, any key Ki can be used to
authenticate the subsequent keys (Ki+1, Ki+2, . . . . . . , Kn) from the same key chain.
For instance, K1 is authentic if K1 = F (K0) and K2 is authentic if K2 = F (K1) or
F (F (K0)). The first key from the key chain, i.e., K0, is therefore distributed to every
potential receiver in the beginning of the protocol to authenticate the subsequent
received key(s). The key chain is then used for authenticated broadcast in the reverse
order of generation, i.e., K1, K2, . . . . . . , Kn. The key used to authenticate the later
key(s) is called the key commitment.
Broadcasting Authenticated Packets. In this phase, the broadcast time is divided
into n uniform time intervals i.e., 1, 2, . . . . . . n and the sender associates each MAC
key from the key chain (K1, K2 . . . . . . , Kn), in the same order, to a corresponding
time interval. MACs for all broadcast packets during a time interval i are computed
using the key Ki associated to that time interval i, for i = 1, 2, . . . . . . n. In a time
interval i, the sender computes the MAC of the packet(s) using Ki and broadcasts.
The sender waits for a certain predefined time period σ to make sure that every
receiver in the network has received the broadcast packet(s). He then reveals the
MAC key Ki after the end of the time interval i. The delay σ depends on the round
trip time between the sender and the farthest receiver(s) in the network. This time
delay ensures that when the MAC key is being released, every receiver has already
received all the broadcast packets of the time interval i and the compromised sensor
nodes cannot exploit the knowledge of that MAC key.
Bootstrapping New Receivers. In order to authenticate a received MAC key
belonging to a certain one-way key chain, the new receiver needs to have a previous
authentic MAC key from the same key chain as a commitment to the entire key
chain. To obtain the key commitment, a new receiver in time interval i + 1 sends
a request message to the broadcast sender. The broadcast sender replies the new
receiver with a key Ki of the one-way key chain used in the past time interval i and
the other µTESLA parameters, for instance, the duration of a time interval, the
delay in disclosure of MAC key etc.
Authenticating Packets. After receiving a packet along with the MAC, the
receiver first checks whether the MAC key for this packet has not already been
disclosed. If the packet passes this security check, the receiver stores it and waits
for the corresponding MAC key otherwise discards the packet. In the second step,
the receiver verifies the newly received MAC key. When a new MAC key (say Ki) of
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a previous time interval, not disclosed before, is received by the receiver, the receiver
verifies Ki using the previously disclosed authentic MAC key Ki−1 by performing a
test Ki−1 = F (Ki). The successful verification implies that the received MAC key is
a valid key from the sender’s key chain. In the third step, the receiver authenticates
all broadcast packets that were received during the last time interval i− 1 using Ki.
The receiver also replaces the previously stored key Ki−1 with Ki.
Sensor Nodes Broadcast. µTESLA is mainly proposed to facilitate authenticated
broadcast by the base station which is a resourceful device. A sensor node, with a
limited storage capability, cannot store the keys of a long key chain and the µTESLA
parameters of all other sensor nodes in the network including their key chain
commitments. Moreover, exchanging the authenticated key chain commitments
securely and broadcasting the disclosed MAC keys to all receivers in the network
are other problems in case of sensor nodes broadcast. All these facts do not allow
sensor nodes to become broadcast senders in µTESLA. Therefore, µTESLA suggests
sensor nodes to broadcast messages via the base station, i.e., a sensor node sends a
broadcast message to the base station which then broadcasts this message on behalf
of that sensor node.
Limitations: In µTESLA, a broadcast sender is required to store long key chains
consisting of n MAC keys while a receiver is required to store key chain commitment
of every broadcast sender. µTESLA suffers from the following major problems:
• Does not provide quick authentication since the receiver waits for the MAC
key to authenticate a broadcast message.
• Can cause a DoS attack against the storage of sensor nodes by forcing them
to store packets until they receive authentication keys to authenticate them.
• Very slow for large scale sensor networks since a sender waits until the message
reaches the other end of a large network before disclosing MAC key.
• Suffers from the problem of distribution of key chain commitment of a new key
chain to all broadcast receivers, once all the keys from a previous key chain
have been used.
• Requires time synchronization between the sender and the receiver.
• Assumes the base station as the only broadcast sender in sensor network and
allows a sensor node to broadcast a message only via base station.
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• Not scalable in terms of number of broadcast senders since the sensor
nodes (receivers) cannot store the initial µTESLA parameters (i.e., key chain
commitment, duration of time interval etc.) of a large number of broadcast
senders.
Different variations [LN04, LNZJ05, DG06, GD07] of µTESLA scheme have
been proposed later on to address the problems of distribution of new key chain
commitment, scalability in terms of number of broadcast senders, and speed issue
for large scale sensor networks, which are discussed below.
Multi-level µTESLA [LN04] attempts to handle the problem of distribution
of new key chain commitments to all broadcast receivers. Once all the keys from
a key chain have been used, distributing the new key chain commitment to all
broadcast receivers in the network is a problem faced in µTESLA. The new key chain
commitment can be sent to all broadcast receivers in the same way as other broadcast
messages. However, any receiver that does not receive a key chain commitment
due to the packet loss in the network would not be able to authenticate future
messages. Moreover, an attacker can target the packet containing the key chain
commitment and interrupt its distribution, for example, by launching a jamming
attack. The motivation behind Multi-level µTESLA is to prolong the life time of
µTESLA broadcast without storing the long key chains on broadcast senders and
authentically distributing the new key chain commitments to the broadcast receivers.
This scheme introduces different levels of key chains. The lower level key chains are
used to authenticate broadcast messages (authenticated message broadcast) from
the base station. The higher level key chains are used to authenticate the new key
chain commitments of lower level key chains (authenticated distribution of new key
chain commitment).
Limitations: Although this variation of µTESLA prolongs the life time of
µTESLA broadcast by handling the problem of distribution of key chain commit-
ment, it still suffers from the delayed authentication, DoS attack and scalability
problems of µTESLA.
Multi-Sender µTESLA [LNZJ05], another variation of µTESLA, provides
scalability in terms of number of broadcast senders (a few resourceful broadcast
senders only). The idea behind this scheme is that the time period is divided
among multiple senders (say m) instead of one broadcast sender. The broadcast
senders broadcast messages one by one in their allocated time intervals. The life
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time (time interval) of each broadcast sender is further divided into n intervals.
The µTESLA parameters (key chain commitment, starting time, duration of time
intervals etc.) and the certificates (containing µTESLA parameters) are generated
for all broadcast senders. To start an authenticated broadcast in a time interval i, a
sender S first broadcasts its certificate containing its key chain commitment at the
beginning of i. The receiving sensor nodes verify the certificate using some stored
information. After that, the sender broadcasts messages during the time interval i
(which is further divided into n time intervals) in the same way as in the original
µTESLA scheme. A sender is allowed to broadcast messages during its predefined
time intervals only.
Limitations: This variation of µTESLA addresses the scalability problem to some
extent, however, it does not allow multiple senders to broadcast at the same time.
Due to the limited storage, the sensor nodes cannot store packets from multiple
senders at the same time before receiving authentication keys. Hence, different
senders are allowed to broadcast messages turn by turn in predefined fixed time
intervals only which does not suit real time applications. Besides, this scheme also
suffers from the delayed authentication and above mentioned DoS attack.
L-TESLA [DG06, GD07] aims to speed up the authentication process of
µTESLA for large scale sensor networks. It assumes the presence of trusted sensor
nodes in the network who are secure with more computing and communication
capabilities than the ordinary resource constrained sensor nodes. The basic idea
behind this scheme is to divide the sensor nodes in the network into equal subsets
and provide the parallel broadcast and authentication of a single message in these
subsets. In this scheme, the whole sensor network is divided into small virtual
networks each containing a subset of the sensor nodes. For each small network,
there is one trusted node acting as a broadcast sender for that small network. The
trusted node plays the same role as is played by the base station in the original
µTESLA scheme. It maintains its own key chain and other µTESLA parameters for
that small network. The µTESLA parameters of the trusted node are stored on each
sensor node in its small network. Whenever the trusted node receives a broadcast
message (either directly from the base station or from another trusted node), it
verifies the message and computes a new MAC for this message using a MAC key
from its own key chain. It then broadcasts this message along with the new MAC to
the sensor nodes in its own small network (subset of sensor nodes). Once all sensor
nodes in its small network have received this message, the trusted node releases the
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corresponding MAC key to authenticate that message. Since the size of a trusted
node’s corresponding network is small, every sensor node receives this message in a
short order. The trusted node also forwards this message to other nearby trusted
nodes which after verification repeat the process. The communication among the
trusted nodes is also carried out through µTESLA using a separate key chain. The
motivation behind this scheme is to decrease the delay in message authentication
for real time data in large scale WSNs.
Limitations: Although L-TESLA decreases the authentication delay of µTESLA
for large scale sensor networks, the presence of trusted nodes in sensor networks is
not usual. Moreover, the experimental results of the scheme show that this scheme
does not work well with unevenly distributed networks. For such networks, it rather
increases the overall delay as compared to the delay incurred in original µTESLA
scheme. Evenly distributed sensor networks are rare since the topology of a WSN
is unpredictable.
3.2.1.2 Schemes with Resource Constrained Broadcast Sender
The broadcast authentication schemes in this section assume the resource con-
strained sensor nodes as the broadcast senders as well as the receivers.
The first attempt in this regard is [CC05] which enables sensor nodes to broadcast
messages to nearby sensor nodes only. [CC05] proposes to use Multi-level µTESLA
protocol, a variation of µTESLA, for sensor nodes broadcast authentication. To use
Multi-level µTESLA for sensor nodes broadcast, a sensor node needs to distribute
its key chain commitments to all nearby sensor nodes. However, distributing the key
chain commitments authentically to all nearby sensor nodes is a problem of µTESLA.
One possibility is to store the key chain commitments on sensor nodes before the
deployment of sensor network. However, before deployment a sensor node does
not know who will be its neighboring nodes after deployment. Due to the limited
storage, it is not possible for a sensor node to store the key chain commitments of all
N − 1 sensor nodes (for a large scale sensor network of N sensor nodes, the number
N is in thousands). Another possibility is to distribute (broadcast) the key chain
commitments to the nearby sensor nodes after the deployment which is also not an
easy task. To address this problem, a scheme to bootstrap key chain commitments
for Multi-level µTESLA after the deployment of sensor network has been proposed
in [CC05].
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In [CC05], the base station calculates a key for each sensor node s before
deployment, known as Identification Key (IDK), as follows,
IDKs = Hash(GMK ‖ s)
and stores it on s, where GMK is a group master key known to the base station
only. During the bootstrapping phase, each sensor node s broadcasts its key chain
commitment to all of its neighboring nodes, encrypted by its IDKs. After a fixed
time interval, the base station broadcasts GMK to all sensor nodes in the network.
Each sensor node then computes the Identification Key, IDKs, of each nearby sensor
node s using GMK and decrypts the received key chain commitments.
Limitations: This scheme uses a µTESLA based scheme for the broadcast
message authentication, and thus limits the number of broadcast senders and
receivers. Moreover, it allows broadcast to the neighboring nodes only. Furthermore,
the key chain commitments are distributed in bootstrapping phase only. The
sensor nodes added after bootstrap phase are not able to obtain/distribute the key
chain commitments from/to nearby sensor nodes and therefore cannot participate
in broadcast communication.
To address the problem of addition of new sensor nodes in [CC05], the scheme
in [KKLL07] proposes to maintain a key chain of group master keys GMKs, called
GMK hash chain. After bootstrapping phase in [CC05], if new sensor nodes are
to be added to the system, their Identification Keys (IDKs) are calculated using
the next key from GMK hash chain. The new sensor nodes broadcast their key
chain commitments, encrypted with their IDKs, to the nearby sensor nodes. After
some time, the base station releases the corresponding GMK. The whole process
of [CC05] then repeats in the same way to obtain the key chain commitments of the
newly added sensor nodes.
Limitations: This approach enables newly added sensor nodes to distribute their
key chain commitments to nearby sensor nodes. However, the new sensor nodes are
not able to obtain the key chain commitments of the old sensor nodes who are close
to them and hence, not able to authenticate broadcast messages from the old sensor
nodes. The number of broadcast senders is also limited in this scheme.
Comments. Since all the above mentioned symmetric cryptography based
broadcast authentication schemes are based on the basic mechanism of µTESLA,
they all inherit the flaws of µTESLA scheme. A summary of major issues with
µTESLA based schemes is as follows:
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• Delayed authentication
• DoS attack due to delayed authentication
• Time consuming for large scale sensor networks
• Lack of scalability in terms of number of broadcast senders
• Multiple senders cannot broadcast simultaneously
• Multiple senders can broadcast only in their predefined fixed time slots
• Distribution of key chain commitments for multiple broadcast senders
• Broadcast by sensor nodes not supported
3.2.2 Schemes Based on Asymmetric Cryptography
Multiple digital signature based broadcast authentication schemes for WSNs have
been proposed in [RLZ07, RLZM07, CKDZ08] addressing several of the limitations
of µTESLA based schemes. All these schemes assume resourceful devices as the
broadcast senders and not typical sensor nodes. The first five schemes [CAS,
DAS, MAS, BAS, HAS] use the traditional PKC based signature schemes where
a message signer signs a message using his private key and the receiver verifies the
signed message using the signer’s public key. In fact, they provide a solution to
the public keys and certificates management problem faced in WSNs. The last two
schemes [IDS, IMBAS] use ID-based signature schemes.
CAS [RLZ07, RLZM07] discusses a certificate based authentication scheme for
WSNs. A certificate contains the public key of broadcast sender signed by the
private key of a fixed sink or the base station. A broadcast sender signs a message
using its private key and broadcasts the signed message along with its certificate. On
receiving a message, the receiver first verifies the signed certificate using the public
key of the base station. If the verification succeeds, the receiver obtains the signer’s
public key from the certificate. The receiver then verifies the signed message using
the received public key. To avoid the certificate transmission and verification for
every message, DAS [RLZ07] suggests every receiver (sensor node) to store the IDs
and the corresponding public keys of all legitimate broadcast senders. A broadcast
sender now signs a message using its private key and broadcasts the signed message
along with its ID and public key pair. The receiver checks whether the received
3.2 BROADCAST AUTHENTICATION 53
ID and public key pair is present in its local memory or not in order to verify the
legitimacy of received public key. If this check passes, the receiver verifies the signed
message using this public key.
Limitations: CAS and DAS both increase the communication overhead where
the certificates or public keys are transmitted for every signed broadcast message.
Furthermore, the receiving sensor nodes in CAS need to verify two signatures which
increases computation overhead; first to verify the signed certificate to obtain the
sender’s public key, and second to verify the signed message. On the other hand,
storing public keys of all broadcast senders in DAS increases storage overhead on
sensor nodes and hence, limits the number of broadcast senders for a large scale
sensor network due to the limited storage capabilities of typical sensor nodes.
Merkle hash tree [Mer80] has been suggested to use in another scheme MAS in
[RLZM07] to manage the public keys of senders. Merkle hash tree helps to avoid the
storage overhead of DAS. In this scheme, each leaf node of the Merkle hash tree is a
hash value of the public key of a broadcast sender. The value of each internal node
is derived as the hash of two of its children nodes’ values. Each receiver stores the
value of the root node of Merkle hash tree in order to authenticate the public keys
of broadcast senders. A sender, along with the signed message, broadcasts the hash
values of all sibling nodes of the nodes on the path from its corresponding leaf node
to the root node named as AAI and its own public key. The receiver constructs a
partial hash tree using the sender’s public key and AAI. If public key is authentic,
the calculated root value is the same as the one already stored on the receiver.
Limitations: For N broadcast senders, AAI for each sender contains log2N
hash values. This approach increases message size and therefore the transmission
cost especially for large scale sensor networks where N corresponds to thousands
of sensor nodes. Moreover, this approach is not dynamic. The reason is that once
the broadcast senders are decided, the Merkle hash tree of senders’ public keys
is calculated and the root node value is stored on every receiver, adding a new
broadcast sender is an issue.
BAS, another scheme proposed in [RLZ07], uses bloom filter [Mit02] to store
the public keys. A bloom filter is a space-efficient probabilistic data structure to
represent a set and to test whether an element is a member of that set. In a bloom
filter, false positives are possible but false negatives are not. It implies that a test
result returns either an element is inside the set (may be wrong) or definitely not
in the set. Unlike DAS, BAS does not preload each sensor node with the ID and
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public key pairs of the broadcast senders. Instead, each sensor node only stores the
hash mappings of the ID and public key pairs employing the bloom filter. When a
sensor node receives a broadcast message together with the sender’s ID and public
key pair, it verifies the authenticity of the received public key by checking if the
corresponding hash mapping of the public key is stored in its local memory or not.
HAS [RLZ07], on the other hand, describes a bloom filter and Merkle hash tree
based hybrid authentication scheme to enhance the number of broadcast senders
in BAS. This approach combines the previously described BAS and MAS schemes
and trades the message length for the storage space to obtain scalability in terms of
number of broadcast senders.
Limitations: BAS suffers from the probability of false positives while authen-
ticating public keys. This probability increases with the increase in number of
broadcast senders and therefore limits the number of broadcast senders. Considering
a reasonable probability of a false positive and the capabilities of a typical sensor
node, the maximum number of broadcast senders supported by BAS is about 434
[RLZ07]. HAS supports more broadcast senders than BAS but at the cost of
increased message size. The addition of new broadcast senders is a problem in both
schemes requiring an update of a bloom filter or a bloom filter and Merkle hash tree
stored on every sensor node. Both schemes require the transmission of a signer’s
public key with every message incurring transmission overhead.
Comments. All the above mentioned asymmetric cryptography based authenti-
cation schemes discussed in [RLZ07, RLZM07] mainly focus on the management of
public keys and/or certificates in WSNs. All these schemes assume either ECDSA
(Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm) [JMV01] or RSA [RSA83] as underlying
signature scheme to sign a message.
IDS [RLZM07] uses a pairing cryptography based digital signature for broadcast
authentication in WSNs. IMBAS [CKDZ08] uses another digital signature scheme
based on ECC for broadcast authentication in WSNs. Since both these schemes are
based on ID-based cryptography, they solve the problem of public key and certificate
management.
Limitations: The message signers in both of these schemes IDS and IMBAS
are assumed to be powerful devices. Although it is possible for resource constrained
sensor nodes devices to compute a pairing operation, it is the most expensive
cryptographic operation for sensor nodes in terms of resource consumption. One
can conclude that ECC based signatures are more efficient than pairing based
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signatures for sensor nodes in terms of computation time and energy consumption.
However, they both still take a considerable time in signing a message on resource
constrained sensor nodes. Consequently, these both authentication schemes consume
considerable time on sensor nodes to broadcast a signed message.
3.2.3 Discussion
All the symmetric and asymmetric cryptography based authentication schemes
that we have presented suffer from significant limitations. In case of symmetric
schemes (µTESLA based schemes), these limitations are the broadcast at regular
and predefined intervals, the storage of µTESLA parameters, the distribution of key
chain commitments and the delayed authentication. µTESLA based schemes fail
to provide a solution to the real-time applications of WSNs. In case of asymmetric
schemes (digital signature based schemes), these limitations are the management
of public keys and certificates and the cost of applying PKC on sensor nodes
particularly the time cost. The former raises the scalability problem and the latter is
critical for real-time applications. Furthermore, all of the above mentioned schemes
except [CC05, KKLL07] assume broadcast senders to be powerful devices and not
ordinary sensor nodes.
3.3 Outside User Authentication
As mentioned earlier, the outside user access to the sensor nodes data requires to
handle two basic tasks of ‘user authentication’ and ‘session key establishment’.
3.3.1 User Authentication
User authentication in WSNs may be implemented using some user credentials for
instance user’s ID and a password known only to the user. It requires sensor nodes
to store the ID and password pair of each user. However, a single compromised node
will reveal the passwords of all the users. Alternatively, user authentication may be
enforced with a public key cryptosystem with public and private keys. A simple
approach to handle user authentication is a centralized mechanism. In a centralized
approach, the user sends his login request to a central entity, say a base station.
The base station, after successful user authentication, forwards the user query to the
sensor nodes to obtain the requested data from them. The base station then replies
the user with data obtained from the sensor nodes. The user can also send the login
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request directly to the sensor nodes. The sensor nodes forward the user information
to a central entity e.g., the base station. The base station verifies the legitimacy of
the user request and decides whether the access should be granted or not. The base
station then replies back to the sensor node with the verification outcomes. Based
on the outcomes, the sensor nodes either provide the requested data to the user
or refuse to process the user request. Both centralized approaches are simple and
easy to deploy because of the fact that the base station is a powerful device which
can perform complex computations to authenticate a user. An alternative approach
to handle user authentication is a distributed mechanism. In distributed approach,
the sensor nodes who receive the user request locally verify it and process the user
query. There is no involvement of a third party in this approach.
3.3.1.1 Centralized Schemes
The centralized user authentication schemes described in [WZCW06, TJY07, Lee08,
Das09] divide the user authentication process into three phases: registration, login,
and authentication. The registration phase is carried out via a secure channel in
which each user registers himself to a registration node, for instance, the base station
or any dedicated node. After registration, whenever the user wants to access data
from the sensor nodes, he sends a login request to the login node with his credentials.
The login node forwards user’s credentials to the registration node who verifies the
authenticity of the user and gives feedback to the login node. Depending on the
feedback from the registration node, the login node either accepts or rejects the user
authentication request.
Limitations: Although, the centralized user authentication schemes are easy to
deploy and efficient for sensor nodes in terms of processing, they all suffer from
certain problems. Firstly, they carry the limitation of a single point of failure
(registration node or the base station). If the third party responsible to authenticate
users fails, the whole scheme will fail. Secondly, they require one round trip
communication between the registration node and the sensor node (login node) for
every user request and hence, result in increased communication overhead. They also
cause traffic congestion in the network in case of multiple simultaneous user requests.
Thirdly, they are vulnerable to a severe DoS attack against sensor network. In this
attack, an adversary sends fake user requests to the login nodes forcing them to
forward fake user requests towards the registration node for verification. The result
is in-network traffic congestion by increased communication and depletion of sensor
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nodes battery power while relaying fake requests. Furthermore, they do not deal
with the session key establishment between the user and the sensor nodes for secure
query and data transfer.
3.3.1.2 Distributed Schemes
A distributed user authentication scheme was proposed by [BGK04] which first
addressed the outside user authentication problem in WSNs. This scheme realized
the presence of compromised sensor nodes in the network affecting the user authen-
tication process and introduced the notion of a (t, n)-threshold authentication. A
(t, n)-threshold authentication means the authentication succeeds only if the user
successfully authenticates to at least (n−t) out of n sensor nodes (t is the number of
potentially compromised nodes in the network). In this scheme, a user U separately
authenticates himself to each of n sensor nodes in his communication range. If U
successfully authenticates himself to a node ni, the node ni broadcasts to other n−1
nodes its vote ‘yes’ otherwise sends nothing. If within a timeout time, n− t or more
‘yes’ votes are collected, the user is successfully authenticated otherwise not.
Limitations: The functionality of this protocol is compromised by the fact
that a legitimate user will not be authenticated if n − t votes are not collected.
Furthermore, the communication cost is increased when each sensor node broadcasts
its authentication results to every other sensor node within its communication range.
RRUASN [BGR05], a PKC based distributed user authentication scheme, was
proposed by the same author later on. In this scheme, every user obtains from
the base station a private key and a certificate containing the user’s corresponding
public key. This certificate is signed by the base station using the private key of the
base station. In first step of the protocol, a user sends his signed certificate along
with his identity U to the sensor nodes in his communication range. The sensor
nodes store this certificate and send a challenge nonce back to the user. In second
step, the user signs this nonce together with his identity U using his private key and
sends them to the sensor nodes. The sensor nodes first verify the user certificate to
obtain user’s public key and then verify the signed nonce. The successful verification
proves the legitimacy of the user. In order to revoke the access rights of a user after
user’s access time period expires, the base station periodically updates its public
and private keys and broadcasts its public key to all sensor nodes in the network.
Thus, only a user who possesses a certificate signed by the current private key of
the base station can access data.
58 CHAPTER 3
Limitations: In this scheme, the receiving sensor nodes verify two signatures for
each authentication request; one to verify the signed user’s certificate and second
to verify the signed nonce. Thus, verifying a user is expensive for a sensor node in
terms of computation cost. Moreover, the messages from a user to the sensor nodes
are sent in two steps: first the user’s certificate which is stored by the sensor nodes
and then the signed value of nonce (originally received from the sensor nodes). An
adversary may exploit this fact by replaying the certificates of legitimate users and
forcing sensor nodes to store them. This may result into DoS attack against the
sensor nodes storage. Furthermore, the periodic broadcast of the public key by the
base station to all sensor nodes increases the communication overhead.
DP2AC [ZZR09] describes a user authentication scheme which uses a distributed
approach to query sensor network after successfully authenticating a user. In
DP2AC, a user is authenticated with the help of a token. A token is a λ-bit random
integer signed by the network owner using RSA signature. A user can purchase a
token from anywhere like a mobile phone voucher. In order to access data from
the sensor nodes, the user sends his data query along with his token to the sensor
node in his communication range. The sensor node verifies the signed token using
network owner’s public key. The interesting part of this protocol is the re-usability
check of a used token. For this purpose, the whole sensor network is divided into
virtual horizontal and vertical lines. Every used token is stored in sensor network
on all sensor nodes who are on any one (same) vertical line, from one end of the
network to the other end. When a user sends a request with a token, after signature
verification, his token is checked on all sensor nodes who are on any one (same)
horizontal line, from one end of the network to the other end. The idea behind
this scheme is that a reused token will be stored on at least one sensor node at the
intersection of those vertical and horizontal lines.
Limitations: This approach only works well where the sensor nodes are deployed
in a grid form, forming horizontal and vertical lines. Moreover, it results in increased
storage overhead because each used token is stored on more than one sensor node
in the network. Due to the increased storage overhead, it restricts the number
of outside users of WSNs. This scheme also results in increased communication
overhead because for each user request more than one sensor node are consulted to
detect token re-usability.
Comments. None of the centralized and distributed user authentication schemes
handle the session key establishment between a user and the sensor nodes.
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3.3.2 Session Key Establishment
To establish a pair-wise key between the user and the sensor nodes, [JLX07] proposes
a key establishment scheme based on the self-certified-key cryptosystem [PH97]. In
this scheme, the user sends a request along with his ID to the sensor nodes in his
range. In response to the user request, each sensor node computes a key using its
private key and other public parameters, encrypts a nonce using the computed key
and sends it to the user. The user, if he is the legitimate one, computes the same
key using his own private key and other public parameters and decrypts the nonce.
He then sends the decrypted nonce back to the sensor node who verifies the correct
decryption. This scheme is efficient in terms of storage and communication overhead
and supports a large number of users as compared to the other above mentioned
user authentication schemes.
Limitations: This scheme only handles the key establishment between a user and
the sensor nodes which implicitly provides user authentication. The sensor nodes
compute a key for every valid or invalid user request. An adversary may exploit
the situation and launch DoS attack by sending bogus user requests and forcing
sensor nodes to perform the key computations, nonce encryption and broadcast.
The result will be the wastage of sensor nodes resources. Another issue with this
scheme is that it always establishes the same key between a user and a particular
sensor node since there is no involvement of the ephemeral keys. Hence, if a key
established between a user and a particular sensor node has been compromised once,
it will enable the adversary not only to hijack all future communication between the
two participants but also decrypt any previous communication between the same
participants, eavesdropped by the adversary.
A PKC based hybrid key establishment protocol between a sensor node and a
security manager (user in our case) is proposed by Huang et al. [HCK+03]. This
protocol exploits the differences in resource capabilities between the sensor nodes and
the security manager and puts the cryptographic burden on less resource constrained
security manager. Like an outside user, a security manager is a powerful device
(compared to a sensor node) which establishes a session key with a sensor node for
the subsequent use. In this protocol, each party obtains a certificate containing its
public key signed by a certification authority. In the beginning of the protocol, both
parties exchange their signed certificates to obtain the public keys of each other. The
contents of the certificates are verified on both sides. The protocol then proceeds
by exchanging some messages and establishing a key between both parties. The
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key confirmation messages at the end of the protocol assure that both parties have
computed the key. The successful key computation authenticates both parties to
each other by proving the fact that both parties have knowledge of the private keys
corresponding to the public keys extracted from their certificates.
Limitations: In this protocol, the knowledge of the corresponding private keys is
only proved after the complete run of the protocol on both sides via key confirmation
messages. An adversary can exploit this fact and repeat this protocol with the
sensor node by replaying a valid certificate. This will force sensor nodes to perform
unnecessary computations and communications and hence, result into DoS attack.
Before a sensor node detects the replayed certificate, it would have performed
expensive computations and communications wasting its resources, particularly
battery power. Later on Tian et al. [TWZ05] detected another serious security
attack against this protocol. They showed in [TWZ05] that a security manager
(user in our case) can easily learn the long-term private key of a sensor node after
having one normal run of the protocol with the sensor node.
Kim et al. [KLP+07] propose an ID-based key establishment protocol based
on pairing based cryptography which aims to reduce the communication cost of
[HCK+03]. Being an ID-based protocol, it replaces the public keys of both parties
with their IDs. It eliminates the need of exchanging the certificates of both parties to
obtain public keys which ultimately reduces the communication cost of [HCK+03].
Limitations: This protocol reduces the communication cost but increases the
overall computation cost of the protocol due to the expensive pairing computations.
Like [HCK+03], this protocol also experiences a delayed user authentication (again
by the proof of knowledge of private key) on the sensor node’s side which causes a
DoS attack.
An attempt to reduce the computation cost of [KLP+07] is made by Zhang et
al. in [ZW09]. They propose another version of the protocol relying on the pairing
based cryptography. Compared with Kim et al.’s protocol, their contribution is
to scale down the number of point multiplication operations (the most expensive
cryptographic operation of ECC) on a sensor node under the same communication
complexity as in [KLP+07].
Limitations: Unfortunately, Zhang et al.’s protocol does not authenticate the
security manager at all which enables any one to establish a session key with the
sensor nodes.
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3.3.3 Discussion
The centralized user authentication approaches relieve sensor nodes from verifying
the user requests. However, they suffer from the problems of in-network traffic
congestion, communication overhead, single point of failure and a DoS attack. The
distributed approaches to user authentication, on the other hand, overcome the
problems of centralized approaches but make the resource constrained sensor nodes
responsible for the verification of a user’s authenticity. Therefore, they require a
lightweight user authentication mechanism on sensor nodes. However, the existing
distributed user authentication schemes result in high processing cost ([BGK04,
BGR05] and storage overhead ([ZZR09]). Moreover, none of them facilitate a session
key establishment after successful user authentication. The scalability in terms of
number of outside users is another issue in these schemes. The existing session key
establishment schemes for WSNs, on the other hand, are either expensive in terms of
computation and communication costs or they suffer from serious security problems.
3.4 Concluding Remarks
The existing authentication schemes for WSNs failed to handle certain problems:
• The existing broadcast authentication schemes do not handle the problem of
sensor nodes broadcast authentication.
• The existing outside user authentication schemes, on the other hand, are
expensive and lack session key establishment.
• The existing session key establishment schemes are also expensive and lack
security feature.
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Part II

Chapter 4
Authentication Framework
Chapter Overview: Based on the literature survey of previous
chapter, this chapter describes the problem definition and the
motivations to find a solution. It also describes the security
goals to achieve, the potential attacks to face and comes up with
a threat model and a trust model. In the light of the motivations
for solution, it briefly introduces the proposed authentication
framework consisting of two authentication protocols, leaving the
details of individual protocols for successive chapters.
4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents our proposed authentication framework for WSNs using
the ID-based signature schemes. The proposed framework aims to tackle the
shortcomings of the existing approaches that emerged during the literature review
in Chapter 3. The main shortcomings are:
• The broadcast authentication schemes for WSNs only focus on two types
of authentication problems, i.e., base station broadcast authentication and
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outside user authentication. No research has been done to address sensor nodes
broadcast authentication whereas having this feature is essential to build many
useful applications of WSNs as described in next section.
• The MAC based broadcast authentication schemes fail to provide a solution
to the above mentioned problem. The digital signature based broadcast
authentication schemes do not meet the needs of real-time applications and
also suffer from the problem of public key and certificate management.
• Centralized user authentication schemes cause traffic congestion and DoS
attacks. Moreover, the base station is a single point of failure in these schemes.
• Distributed user authentication schemes are not efficient with increased
communication and storage overhead. Moreover, they do not provide session
key establishment for the secure exchange of sensor nodes data after user
authentication. Scalability is another problem faced by these schemes.
• Session key establishment protocols for wireless sensor networks are expensive
posing considerable computation and communication burden on sensor nodes.
In addition, they are not secure and suffer from serious security attacks.
The main focus of our proposed framework is the two authentication problems,
i.e., sensor nodes broadcast authentication and outside user authentication. How-
ever, it can handle all three authentication problems of WSNs including base station
to sensor nodes broadcast authentication.
Contribution. The major contribution of this chapter towards the thesis is the
authentication framework proposed for wireless sensor networks.
4.2 Motivations
Although considerable advancements have been made to address authentication
problems in sensor networks, they are inadequate. Most of the existing solutions
target a specific authentication problem but ignore others. There are certain issues
related to authentication in WSNs which still need to be explored, for instance,
authenticated broadcast of real time data by the sensor nodes.
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4.2.1 Sensor Nodes Broadcast Authentication
There are many critical situations where a sensor node is obliged to send a quick
message. For example:
• Consider a forest fire alarm application of WSNs discussed in [Sto05]. In
case a fire starts in the forest, the sensor nodes deployed there immediately
inform other sensor nodes and/or authorities about the event and the exact
location of the event before the fire begins to spread. This timely detection
gives firefighters an advantage to arrive at the scene before the fire spreads
uncontrollably.
• In a traffic application [BHUW08], whenever a sensor node senses an accident,
a traffic jam or a dangerous road condition, it sends an immediate message
in all directions to alert other traffic approaching this location. This prevents
traffic jams to build up on the roads and helps drivers in safe driving.
• In a structural health monitoring application [SCL08], the sensor nodes are
intended to monitor the condition of large structures such as bridges, subway
tunnels and water pipes etc., so that structural damages or cracks may be
noticed and reported immediately. This way precautionary measures can be
taken before the structure weakens to the point of failure.
• Wireless sensor networks are also used in many military applications. For
instance, consider the military application scenario discussed in [Sto05], where
a troop of soldiers needs to move through a battlefield. The sensor nodes
deployed there detect the presence of an enemy’s tank, vehicle or personnel
and broadcast this information immediately throughout the network. The
soldiers obtain this information from their nearby sensor nodes and use it to
strategically position themselves in the battlefield.
All these scenarios represent a real-time event and require a message to be sent
as quickly as possible to report this event. However, the transmission and reception
of a message consume a considerable time due to the wireless media. Moreover, in
most of the cases a message propagates through several hops to reach the desired
destinations. Therefore, the message sending time should be as short as possible.
A delayed message may cause undesirable effects. For example, it may leave a fire
to spread uncontrollably, a traffic jam to become worse and a structure to collapse.
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A delayed message about the presence of an enemy in the battlefield may cause the
deaths of soldiers.
In addition, the message authentication is equally important in all the
above situations otherwise a malicious entity may exploit the situation and cause
unnecessary actions and even serious damages in some cases. For example, an
adversary can cause a fake fire alarm or can give the wrong location of the fire
event. The former case forces the authorities to take unnecessary actions whereas
the latter case misguides the firefighters and ultimately causes delay in rescue efforts.
The adversary may send fake messages to block traffic towards a specific region or
to turn traffic towards a specific direction in a traffic application. Similarly, an
attack on the sensor network deployed for structural monitoring may cause the
structures to collapse. The attacker may send fake data to make believe that there
is no fault in a structure when there is one. Thus, he can delay the maintenance
necessary to fix the problem, especially when the fault is created by the attacker
himself. In a battlefield scenario, the malicious sensor nodes added by the enemy
can disseminate wrong information about the enemy’s movement, thus deceiving the
soldiers. All these situations point towards the fact that the message authentication
is a compulsory requirement in all these applications.
Moreover, in all the above mentioned scenarios, sensor nodes on the path from
the sender node to the receiver(s) relay the messages towards destination. The
wireless communication allows an adversary to inject false messages during multi-
hop forwarding and causes sensor nodes to relay false data and deplete their energy
[LPW06]. It implies that the sensor nodes on the path should be able to authenticate
and filter out false messages as early as possible to save relaying energy [ZSW08,
ZSJN07]. Therefore, they are also potential receivers of these messages, arising the
need of authenticated multicast by the sensor nodes. In a battlefield application,
all sensor nodes in the network are potential receivers of the critical information,
arising the need of authenticated broadcast by the sensor nodes.
To summarize, there is a need of a secure mechanism which
• enables sensor nodes to broadcast a message without the involvement of the
base station, unlike µTESLA.
• empowers all sensor nodes in the sensor network to broadcast an authenticated
message efficiently in terms of resource consumption.
• enables a sensor node to send a message as quickly as possible to report a
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critical event in real time.
• allows addition of new sensor nodes as broadcast senders as well as broadcast
receivers.
• enables all potential receivers to verify a broadcast message sent by any other
sensor node in the network.
• enables all sensor nodes on path from the sender node to the receivers to verify
a message to detect injected false data earlier to save network resources.
• makes the typical sensor nodes the broadcast senders rather than other
resourceful devices.
4.2.2 Outside User Authentication
As mentioned previously, a distributed approach to authenticate an outside user is
desirable to avoid the security attacks of centralized approaches. The distributed
approach puts the burden of user verification on sensor nodes. Since the sensor nodes
are resource constrained devices, a lightweight user authentication mechanism is
needed for them to verify the authenticity of an outside user. However, the existing
distributed user authentication schemes are expensive for sensor nodes increasing
processing, storage and communication overheads. The session key establishment
between a sensor node and a user is another requirement to provide user access to the
sensor nodes data. Nevertheless, none of the existing user authentication schemes
for WSNs handle the session key establishment. Similar problems arise in existing
session key establishment protocols for WSNs. They are either very expensive for
sensor nodes or prone to security attacks.
To summarize, there is a need of a lightweight user authentication mechanism which
• enables all sensor nodes in the network to authenticate any user locally without
the involvement of a third party efficiently in terms of processing, storage and
communication overheads.
• provides scalability in terms of the number of outside users.
• allows addition of new sensor nodes (as user verifiers) as well as new users to
the system.
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• establishes a session key between a user and a sensor node after successful user
authentication.
• makes the typical sensor nodes the user verifiers rather than other resourceful
devices.
4.3 Security Goals
The primary security goals of authentication framework are to satisfy the security
properties of authentication, integrity, verification, freshness, confidentiality and
availability. The security goals discussed in Section 2.1.2 are restated here
specifically with reference to broadcast authentication and user authentication in
WSNs. The security goals for user authentication overlap with those of broadcast
authentication with the addition of confidentiality property.
Authentication enables the broadcast sender nodes and the outside users to
prove their identities to other sensor nodes in the network. Authentication is
required to prove that a broadcast message or a user authentication request message
received by a sensor node is actually sent by a legitimate broadcast sender or an
outside user respectively. In addition, a session key is established with a legitimate
user. Authentication distinguishes the legitimate broadcast senders and outside
users from intruders.
Message Integrity guarantees that the contents of a received broadcast
message or user authentication request message have not been modified en-route
and any modified message can be detected. Lack of message integrity can result in
serious issues, especially in authenticated broadcast, since the consequences of using
false or altered information could be disastrous.
Verification empowers a sensor node to attest the legitimacy of any broadcast
sender node or any outside user. Verification property implies the ability of the
sensor nodes to perform necessary tests to verify the authenticity, for instance, sensor
node’s access to sender’s authentication information like public key and capability
to perform necessary computation to verify authentication information.
Freshness ensures that a broadcast message or a user request message received
by a sensor node is fresh and not the replay of an old message from a legitimate
sender by the adversary to take some deceitful advantage or to waste the resources
of the sensor nodes.
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Confidentiality prevents unauthorized users or intruders from accessing the
sensor nodes data being sent to authorized users after successful user authentication.
Since an adversary may eavesdrop on the in-transit data, this data should be
resistant to disclose its meaning.
Availability ensures that the services of authenticated broadcast and user
authentication are available even in the presence of a DoS attack.
4.4 Security Attacks
We now consider some potential security attacks against authentication in WSNs
which are to be handled by the proposed framework.
1. Impersonation Attack. In this attack, an adversary impersonates a legitimate
sensor node or a user. He uses the identity of a legitimate sensor node to
broadcast messages on its behalf and the identity of a user to login to the
system on user’s behalf. The motivations behind this attack are to deceive
broadcast receivers by giving them false information on behalf of the targeted
legitimate sensor node and to access sensor nodes data for which the adversary
is not a legitimate user.
2. False Data Injection Attack. In this attack, an adversary injects random false
data in the sensor network. There are two motivations behind this attack.
The first one is to give some wrong information about an event. For instance,
reporting a fire in a forest whereas there is no fire or giving the wrong location
of the fire whereas the fire has set up at a different location. The first case
causes a fake fire alarm whereas the second case wastes the time of the rescue
team and makes the fire uncontrollable. The second motivation behind the
false data injection is to cause sensor nodes relaying false data and depleting
their battery power.
3. DoS Attack. The DoS attacks disrupt the functionality of the sensor network
in one or another way. For instance, the above mentioned false data injection
attack can lead to a DoS attack where the relaying nodes deplete their
battery power and become nonfunctional. This results in the disruption
of network functionality. µTESLA based broadcast authentication schemes
suffer from the DoS attack against the sensor node’s storage due to the
delayed authentication. Moreover, successfully targeting only the base station
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collapses the whole protocol of µTESLA. The centralized user authentication
schemes suffer from the DoS attack against the sensor network resources where
an adversary sends fake user requests forcing sensor nodes to forward them
towards the base station. It does not only result into network traffic congestion
(wasting bandwidth) but also wastes the resources of the relaying sensor nodes.
As a result, the relaying sensor nodes deplete their battery power and fail to
function. Targeting the sensor nodes closer to the base station, makes the base
station disconnected from the sensor network.
4. Message Replay Attack. In this attack, the adversary captures the previous
legitimate messages exchanged between nodes and between users and nodes,
and replays them later. The motivations behind this attack are to cause
confusion, impersonate a legitimate user or make sensor nodes to waste their
resources in unnecessary processing.
5. Node Compromise Attacks. A compromised node does not only reveal the
cryptographic material stored on it but can also be used to launch any of the
above mentioned attacks. The compromised nodes attacks are very successful
in symmetric MAC based authentication schemes. In such schemes, a single
compromised node revealing a MAC key enables an intruder to impersonate
all sensor nodes sharing the same MAC key for broadcast authentication.
Multiple compromised nodes can also collude and launch any of the above
mentioned attacks to achieve devastating results.
4.5 Threat Model
A threat model for the proposed authentication framework describes the sensor
network assets which are to be protected, adversary’s goals and his capabilities to
launch attacks against WSNs assets.
4.5.1 Assets to Protect
The valuable assets of a WSN that must be protected are:
• Confidential sensor nodes data
• Sensor nodes resources, such as battery power, processing and storage
• System availability (in presence of a DoS attack)
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4.5.2 Adversary’s Goals
The adversary’s goals are to:
• impersonate a legitimate broadcast sender to send messages on its behalf and
a user to access sensor nodes data,
• modify the contents of the broadcast messages and the user request messages,
• send bogus messages to waste the resources of the sensor nodes,
• replay old broadcast messages and user requests to fool the sensor nodes,
• obtain the session key established between a user and the sensor node.
4.5.3 Adversary’s Capabilities
To achieve his goals, the adversary may use an ordinary sensor node or a resourceful
device like a laptop. The adversary can eavesdrop on all communication because of
the insecure radio link. The wireless nature of communication helps adversary in
interrupting communication. Moreover, he may compromise a few sensor nodes in
the network. The adversary does not compromise the majority of or all the sensor
nodes in the network since this reveals his presence. Moreover, if he compromises
majority of the sensor nodes, it breaks down all the security mechanisms. He is able
to extract all cryptographic material stored on the compromised nodes including
their private keys and the session keys established with users. He may use these
compromised nodes to attack the security of the sensor network. In addition, the
adversary may add a few sensor nodes of his own in the network. He may launch
jamming attacks on the data link layer and the physical layer. However, we do not
take into account these attacks as almost all authentication schemes are vulnerable
to such attacks.
4.6 Assumptions
The proposed authentication framework makes the following assumptions:
• The wireless sensor network is a large scale network consisting of several
thousands of sensor nodes.
• The sensor nodes are stationary and not mobile sensor nodes.
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• The sensor nodes are densely deployed in the area of interest.
• The topology of the sensor network is not known prior to the deployment of
the network.
• The network topology is prone to frequent changes due to the addition of new
nodes, revocation of malicious nodes, depleted batteries and nodes failure.
• The wireless sensor network employs a broadcast communication paradigm
rather than a point-to-point communication paradigm.
• The medium of communication is a radio link.
• The sensor nodes are deployed in a hostile environment where they are directly
accessible by any one.
• All the sensor nodes in the sensor network are similar and equally resource
constrained in terms of battery power, memory, computation, bandwidth and
the transmission range.
• To keep the cost low, the sensor nodes are not equipped with the tamper
resistant devices (e.g., Trusted Platform Modules (TPM) technology).
• The base station is comparatively a resourceful device, e.g. a laptop, with
large battery power, memory, computation and bandwidth, which connects
the sensor nodes to the outer networks.
• The outside users of the sensor nodes data are equipped with the resourceful
devices, for instance PDA, notebook or mobile phone, to query sensor nodes.
4.7 Trust Model
• Since the sensor nodes are usually placed unattended in open places and
they are not equipped with TPM chips, any adversary can compromise any
sensor node in the network and obtain the cryptographic material stored on it.
The adversary can further use the compromised sensor node for his malicious
intentions to launch attacks against the sensor network. Therefore, no trust
requirements are placed on the sensor nodes.
• The base station, on the other hand, is a powerful device which can protect
itself and is considered as the trustworthy entity in the wireless sensor network.
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4.8 Proposed Authentication Framework
The proposed authentication framework is a detailed solution which covers all three
previously mentioned broadcast authentication problems in WSNs counteracting the
security attacks against sensor networks. The proposed authentication framework
utilizes ID-based cryptography and online/oﬄine signature (OOS) schemes and
is comprised of two authentication schemes; one for sensor nodes broadcast
authentication and second for user authentication. The user authentication scheme
can also handle the base station to sensor nodes broadcast authentication. It makes
the proposed authentication framework a single solution to all three authentication
problems in WSNs.
• The name of the first scheme is authenticated broadcast by sensor nodes .
This scheme aims to achieve two primary goals:
1. It enables each sensor node in the sensor network to broadcast or multicast
authenticated messages as soon as possible without the involvement of the
base station. In other words, it enables every sensor node in the sensor
network to become a broadcast sender.
2. It also enables every potential receiver to verify a signed message sent by
any other broadcast sender node in the network. It also allows sensor
nodes on the path from the sender node to the receivers to verify a valid
message and drop the false injected data.
Authenticated broadcast by sensor nodes scheme together with its security
and performance evaluation is discussed in detail in Chapter 5.
• The name of the second scheme is outside user authentication . This
scheme also achieves two primary goals:
1. It enables each sensor node in the sensor network to verify the legitimacy
of any outside user without storing the user specific information.
2. It also enables a sensor node to establish a session key with the user after
the successful user authentication to securely exchange the confidential
sensor nodes data.
Outside user authentication scheme and its security and performance evalu-
ations are discussed in Chapter 6 together with the details of its use for the
base station broadcast authentication.
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The proposed authentication framework uses digital signatures to grant authen-
tication in both schemes while maintaining the efficiency requirement of the resource
constrained sensor nodes. It uses ID-based Online/Oﬄine Signature (IBOOS)
scheme for the first authentication scheme and ID-based Signature (IBS) scheme for
the second authentication scheme. ID-based cryptography replaces a public key with
the ID, and thus eliminates the need of a signed certificate to extract the public key.
An online/oﬄine signature scheme performs most of the computations of signature
generation before the message to be signed is known in oﬄine phase. The online
phase performs only minor quick computations to obtain the final signature when
there is a message to send. The online phase is assumed to be very efficient while
the oﬄine phase can be performed by other resourceful device, for instance, the base
station in case of WSNs. An IBOOS scheme thus enables a resource constrained
sensor node to sign and broadcast a message immediately, once it has some critical
event to report. Authenticity and efficient signature generation are the two main
features of IBOOS schemes.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the proposed authentication framework which achieves
the aimed security goals, described in Section 4.3. Due to the use of ID-based
cryptography and secure digital signature schemes (IBS and IBOOS), verification
Figure 4.1: Authentication Framework for Wireless Sensor Networks
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and integrity are ensured on top of authentication. The session key establishment
in user authentication protocol meets the necessary confidentiality requirement.
Freshness is achieved via time stamps and availability is ensured by adopting
distributed approaches of authentication in both schemes. A detail discussion about
how these security properties are satisfied in both types of authentication problems
is given in subsequent chapters with individual authentication schemes.
By ensuring these security properties, the proposed framework safeguards the
WSNs from the potential attacks (given in Section 4.4) against it saving its assets.
Figure 4.2 illustrates the attacks against WSNs and how they are defeated by the
Figure 4.2: Authentication Framework: A Countermeasure to Security Attacks
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proposed framework. The attacker in these attacks could be a compromised node or
an adversary himself. The proposed framework introduces a logical layer between a
WSN and the attacker which shields the WSN from the attacks. Again, the detail
about how these attacks are defeated by our proposed framework is given in coming
chapters. Besides these attacks, the proposed framework can also help in defeating
other attacks against WSNs such as attacks against secure data aggregation, e.g.
False Data Injection Attack and attacks against routing protocols, e.g. Hello Flood
Attack etc., by providing required authentication.
The primary objective of the proposed framework is to design an authentication
mechanism which solves the above mentioned authentication problems efficiently
in terms of power consumption, processing time and storage overhead on sensor
nodes. The primary advantage of this framework is its re-usability which means
it does not restrict the solution to existing IBS and IBOOS schemes, rather it
can be reused with any IBS and IBOOS schemes. Once new IBS and IBOOS
schemes are available, which are more secure and efficient than the existing IBS
and IBOOS schemes, they can replace the existing ones to achieve better security
and performance results. Security and efficiency are the two central design features
of the proposed authentication framework.
4.9 Framework Instantiation and Evaluation
To instantiate the proposed authentication framework, the most efficient IBS and
IBOOS schemes were selected while keeping the security with maximum efficiency
objective of this research in mind. There are many IBS and IBOOS schemes
available, for instance, based on RSA signatures. The verification of RSA signature
is efficient for sensor nodes since one can set small verification exponents. This fact
can be utilized in a user authentication scheme, where the sensor nodes only verify
a signed user request. However, RSA based signatures result in lengthy messages
due to the large signature sizes. The ECC based signatures, on the other hand,
are equally efficient for signing and verification of messages and also enjoy the
short signature sizes. For this reason, the ECC based signatures are considered
more efficient for WSNs than RSA signatures [GPW+04]. Therefore, the proposed
authentication framework was instantiated using the eficient ECC based IBS and
IBOOS schemes.
Initially, the authentication framework was theoretically evaluated at an early
stage of the performance evaluation using Cao et al.’s IBS scheme [CKDZ08], Ren et
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al.’s IBOOS scheme [RMS08], and Xu et al.’s IBOOS scheme [XMS05]. The details of
these signature schemes will be discussed later on with the individual authentication
schemes. The two selected IBOOS schemes represent the two different classes of
ID-based Online/Oﬄine Signature schemes, discussed in Section 2.2.4. The actual
implementation of these schemes on the real sensor nodes was done at a later stage.
To the best of our knowledge, these IBS and IBOOS schemes were the most secure
and efficient schemes of that time for the resource constrained sensor nodes among
the available IBS and IBOOS schemes. However, later on some changes were made
based on implementation results which will be discussed in detail in the chapters of
individual authentication schemes.
4.10 Concluding Remarks
In order to address the shortcomings of existing authentication schemes for WSNs,
an authentication framework has been proposed. The proposed authentication
framework provides a detailed solution to address the shortcomings of the existing
schemes. Other than sensor nodes broadcast authentication, outside user authen-
tication and session key establishment, it can also deal with the base station to
sensor nodes broadcast authentication. It therefore provides a single solution to all
authentication problems in WSNs. Security, efficiency and re-usability are the main
features of the proposed authentication framework.
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Chapter 5
Authenticated Broadcast by
Sensor Nodes Protocol
Chapter Overview: This chapter presents the proposed au-
thenticated broadcast by sensor nodes protocol using the ID-based
online/oﬄine signature schemes together with its performance
and security evaluations. The first half of this chapter highlights
the challenges faced in the design of a broadcast authentica-
tion protocol and discusses the available ID-based online/oﬄine
signature schemes. It also describes our adapted ID-based
online/oﬄine signature scheme. It then presents the proposed
authenticated broadcast by sensor nodes protocol in detail. The
second half of this chapter evaluates the performance as well as
security of the proposed protocol. At the end of this chapter, the
proposed protocol has been compared with the existing protocols
for authenticated broadcast in WSNs.
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5.1 Introduction
The realization of many WSN applications (for instance, forest fire alarm appli-
cation, enemy tracking application etc.) depends on the existence of a secure and
efficient protocol for broadcast authentication. On the other hand, designing a secure
and efficient broadcast authentication protocol for WSNs is a challenging task due
the resource constraints and nature of deployment of the network. Some major
challenges faced in designing a secure as well as efficient broadcast authentication
protocol for WSNs, adapted from [LPW06, Per01], are:
• Efficient generation and verification. Since the sensor nodes are resource
constrained devices with limited computation and storage capabilities, the
generation and verification overheads of the authentication information should
be small.
• Low communication. The battery power is the most scarce resource on sensor
nodes and communication consumes most of it. Thus, a protocol with low
communication overhead is highly desirable for low power sensor nodes.
• Instant/Individual message authentication. Some applications send messages
at irregular and unpredictable times and require instant message authenti-
cation, for instance, the fire alarm application. For such applications, the
authentication protocol should enable a receiver to verify a broadcast message
individually and instantly once the message has been received.
• Scalability. The broadcast applications have a potentially large number of
receivers and, in some applications, a large number of senders as well. The
protocol should be independent of the number of broadcast senders and
receivers. It should also be dynamic allowing the addition of new broadcast
senders and receivers.
• Robustness to packet loss. Due to radio communications, WSN applications
face a high level of packet loss. The lost packets are not retransmitted in many
broadcast applications. Hence, the broadcast authentication protocol should
be tolerant to packet loss.
Unfortunately, all the existing MAC based efficient schemes for broadcast
authentication in WSNs, discussed earlier in Chapter 3, cannot support in-
stant/individual message authentication, scalability and robustness to packet loss.
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On the other hand, the digital signature based broadcast authentication schemes
provide instant/individual message authentication and robustness to packet loss.
However, signing a message consumes more time and battery power than a MAC
computation. The public key and certificate management in WSNs is another issue
causing the scalability problem. For a large sensor network, it is not possible for a
sensor node to store public keys of all other sensor nodes in the network, restricting
the number of broadcast senders. Moreover, all these previously proposed schemes
assume powerful devices as broadcast senders rather than the resource constrained
sensor nodes.
This chapter presents the proposed authenticated broadcast by sensor nodes
protocol for WSNs using the ID-based Online/Oﬄine Signature (IBOOS) schemes.
The IBOOS schemes enable a sensor node to quickly sign and broadcast a message
as soon as it has some time critical event to report since the computation of online
signature of an IBOOS scheme is very fast. The IBOOS schemes allow the oﬄine
phase to be performed by some other resourceful device. Hence, it is possible for the
base station to perform the complex computations of the oﬄine phase and distribute
the partial oﬄine signature to the sensor nodes. The sensor nodes then only perform
the small, energy efficient computations of the online phase. In addition, some
IBOOS schemes, like [RMS08], facilitate a signer to reuse the partial signature
computed in the oﬄine phase to sign more than one message. This feature of an
IBOOS scheme can further reduce the computation burden on the sensor nodes. The
ID-based public key cryptosystem does not require the public keys and certificates
and, as a result, solves the scalability problem of the digital signatures.
Due to the resource constrained nature of sensor nodes, the security and the
efficiency are the two most important aspects of a security protocol to decide the
suitability of that protocol for WSNs. This chapter also presents the performance
evaluation and the security analysis of the proposed protocol. Since our proposed
protocol is the first proposal to use IBOOS schemes in WSNs, a cryptographic
primitive previously untested on the sensor nodes devices, we have implemented a
few IBOOS schemes on actual sensor nodes as part of this research work. Although
the theoretical evaluation before the actual implementation strengthened the idea
of applying IBOOS schemes to sensor nodes devices, the actual implementation
confirmed the suitability of the idea. The implementation results helped to evaluate
the performance of the proposed protocol. Besides performance, the security of the
proposed authenticated broadcast by sensor nodes protocol using IBOOS schemes
together with our adapted IBOOS scheme is assessed.
84 CHAPTER 5
Contribution. The major contribution made by this chapter is addressing the
problem of broadcast by sensor nodes authentication in WSNs for the first time
and proposing to use the online/oﬄine signature schemes in WSNs for the first
time. Another major contribution is the practical implementation of several
online/oﬄine signature schemes on real sensor nodes devices for the first time and
the transformation of an IBS scheme to an efficient and secure IBOOS scheme.
5.2 Options for IBOOS Schemes
We now discuss the IBOOS schemes options for our proposed authenticated
broadcast by sensor nodes protocol.
5.2.1 Available IBOOS Schemes
There are many IBOOS schemes available, for example, based on ECC or RSA. Since
ECC based signature schemes are more efficient to process for sensor nodes than
RSA ones [GPW+04], we only consider ECC based signature schemes in this work.
We selected two ECC based IBOOS schemes [XMS05] and [RMS08] to evaluate
our proposed protocol. This selection was made keeping the security and efficiency
requirements for WSNs in mind. We name the first scheme [XMS05], proposed
by Xu et al., as X-IBOOS scheme and the second scheme [RMS08], proposed by
Ren et al., as R-IBOOS scheme for convenience. These schemes represent two
different categories of direct (X-IBOOS scheme) and indirect (R-IBOOS scheme)
online/oﬄine signature schemes, mentioned in Section 2.2.4. Both X-IBOOS and R-
IBOOS schemes have been proved to be existentially unforgeable under the adaptive
chosen message attacks in [XMS05] and [RMS08] respectively. The oﬄine signature
in R-IBOOS scheme can be securely reused to sign more than one message. We
roughly estimated the cost of both schemes on sensor nodes before implementation.
To see how efficient these IBOOS schemes would be on sensor nodes, we chose them
to implement on actual sensor nodes. However, we only implemented and evaluated
the X-IBOOS scheme and based on the expensive implementation results of this
scheme, we decided to skip the implementation of the R-IBOOS scheme. Instead,
we implemented and evaluated the adapted B-IBOOS scheme given in next section.
The implementation results are discussed in detail in later sections.
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5.2.2 Adapted IBOOS Scheme
To achieve our efficiency aim, we also adapted an ID-based signature scheme
to an ID-based online/oﬄine signature scheme and evaluated it. The reason
behind this adaption is the expensive results of X-IBOOS scheme discussed later
in Section 5.4.1.5. To obtain a more efficient IBOOS scheme than the X-IBOOS
and R-IBOOS schemes, we noticed that the ID-based signature scheme (BNN-
IBS) proposed by Bellare et al. [BNN04] and improved by Cao et al. [CKDZ08]
could be securely transformed to an IBOOS scheme. The BNN-IBS scheme and
its improved versions are given in Section 2.2.6.1. The BNN-IBS is an ECC based
pairing-free ID-based signature scheme having only one point multiplication as an
expensive operation in the signature generation process. This point multiplication
computation results in a partial signature and is independent of the message to
be signed. This can be computed as an oﬄine signature before the message to be
signed is known. Thus, this point multiplication operation forms the oﬄine phase
of the online/oﬄine version of BNN-IBS that we propose. The rest of the signature
generation process uses this oﬄine signature and the message and only performs
integer arithmetics to get the final signature of the message. Integer arithmetics
is very efficient for sensor nodes in terms of time and power consumption. Integer
arithmetics operations performed when the message to be signed is known form the
online phase of the adapted online/oﬄine version of BNN-IBS scheme. We named
the adapted IBOOS scheme as B-IBOOS scheme after the name of BNN-IBS scheme
which was proposed by Bellare et al. This transformation can be applied to both
BNN-IBS scheme and Cao’s variant of BNN-IBS scheme since both have the same
Setup, Key Extract and Sign algorithms and only the Verify algorithm is different.
5.2.2.1 B-IBOOS Scheme
Like the X-IBOOS scheme, the B-IBOOS scheme is a direct online/offine signature
scheme. The B-IBOOS scheme has five algorithms instead four algorithms of BNN-
IBS scheme. The additional algorithm in B-IBOOS scheme is introduced due the
fact that the message is signed in two phases in B-IBOOS scheme unlike BNN-
IBS scheme. The five algorithms of the B-IBOOS scheme are Setup, Key Extract,
OffSign, OnSign, and Verify. The Setup, Key Extract and Verify algorithms of the
B-IBOOS scheme are the same as in Cao’s variant of BNN-IBS scheme whereas the
Sign algorithm of the BNN-IBS version is split into OffSign and OnSign algorithms
in our adapted B-IBOOS scheme.
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Setup. This algorithm sets up the system parameters which are (E/Fp, G, P ,
q, p, P0, H1, H2). The Setup algorithm performs the following steps:
• Specify the parameters E/Fp, q, p, P and G, where
– E/Fp is an elliptic curve E over a finite field Fp,
– q is a large prime number and p is the field size,
– P is a point of order q on the curve E and,
– G is a cyclic group of order q under the point addition “+” generated by
P .
• Chose a master secret key s ∈R Z∗q uniformly.
• Compute the master public key as P0 = sP .
• Choose one cryptographic hash function H1 = {0, 1}∗ ×G→ Z∗q.
• Choose another cryptographic hash function H2 = {0, 1}∗ ×G→ Z∗q.
• Output the system parameters {E/Fp, G, P , q, p, P0, H1, H2} and keep s
secret.
Key Extract . Given an identity IDi of a user I, this algorithm computes the
corresponding private key as follows:
• Choose a random ri ∈R Z∗q and compute
• Ri = riP
• ci = H1(IDi, Ri)
• si = ri + cis
Here the private key si is the Schnorr signature of the identity IDi of I signed with
the master secret key of the PKG. The user I obtains (Ri, si) via a secure channel.
Here si is secret information whereas Ri is public.
OffSign . The oﬄine phase is performed before the message to be signed is
known. The OffSign algorithm proceeds as follows:
• Choose y ∈R Z∗q
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• Compute Y = yP
The oﬄine signature is (y, Y ).
OnSign . The online phase is performed after the message becomes available.
The OnSign algorithm computes
• h = H2(IDi, m, Ri, Y )
• z = y + hsi
The tuple 〈Ri, h, z〉 is I’s signature on message m.
Verify . Given the signature tuple 〈Ri, h, z〉, I’s identity IDi and the message
m, the Verify algorithm verifies the signature as follows:
• Compute ci = H1(IDi, Ri)
• Check whether the following equation holds
h = H2(IDi, m, Ri, zP - h(Ri + ciP0))
The signature is accepted if the answer is yes and rejected otherwise.
5.3 Proposed Authenticated Broadcast by
Sensor Nodes Protocol
In the proposed broadcast authentication protocol, the sensor nodes sign a broadcast
message in two phases. In first phase, the oﬄine signature is computed before any
time critical information to report is available. The oﬄine phase can be performed
by the base station or by the sensor node itself depending on the nature of the
application. The oﬄine signature is stored on the sensor node. In the second phase,
when a critical event happens, the sensor node uses the oﬄine signature to compute
the final signature of the message and broadcasts the message. The proposed scheme
for broadcast authentication using an IBOOS scheme consists of four phases, System
Initialization, Key Generation, Message Broadcast and Authentication, and Sender
Revocation. The first two phases are performed only once before the deployment
of the sensor network. As mentioned earlier, in ID-based signature schemes a
private key generator (PKG), which is a trustworthy entity, initializes the system
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and computes the private keys corresponding to the users’ IDs. In the proposed
protocol, the base station, which is a trustworthy and a resourceful device, plays the
role of PKG to initialize the system and compute the private keys. The details of
the protocol are explained as follows:
System Initialization: In this phase, the Setup algorithm of an IBOOS scheme
runs on the base station and computes the public system parameters and the master
secret key. Let SKBS be the secret key of the base station, which will be called the
master secret key. The base station calculates the corresponding public key PKBS,
which will be called the master public key. The master secret key SKBS is only
kept by the base station while the master public key PKBS is made public. The
base station also sets up public system parameters (SP ) in this phase which include
PKBS.
Key Generation: In this phase, the base station calculates the private keys of
all sensor nodes corresponding to their IDs using the master secret key SKBS and
other system parameters. For a sensor node I with identity IDi, the private key
DIDi is computed using the Key Extract algorithm as
DIDi ← KE (IDi, SKBS)
The ID, private key, system parameters and other related information (if any) are
stored on individual sensor nodes before the deployment of sensor network. Hence,
every sensor node I stores {IDi, DIDi , SP}.
Message Broadcast and Authentication: The process of a signature
generation for a broadcast message is divided in two phases: the oﬄine phase and
the online phase.
Oﬄine phase: The oﬄine phase is preformed before the message to broadcast
is available. The oﬄine signature generation algorithm (OffSign) runs in this phase
and performs most of the signature computations in order to compute the partial
signature S as
S ← OffSign(DIDi , SP )
The resulting partial signature S is stored on sensor node I.
Online phase: As soon as a sensor node I senses an event which requires quick
reporting, the online phase starts. In this phase, the sensor node I retrieves the
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partial signature S calculated in the oﬄine phase and performs very minor and fast
computations to get final signature σ over message m as
σ ← OnSign(〈m,TS〉, S)
Here TS is the current time stamp. The final broadcast message then contains the
message m, the time stamp TS, identity of the sensor node IDi and the signature
σ, i.e.,
{m, TS, IDi, σ}.
To sign a broadcast message, our adapted ID-based online/oﬄine signature scheme
i.e., the B-IBOOS scheme, or any other efficient as well as secure IBOOS scheme
can be used here.
Authentication: On receiving a broadcast message, the receiver node first checks
the time stamp TS to avoid the verification of a replayed message. If it is a fresh
one, the receiver node further proceeds with signature verification, else it discards
the message. The receiver node verifies the signature σ using the sender node’s
identity IDi and other system parameters as
yes/no ← Verify(〈m,TS〉, IDi, σ, SP )
If the verification holds, the receiver node accepts the message otherwise discards
it. If necessary it rebroadcasts (relays) the legitimate message to all sensor nodes
belonging to the next hop.
Sender Revocation: To revoke a compromised sensor node I, the base station
broadcasts its identity IDi to all other sensor nodes in the network, who store IDi.
If in the future a sensor node receives a message containing IDi, it simply rejects
the message without going through authentication process. An adversary is assumed
to compromise only a few sensor nodes in the network. Storing the IDs of a few
compromised nodes incurs a reasonable storage overhead for sensor nodes. Moreover,
the base station can periodically update system parameters and secret keys of all
legitimate sensor nodes excluding the malicious nodes. However, this update might
be costly. Another possible solution is to manually detach these compromised sensor
nodes from the sensor network.
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5.3.1 Is an Online/Oﬄine Signature Scheme Secure for
Wireless Sensor Networks?
An interesting and important question to ask here is whether it is secure to use an
online/oﬄine signature scheme in WSNs in the presence of the node compromise
attack? An online/oﬄine signature scheme signs a message in two phases. The
partial oﬄine signature is computed before the message is known and is stored on the
sensor node. Once the message is known, the sensor node uses this oﬄine signature
to compute the final signature on the message. What if an adversary compromises
the sensor node before the online phase starts and obtains the oﬄine signature
stored on it? Will it give an extra advantage to an adversary in comparison to the
situation where an ordinary digital signature is used? The answer to this question
is ‘NO’. The reason is that in both cases, once the adversary compromises a sensor
node, he has a full control over the compromised sensor node and all cryptographic
material stored on it including the private key of the node. With the private key of
the compromised sensor node, the adversary can sign the messages on behalf of that
node in both cases. Then, the presence of an extra phase in message signing process
of an online/oﬄine signature does not give any extra benefit to the adversary. Hence,
using an online/oﬄine signature scheme in WSNs is as secure as using any other
digital signature scheme.
5.4 Performance Evaluation
The performance of the proposed protocol is evaluated in two steps. In first step,
we discuss the efficiency of several IBOOS schemes on sensor nodes. In second step,
we analyze the efficiency of the proposed authenticated broadcast by sensor nodes
protocol using IBOOS schemes.
5.4.1 Performance of the IBOOS Schemes
The goal of implementing the IBOOS schemes on sensor nodes was to validate the
idea of applying IBOOS to WSNs experimentally. Specifically, we aimed to find the
answers to the following questions:
1. Is it possible for a typical resource constrained sensor node processor to
perform IBOOS operations?
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2. How efficient it is to compute an IBOOS scheme on sensor nodes in terms of
resource consumption with respect to the computation, communication and
memory costs?
5.4.1.1 Hardware and Software Used
MICA2. For implementation purposes, the hardware platform selected was the
standard MICA2 [MIC] sensor node. MICA2 has an integrated ATMEGA 128L
micro-controller from the AVR family having 8-bit processor, 4KB of SRAM, 128KB
of flash memory (ROM) with a clock speed of 7.3828MHz. MICA2 radio operates
on 868/916 MHz ISM band. 868 MHz is a license-free frequency band for Europe.
MICA2 is a popular choice among research community. Several research groups
[GPW+04, PLP06, ADLO10, OAG+11] all over the world have used MICA2 nodes
for the evaluation of security protocols and cryptographic operations. This fact
helped us to compare our experimental results with others. Figure 5.1 shows a
MICA2 (MPR4x0) node without an antenna.
Figure 5.1: MICA2 node without an antenna [Cro]
TinyOS. The MICA2 motes use a special operating system called TinyOS [Tin].
TinyOS is an open source operating system designed for wireless embedded sensor
networks, released under the BSD license. Its component-based architecture enables
rapid innovation and implementation while minimizing the code size to meet the
severe memory constraints inherent in sensor networks. The component library of
TinyOS includes network protocols, distributed services, sensor drivers, and data
acquisition tools all of which can be used as they are or be further refined for a
custom application. Sine sensor nodes are application specific, only one application
runs on a sensor node. Therefore, TinyOS does not support memory management
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or process management. TinyOS was originally developed as a research project at
the University of California Berkeley, but has since grown to have an international
community of developers and users.
NesC. The TinyOS operating system has been implemented in a language called
nesC [Nes]. This language is an extension of C language. It has been designed to
embody the structuring concepts and execution model of TinyOS. For further details
of TinyOS and nesC, see tutorials online available at [Tin] and [Nes], respectively.
The further details about how hardware and software are setup to build a test
sensor network and how sensor nodes are programmed are given in Appendix A.
5.4.1.2 Performance Metrics
The primary goal of these experiments was to gather the actual statistics about
the resource consumption of an IBOOS scheme on real sensor nodes and study
its performance. In the case of a signature scheme, the primary factors that
affect a sensor node’s resources are the signature generation and verification
costs (computation and memory costs) and signature size (transmission cost).
Therefore, the IBOOS schemes are evaluated for the following performance metrics:
computation cost (time and battery power consumption), memory consumption
(ROM/RAM usage), and signature size. The transmission cost is proportional to
the signature size, thus we only count the signature size.
5.4.1.3 Experimental Details
The implementation involved a base station (a laptop with TinyOS installed on
it) and two MICA2 sensor nodes; one acting as a signer while the other acting
as a verifier. However, both nodes had the ability to sign as well as verify the
messages. To perform the cryptographic operations, we used RELIC [AG]. RELIC is
a publicly available highly efficient library to implement cryptographic operations on
sensor nodes particularly the most efficient implementation of pairing computation
operation. Since both IBOOS schemes chosen for experiments required pairing
computations, we decided to use this library. The security level of ∼80-bit (RSA-1024
equivalent), considered adequate for resource constrained sensor nodes by NIST, was
adopted. ηT pairing [BGhS07] was chosen to compute pairing operation. ηT pairing
is the fastest one to compute on resource constrained sensor nodes and a best choice
at this security level [OAG+11]. The Setup and the Key Extract phases of ID-
based settings were performed at the base station. The system parameters and
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other relevant information for the sensor nodes were stored on them via the base
station. All the software programs (including the codes for online/oﬄine signature
schemes) running on the sensor nodes for evaluation had been implemented in the
nesC language installed on the TinyOS operating system. We developed and tested
our programs first on TOSSIM [Tos] and Avrora [Avr], two popular simulation
and analysis tools for MICA micro-controllers. These tools allow both the code
development and the debugging. The programs were then installed on MICA2
sensor nodes. The reported implementation results of the computation cost and
memory consumption are the average of running the code 50 times.
5.4.1.4 Results of X-IBOOS Scheme
We implemented the X-IBOOS scheme on sensor nodes first. This section presents
the implementation results of the X-IBOOS scheme.
a) Computation Cost
The X-IBOOS scheme involves two pairing computations in signature verification as
the most expensive cryptographic operations. Table 5.1 shows the time and energy
consumption of this scheme. It took about 1.697s to compute the oﬄine signature
while only 0.018s to compute the online part. Thus, this scheme enables a sensor
node to generate a final signature of a real time message in 0.018s only, which is quite
fast considering the resource constraints of a sensor node. However, the signature
verification is very expensive which consumes considerable time of 5.099s and hence
the battery power1 due to the two pairing computations. The computation of a
single pairing operation using RELIC takes about 1.9s [OAG+11].
Time (s) Energy (mWs)
Oﬄine Sign 1.697 50.92
Online Sign 0.018 0.54
Verify 5.099 177.01
Table 5.1: Time and Energy Consumption of X-IBOOS Scheme
1Power consumption is computed using the MICA2 data sheet [MIC] and the computed number
of clock cycles for each stage. The power consumption is calculated at 3V power supply and
7.3728MHZ clock frequency.
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b) Signature Size
A signature in the X-IBOOS scheme is comprised of two group elements of the form
(x, y) and one number. Based on our selection of ηT pairing and ∼80-bit security
level, a random number takes about 271 bits and a group element is about 2*271
bits. Therefore, the resulting signature size is 1355 bits or 170 bytes. This signature
size can be reduced to 102 bytes by applying compression and including only one
co-ordinate (x) of the group element. Given x and a single bit of y, the receiver
can regenerate y, the second co-ordinate of the group element. However, this is a
trade-off between the transmission cost of sending both co-ordinates (x, y) and the
computation cost of deriving y on the receiver side.
c) Memory Consumption
Table 5.2 summarizes the memory requirement of the X-IBOOS scheme including
the size of both signature generation and verification codes. It also includes the code
size of RELIC, TinyOS code, node’s ID (16 bits) and private key (2∗271 bits), master
public key (2∗271 bits) and other system parameters. The memory consumption of
ROM, Global RAM and Stack RAM is 63,972, 1,933 and 1,911 bytes respectively.
The stack memory is consumed only during the execution of the program, i.e.,
during the signature generation and verification. Once the program stops execution,
this memory is available for other operations. Note that this is the total storage
consumption on a sensor node when a sensor node acts as both a signer and a verifier.
In our proposed authenticated broadcast by sensor nodes scheme, a sensor node acts
as a sender as well as a receiver of broadcast messages. This memory consumption
can be reduced by storing only one co-ordinate x of the group elements on sensor
node. Given x and a single bit of y, the node can derive y when it needs. This will
reduce the storage consumption per one group element stored on the sensor node
by 270 bits.
ROM Global RAM Stack RAM
63,972 1,933 1,911
Table 5.2: Memory Consumption of X-IBOOS Scheme in Bytes
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5.4.1.5 Optimization: Our Adapted B-IBOOS Scheme
We proposed to evaluate the two IBOOS schemes, X-IBOOS and R-IBOOS, as
mentioned earlier. However, the evaluation results of X-IBOOS scheme depict
the fact that the X-IBOOS scheme is costly for sensor nodes in terms of resource
consumption. In fact, the reason behind this cost is the pairing computations which
consume considerable resources on sensor nodes including processing time, battery
power and memory. The signature verification in X-IBOOS scheme consumed 5.099s
which is not very ideal for real-time applications. A single pairing computation using
RELIC takes about 1.9s [OAG+11]. To the best of our knowledge, this is the most
efficient implementation result of pairing operation for MICA2 sensor nodes. The
resulting signature size is 170 bytes which implies considerable communication cost.
Since the R-IBOOS scheme also requires pairing computations, similarly expensive
results are to be expected from the implementation of R-IBOOS scheme. Hence, we
decided to skip its implementation as we were looking for IBOOS schemes efficient for
sensor nodes. Our next step was to find a pairing-free IBOOS scheme to implement
and evaluate for sensor nodes.
To the best of our knowledge, there are a few ECC based IBS schemes
without pairing [BNN04, CKDZ08, GG09] but no ECC based IBOOS scheme
without pairing. Therefore, to obtain a pairing-free IBOOS scheme, we securely
transformed a pairing-free IBS scheme to a pairing-free IBOOS scheme, i.e., B-
IBOOS scheme. The details of this modification together with the B-IBOOS
scheme have already been discussed in Section 5.2.2. The B-IBOOS scheme has
only one point multiplication as the expensive operation in signature generation
which is computed during the oﬄine phase. The online phase only performs integer
arithmetics to obtain the final signature of the message, which is very efficient for
sensor nodes. The signature verification in B-IBOOS scheme requires three point
multiplication operations which, although expensive, are far less expensive than a
single pairing computation for sensor nodes. Thus, we implemented and evaluated
the adapted B-IBOOS scheme in next step.
5.4.1.6 Results of B-IBOOS Scheme
In our implementation of B-IBOOS scheme, that is the IBOOS version of the IBS
scheme presented in [CKDZ08], the sensor nodes are both signers and verifiers. The
IBS scheme in [CKDZ08] is actually an improvement over the BNN-IBS [BNN04]
scheme to reduce the signature size. This improved version of the BNN-IBS
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scheme has already been proposed to use in WSNs in [CKDZ08] without the actual
implementation on sensor nodes. In [CKDZ08], the improved signature scheme is
used to provide outside user authentication where sensor nodes are the verifiers only.
a) Computation Cost
The B-IBOOS scheme computes three point multiplication operations in signature
verification as expensive cryptographic operations for sensor nodes. The oﬄine phase
is comprised of only one point multiplication. A point multiplication took 0.295s
in our implementation which confirmed the point multiplication cost obtained by
[ADLO10] using the same RELIC library. Table 5.3 shows the time and energy
consumption of this scheme. It took about 0.295s to compute the oﬄine signature
whereas only 0.025s to compute the online part. The computation cost of the online
phase is almost the same for both B-IBOOS (Table 5.3) and X-IBOOS (Table 5.1)
schemes. Nevertheless, in the oﬄine phase X-IBOOS scheme took more time, and
thus consumed more battery power than B-IBOOS scheme. The same is the case
with the verification phase. The B-IBOOS scheme, being a pairing-free signature
scheme, verifies the signature in 1.044s only as compared to the verification time of
5.099s of the X-IBOOS scheme. A comparison of Table 5.1 and Table 5.3 revealed
the fact that the B-IBOOS scheme is very efficient for resource constrained sensor
nodes in terms of computation cost when compared with the X-IBOOS scheme.
Time (s) Energy (mWs)
Oﬄine Sign 0.295 8.85
Online Sign 0.025 0.74
Verify 1.044 31.33
Table 5.3: Time and Energy Consumption of B-IBOOS Scheme
b) Signature Size
The signature in B-IBOOS scheme is comprised of one elliptic curve point of the
form (x, y) and two numbers. We used 163-bit field for ECC to meet the ∼80-bit
security level. For these settings, a number takes 160 bits while one elliptic curve
point takes 2∗163 bits. Therefore, the resulting signature size is 646 bits (80 bytes)
without compression while 484 bits (60 bytes) with compression. This signature size
is much smaller than the one in X-IBOOS scheme, and thus results in a reduced
transmission cost. The standard IEEE Std. 802.15.4 [ICS03] for the low-power
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sensor networks allows a variable payload of up to 102 bytes. With this packet
size, a sensor node still has 22 bytes available to include its ID and the message
m, other than uncompressed 80 bytes of the signature, to send them all together in
a single packet. The messages exchanged to report any critical event, for instance
the location of an enemy, are usually short in size up to a few bytes. Therefore, 22
bytes provide enough space for both the ID and the message m.
c) Memory Consumption
Table 5.4 shows the memory requirement of the B-IBOOS scheme. Like X-IBOOS
scheme (Table 5.2), it includes the memory consumed by the signature generation
and verification code, RELIC code, TinyOS code, node’s ID (16 bits) and private
key (160 bits), master public key (2∗163 bits) and other system parameters. In case
of B-IBOOS scheme, ROM, Global RAM and Stack RAM consume 47,798, 1,902
and 1,821 bytes respectively. The memory consumed by the stack is returned once
the program completes its execution. Like in the case of X-IBOOS scheme, this is
the total storage consumption on a sensor node when a sensor node acts as both a
signer and a verifier. This memory consumption can also be reduced by storing only
one co-ordinate (x) of the elliptic curve points of the form (x, y). It reduces the
memory consumption per one elliptic curve point stored on the sensor node by 162
bits. Compared with the memory consumption in X-IBOOS scheme (Table 5.2),
the ROM consumption is lower in B-IBOOS scheme than in X-IBOOS scheme while
the Global RAM consumption is almost the same in both schemes. The stack
usage is slightly lower in B-IBOOS scheme than in X-IBOOS scheme. However, the
overall RAM consumption of B-IBOOS scheme is slightly smaller than the RAM
consumption in X-IBOOS scheme.
ROM Global RAM Stack RAM
47,798 1,902 1,821
Table 5.4: Memory Consumption of B-IBOOS Scheme in Bytes
5.4.1.7 Optimization
In the light of the results we obtained for computation cost, signature size and
memory consumption of both IBOOS schemes, X-IBOOS and B-IBOOS, it is
clear that the B-IBOOS scheme outperforms the X-IBOOS scheme in terms of
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computation cost and signature size. The memory usage, however, did not make
a big difference in both schemes. One factor, which was contributing towards the
memory usage of B-IBOOS scheme, was the fact that RELIC used a precomputed
table to speed up the computation of point multiplication for ECC based schemes.
This precomputed table was also stored and consumed some memory space on the
sensor node. To optimize the B-IBOOS scheme for memory consumption, we decided
to evaluate this scheme without the precomputed table of RELIC. It restrained us
from using one efficient function of RELIC used to compute the point addition
of the two point multiplications, i.e., (aP + bQ). Table 5.5 and Table 5.6 show
the implementation results of the B-IBOOS scheme obtained after removing the
precomputed table of RELIC.
Time (s) Energy (mWs)
Oﬄine Sign 0.317 9.52
Online Sign 0.025 0.74
Verify 1.118 33.54
Table 5.5: Optimized Time and Energy Consumption of B-IBOOS Scheme
ROM Global RAM Stack RAM
45,612 1,634 1,381
Table 5.6: Optimized Memory Consumption of B-IBOOS Scheme in Bytes
Compared with Table 5.3 and Table 5.4, avoiding the precomputed table reduced
the memory consumption of B-IBOOS scheme, particularly the RAM consumption.
Although, it slightly increases the time and power consumptions of the oﬄine phase
and the signature verification phase, this increment is not a drastic change. It is
an acceptable trade-off between the computation cost and the memory usage giving
10% of free memory. However, it depends on the nature of the application whether
it can compromise on speed or memory.
Table 5.7 and Table 5.8 summarize the performance results of X-IBOOS and
B-IBOOS schemes for comparison purposes.
5.4.1.8 Application Possibilities for Different IBOOS Schemes
The two implementations of B-IBOOS scheme offer a trade-off between the
computation cost and the memory usage. Memory can be saved by removing the
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Schemes Time (s) Energy (mWs)
X-IBOOS
Oﬄine Sign 1.697 50.92
Online Sign 0.018 0.54
Verify 5.099 177.01
B-IBOOS
Oﬄine Sign 0.295 8.85
Online Sign 0.025 0.74
Verify 1.044 31.33
B-IBOOS - Optimized
Oﬄine Sign 0.317 9.52
Online Sign 0.025 0.74
Verify 1.118 33.54
Table 5.7: Summary of Time and Energy Consumption of X-IBOOS and B-IBOOS
Schemes
Schemes ROM Global RAM Stack RAM
X-IBOOS 63,972 1,933 1,911
B-IBOOS 47,798 1,902 1,821
B-IBOOS - Optimized 45,612 1,634 1,381
Table 5.8: Summary of Memory Consumption of X-IBOOS and B-IBOOS Schemes
in Bytes
precomputed table and slightly increasing the computation time. However, this can
be decided depending on the type of application. The oﬄine signature is computed
before the message to be signed is available and the online phase takes the same
time in both implementations, i.e., 0.025s. Therefore, the time to compute the final
signature, once the message is known, is the same in both cases. For the time critical
applications, it is reasonable to use the first implementation of B-IBOOS scheme if
the receiver is a sensor node, and the second implementation of B-IBOOS scheme
if the receiver is a powerful device. Moreover, if the oﬄine phase is performed on
the base station and the resulting oﬄine signature is stored on the sensor node,
the X-IBOOS scheme can also be useful for such applications of WSNs where the
signature verifier is a powerful device. For such applications, the X-IBOOS scheme
enables a sensor node to broadcast a signed message only in 0.018s which is quicker
than the B-IBOOS scheme.
5.4.1.9 Impact of Applying IBOOS Schemes on Sensor Nodes
In previous sections, we presented the experimental results of implementing and
executing IBOOS schemes on sensor nodes. In the light of those results, we
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demonstrate the impact of IBOOS schemes on sensor nodes lives in this section.
The public key cryptography based digital signatures are expensive to compute
on sensor nodes as compared to the MAC operation. However, the application
of public key cryptography operations on sensor nodes does not affect a node’s
life time drastically, if the number of operations is smaller or spread over time
[PLP06]. In time critical applications of WSNs, the broadcast of a message by a
sensor node is not a very frequent event. An example of such applications is a forest
fire alarm application. In a forest fire alarm application, a message is sent by a
sensor node only when a fire is set up somewhere in the forest which is not very
frequent. Signing and verifying a message occasionally only in critical situations
is not very expensive for the sensor nodes. With 2AA batteries in ordinary MICA
sensor nodes, the available battery power is 6750,000mW [PLP06]. If only 2% of this
battery power i.e., 135,000mW, is available for signing broadcast messages, a sensor
node can sign 14,077 messages applying the first B-IBOOS implementation and
13,158 messages applying the second B-IBOOS implementation during the life time
of the batteries. For the same available battery power, a sensor node can verify 4,308
messages in the first B-IBOOS implementation and 4,025 messages in the second
B-IBOOS implementation. This number of broadcast messages is big enough for
the considered applications, for instance, the forest fire alaram application. These
figures are calculated by assuming the fact that both the oﬄine and the online phases
are performed by the sensor nodes themselves.
5.4.2 Performance of the Proposed Protocol
We now evaluate the performance of the proposed authenticated broadcast by sensor
nodes protocol using IBOOS schemes. To the best of our knowledge, the proposed
protocol is the first attempt to highlight and provide a solution to the problem
of sensor nodes broadcast authentication. The proposed protocol introduces the
online/oﬄine signature schemes to the WSNs for the first time. It therefore handles
the problem of real-time broadcast applications providing security with efficiency.
Due to the online/oﬄine signature, a resource constrained sensor node can sign a
message quickly and efficiently. Moreover, the ID-based cryptography copes with
the problem of public keys and certificates management. The proposed protocol
using the IBOOS schemes does not only meet the design challenges mentioned in
the beginning of this chapter but also provides some extra features as follows:
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5.4.2.1 Broadcast by Sensor Nodes
In the proposed protocol, a sensor node can broadcast a message by itself without
the involvement of the base station or any other third party unlike µTESLA based
authentication schemes where a sensor node can broadcast only via base station.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first broadcast authentication protocol for
large scale sensor networks which empowers all sensor nodes in the sensor network
to become broadcast senders.
5.4.2.2 Quick Broadcast
An online/oﬄine signature scheme computes the most time consuming oﬄine phase
of the signature generation beforehand and the sensor nodes only need to compute
the quick and efficient computations of the online phase when the message is known.
It enables sensor nodes to sign a message quickly once they have some event to report.
Consequently, the proposed protocol enables a quick broadcast of signed messages
by the sensor nodes to respond to the time critical situations.
5.4.2.3 Storage Efficiency
The broadcast receiver nodes store the µTESLA parameters, in µTESLA based
schemes, and the ID and public key pairs, in digital signature based schemes, of all
broadcast senders. In the proposed protocol, the receiving nodes do not need to store
any broadcast sender specific information for the verification of broadcast messages.
They are only required to store their own public and private information and the
system parameters. Thus, the proposed protocol achieves the storage efficiency.
5.4.2.4 Computation Efficiency
In the proposed protocol, as discussed previously, the oﬄine signature generation
phase can be performed by any resourceful device, for instance, the base station.
By performing the most complex computations of oﬄine phase on the base station,
the sensor nodes are only left with the online phase computations. The online phase
computations involve only integer arithmetic and are very efficient to compute for
sensor nodes in terms of time and power consumption. As a result, the proposed
protocol reduces the computation burden of a signature generation on sensor nodes.
However, it depends on the nature of the application and the trade off between the
computation and communication costs. For example, in a fire alarm application,
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the broadcast of a message is not a very frequent event. The base station can
compute and distribute a few oﬄine signatures to the sensor nodes that can store
them for later use. The distribution and storage of a few oﬄine signatures incur
only a reasonable communication and storage overheads on sensor nodes, reducing
the computation overhead on the other hand. Moreover, reusing an oﬄine signature
to sign more than one message results into further computation efficiency.
5.4.2.5 Communication Efficiency
The ID-based signature schemes do not require a broadcast sender to send a
public key and/or a certificate with all messages, as is done in some existing
signature based authentication schemes for WSNs in order to avoid storage overhead.
Thus, the proposed protocol using ID-based online/oﬄine signatures reduces the
communication overhead of the signature based authentication schemes without
increasing storage overhead.
5.4.2.6 Multiple Senders
Unlike µTESLA based broadcast authentication schemes, which allow only one
broadcast sender (i.e., the base station), the proposed protocol enables more than
one sensor node to send authenticated broadcast messages. Preloaded with their
IDs, private keys and other system parameters, the broadcast sender nodes can
broadcast authenticated messages which can be verified by any other sensor node
in the network using the ID information of the broadcast sender sent along with
the messages. Moreover, the multiple broadcast sender nodes can send broadcast
messages simultaneously at any time which are verified by the receivers as soon
as they have been received. Therefore, the proposed protocol using the ID-based
online/oﬄine signatures supports multiple broadcast senders.
5.4.2.7 Scalability
Scalability in the context of designing a broadcast authentication scheme for WSNs
refers to building an application that can scale well and easily support large number
of broadcast senders and receivers. In most of the existing broadcast authentication
schemes for WSNs, the high storage requirement restricts the number of broadcast
senders. For example, the µTESLA based schemes require every sensor node to
store the long hash key chains and µTESLA parameters of every other broadcast
sender node in the network whereas the digital signature based schemes require to
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store the ID and public key pairs of every broadcast sender. Due to the limited
storage capability, a sensor node can store the sender related information, for
instance the µTESLA parameters or the ID and public key pairs, for only a limited
number of broadcast senders, restricting the number of broadcast senders. ID-based
cryptography resolves the public key and certificate management problem faced in
WSN environment and therefore, the sensor nodes do not need to store the ID and
public key pair of any sender node. As a result, the proposed protocol using the ID-
based signature schemes supports a large number of broadcast senders. Moreover,
new sensor nodes can be added to the WSN easily at any time. Preloaded with ID,
private key and system parameters, a new sensor node can broadcast authenticated
messages as well as verify signed messages sent by any other broadcast sender node.
Hence, the proposed protocol meets the scalability challenge of designing a broadcast
authentication protocol described at the beginning of this chapter.
5.4.2.8 Robustness to Packet Loss
In µTESLA based authentication schemes, first broadcast packets are sent and then
the MAC keys to authenticate those packets are sent. If a packet carrying a MAC
key is lost due to the radio communication, the broadcast receivers will not be
able to authenticate all those broadcast packets received in a previous time interval.
Hence, µTESLA based broadcast authentication protocols do not provide robustness
to packet loss. In the proposed protocol, as soon as a signed message is received it
can be verified individually and if a packet is lost, it only affects the single message
carried by that packet, providing robustness to packet loss.
5.5 Security Analysis
This section first reviews the security of the IBOOS schemes i.e., the B-IBOOS
scheme, and then the security of the proposed authenticated broadcast by sensor
nodes protocol using IBOOS schemes.
5.5.1 Security of the IBOOS Schemes
The performance evaluation of the B-IBOOS scheme proved this signature scheme
the most efficient IBOOS scheme among the existing ones. We therefore only
discuss the security of the B-IBOOS scheme. The BNN-IBS scheme has been
shown to be existentially unforgeable against the chosen message and ID attacks
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(i.e., euf-cma-ida secure) in [BNN04]. Using BNN-IBS as an IBOOS does not
affect the security of this signature scheme. It is secure to compute the oﬄine part
before the message is known and store it. If an attacker compromises a sensor node
and obtains both the oﬄine signature Y and the random number y used to generate
Y , he still would not be able to get any extra benefits other than the ones obtained
by compromising a sensor node. The attacker will not be able to reuse that oﬄine
signature to impersonate the sensor node since the oﬄine signature does not use
the private key of the sensor node or any other node specific information. After
computing the final signature and broadcasting it, the sensor node deletes both y
and Y . In addition, when an attacker compromises a sensor node he has access to
the private key of the sensor node. In that scenario, none of the signature schemes
are secure anymore.
5.5.2 Security of the Proposed Protocol
5.5.2.1 Security Properties Achieved
We now explain how the security properties listed in Section 4.3 are achieved by the
proposed authenticated broadcast by sensor nodes protocol.
Authentication . The proposed sensor nodes broadcast protocol provides the
required authentication, i.e., a proof of the identity of the claimed message sender.
The required authentication is achieved via the signed messages that are signed by
a broadcast sender using his private key and a secure IBOOS scheme, giving a proof
of the sender’s identity. This proof of identity is affirmed by verifying the signed
message. The successful signature verification implies that the claimed message
sender is the actual source of the message.
Message Integrity . The proposed protocol using IBOOS schemes ensures
message integrity since any changes made in the contents of a broadcast message
during the transmission are detected through the signature verification. Any
message modified in transit will not pass the signature verification process.
Verification . The proposed protocol empowers every sensor node in the sensor
network to verify a broadcast message sent by any sender in the network. The
verifiers only need the signer’s ID information sent along with the message to
verify the signed message. The receivers do not need any other sender specific
information, like µTESLA parameters, in order to be able to verify a signed message.
Moreover, our experimental results proved the fact that it is possible for the resource
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constrained sensor nodes to perform signature verification computations required in
an efficient IBOOS scheme.
Freshness. In the proposed protocol, every broadcast message includes a
timestamp and only the messages with the fresh timestamps are accepted. Thus,
the proposed protocol provides freshness.
Availability . In µTESLA based authentication schemes, where the base station
makes a single point of failure, if the base station fails the whole protocols collapse.
On the other hand, in the proposed broadcast authentication protocol even if
the base station becomes unavailable for some time, the message senders can still
broadcast the signed messages and the receivers can verify them.
5.5.2.2 Countermeasures to Security Attacks
This section discusses how the security attacks listed in Section 4.4 are countered
by the proposed broadcast authentication protocol.
1. Node Impersonation Attack. The proposed broadcast authentication protocol
employs secure IBOOS schemes providing strong authentication and message
integrity. The secure IBOOS schemes make it impossible for an intruder to
sign a message on behalf of or modify a valid message sent by a legitimate
broadcast sender node. Only the legitimate broadcast sender node with a
valid secret key can sign a message. For an attacker to impersonate a broadcast
sender node, he must be able to compute a valid message signed by the target
legitimate sender node (i.e., a valid message signature pair). However, it is
hard to compute such a valid pair without the knowledge of private key of the
target legitimate sender. At the same time, no one can forge a signature in
the presence of an existentially unforgeable signature scheme.
2. False Data Injection Attack. The verification of the signed messages in the
proposed broadcast authentication protocol distinguishes the actual data from
the false data injected by the intruder to waste the resources of the relaying
sensor nodes. The proposed protocol enables all sensor nodes on the message
path, during multi-hop forwarding, to verify any data messages in the network
and filter out false injected data as soon as it has been injected.
3. DoS Attack. The proposed broadcast authentication protocol yields authenti-
cation of a broadcast message without any delay. A signed broadcast message
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is verified as soon as it has been received. This instant and individual
authentication prevents the DoS attack faced in µTESLA based schemes.
Moreover, the early detection of false data injected into the sensor network
avoids the DoS attack against the resources of the relaying sensor nodes.
4. Node Compromise Attacks. The proposed protocol avoids the node compro-
mise attack typically faced in MAC based authentication schemes. In the
proposed protocol, an intruder can impersonate only the compromised node.
The collusion of multiple compromised sensor nodes will not give any extra
benefits to the adversary than those obtained by the individual compromised
nodes. Furthermore, after revocation process the compromised nodes will not
be able to successfully broadcast messages in the network.
5. Message Replay Attack. The proposed protocol uses timestamps in order to
provide freshness which ultimately resists message replay attacks. A receiver
node first checks the timestamp before actual signature verification to avoid
the verification of a replayed message. Depending on the transmission delay
imposed by the communication channel between the sender and the receiver,
the sensor node sets a time threshold leaving a potential attacker little time
to mount a replay attack.
5.6 Comparison with Existing Protocols
Now we compare the proposed authenticated broadcast by sensor nodes protocol
using IBOOS schemes with the existing digital signature based authentication
protocols for WSNs: CAS [RLZ07], DAS [RLZ07], IDS [RLZM07], and IMBAS
[CKDZ08]. The details of these schemes are given in Section 3.2.2. We do not
include the µTESLA based broadcast authentication schemes here due to the fact
that they cannot provide a solution to the broadcast authentication problem in
real-time applications of WSNs. For the comparison purposes, we assume the
pairing-free B-IBOOS scheme for our proposed protocol. The actual implementation
results of the existing digital signature based schemes on real sensor nodes are
not available. These authentication schemes assume broadcast senders as powerful
devices, however for comparison purposes, we estimate the cost of applying these
schemes to ordinary sensor nodes. Using the most efficient implementation results
of the computation costs of pairing operation, point multiplication and elliptic curve
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Schemes Signature Sign Time Verify Time Storage α Msg Size
Oﬄine Online
s s s KB Bytes
Existing Broadcast Authentication Schemes
CAS
ECDSA 0 0.36 2×0.63 0 60 β
[RLZ07]
DAS
ECDSA 0 0.36 0.63 1172 γ 40
[RLZ07]
IDS
Pairing based 0 2.2 4.98 0 84 ρ
[RLZM07]
IMBAS
BNN-IBS 0 0.32 1.044 0 80
[CKDZ08]
Proposed Broadcast Authentication Scheme
Proposed B-IBOOS 0.295 0.025 1.044 0 80
α storage only considers the additional authentication information stored
β Msg size ignores the signed certificate sent to extract ECDSA public key
γ computed for a large WSN of about 60,000 sensor nodes and 20 bytes public key
ρ signature size given in [RLZ07]
Table 5.9: Comparison of proposed broadcast authentication scheme with existing
digital signature based broadcast authentication schemes for WSNs
digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) on MICA2 sensor nodes and ignoring all other
costs including hash computations, we roughly estimated the time cost of these
schemes for comparison purposes. A point multiplication operation on MICA2 takes
about 0.295s (our result), pairing operation takes 1.9s [OAG+11] (and our result),
signature generation and verification for ECDSA take 0.36s and 0.63s respectively
[ADLO10]. Using these results, Table 5.9 gives the time cost of all schemes. The
message size includes both the signature size as well as the public key (20 bytes for
ECDSA) ignoring the certificate size for the first scheme while only the signature
size for all other schemes.
The first two schemes CAS and DAS propose to use ECDSA signature scheme
to sign a message. CAS requires the signer’s public key and certificate to be sent
with every signed message, increasing message size and hence the transmission cost.
The receiver verifies two ECDSA signatures for every received message; one to verify
the signed certificate and another to verify the signed message. DAS, on the other
hand, requires all sensor nodes to store the public keys of every broadcast sender
in the network, increasing the storage overhead. For a large scale sensor network,
it is not possible for a sensor node having a limited storage capability to store the
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public key of every other sensor node in the network. For instance, considering a
large scale sensor network of about 60,000 sensor nodes and ECDSA public key of
size 20 bytes, every sensor node is required to store 1172KB which is beyond the
storage capabilities of a sensor node.
The signature generation in IDS comprises one pairing and one point multiplica-
tion computations while signature verification involves two pairing computations and
one exponentiation in target group GT (say ETG). Note that if the basic operation in
G is denoted multiplicatively (×) instead of additively (+), the point multiplication
in G is then called exponentiation (say EG) correspondingly, and hence takes
0.295s. However, the exponentiation in the target group GT (in the settings of
pairing [CMS08]) takes more time than exponentiation (or point multiplication) in
G because of the fact that it computes arithmetic in GT which is operated in a
field much bigger than the field in which G is defined. In usual implementations
of pairing, one exponentiation in GT costs about equal to four exponentiations in
multiplicative group [CMS08] and hence four point multiplications in an additive
group. Thus, the signature verification cost for IDS is two pairing operations
and four point multiplications (for ETG). Like exponentiation operation, a point
multiplication in pairing-based settings also takes longer than in pairing-free ECC
based settings. However, we use the cost of point multiplication in pairing-free ECC
based settings here to evaluate IDS scheme. IMBAS proposes BNN-IBS signature
scheme for sensor networks where sensor nodes are only receivers (verifiers). The
signature verification in BNN-IBS requires three point multiplications as expensive
operations. The signature verification costs of BNN-IBS and B-IBOOS schemes are
the same since B-IBOOS is the adapted IBOOS version of BNN-IBS scheme.
The figures in Table 5.9 show that the proposed sensor nodes broadcast
authentication scheme using B-IBOOS scheme enables a sensor node to sign and
broadcast a message in 0.025s only whenever it has some time-critical event to report
as compared to the existing schemes which take significantly longer. In signature
verification, only DAS consumes less time than the proposed scheme. However, it
increases the storage overhead of storing senders public keys beyond the storage
capabilities of the sensor nodes. The comparison results given in Table 5.9 suggest
that the proposed authenticated broadcast by sensor nodes protocol using IBOOS
schemes is the most efficient and suitable scheme for the time critical applications
of WSNs when compared with the existing signature based authentication schemes.
It also allows the base station to compute the oﬄine signature on behalf of a sensor
node, reducing computation overhead on them.
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Note that for MICA2, the active power consumption is 30mW [PLP06].
Therefore, the energy consumption Y can be computed using the time consumed
X as Y = X × 30 (mWs). Moreover, the transmission cost is proportional to the
message size.
5.7 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, the proposed broadcast by sensor nodes authentication protocol and
its performance and security evaluations have been presented. The existing µTESLA
based authentication schemes failed to handle the broadcast scenario of multiple
senders. The existing signature based authentication schemes, on the other hand,
failed to meet the requirements of real-time applications. Compared to the existing
digital signature based authentication schemes, the proposed protocol introduces
the online/oﬄine signatures to the WSNs. An IBOOS scheme does not only address
the problem of real time broadcast applications of WSNs but also brings efficiency
on resource constrained sensor nodes side. The implementation and evaluation
of several IBOOS schemes on real sensor nodes prove the fact that the IBOOS
schemes are suitable for the sensor nodes. The X-IBOOS scheme proved expensive
for the sensor nodes, consuming considerable resources on them. However, the
reason behind this cost was not the online/oﬄine signature itself but the expensive
pairing based cryptography. The implementation results of our adapted B-IBOOS
scheme proved this argument. It implies that if we use pairing-free efficient ECC
based IBOOS schemes for WSNs, we can obtain efficient results. Moreover, if in
future a more efficient implementation of pairing computation for sensor nodes
processors is available than the one in hand now, the pairing-based IBOOS scheme
may also become eligible to use in WSNs. The implementation results of the
IBOOS schemes confirmed the suitability of the proposed authenticated broadcast
by sensor nodes protocol, demonstrating particularly low computation overhead of
the proposed protocol as compared to the existing digital signature based broadcast
authentication protocols for WSNs.
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Chapter 6
Outside User Authentication
Protocol
Chapter Overview: This chapter presents the proposed out-
side user authentication protocol using the ID-based signature
schemes together with its performance and security evaluations.
The first half of the chapter highlights the challenges faced in the
design of a user authentication protocol and discusses the avail-
able ID-based signature schemes. It also describes the available
session key establishment options and protocols and our proposed
ID-based one-pass session key establishment protocol. It then
presents the proposed outside user authentication protocol in
detail. The second half of this chapter evaluates the performance
and security of the proposed protocol. At the end of the chapter,
the proposed protocol has been compared with the existing user
authentication protocols for WSNs.
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6.1 Introduction
The favorable outcomes of many WSN applications rely upon the presence of a secure
and efficient outside user authentication protocol. An example of such applications
is a large scale sensor network set up for business purposes. This sensor network
collects the data of interest to multiple outside users, like research organizations,
other businesses and individuals, and sells this data to these users in return of
money. The major concern of this application is to securely deliver the valuable
data only to authorized users who have paid for the data. Like for broadcast
authentication protocol, designing a secure and efficient user authentication protocol
for WSNs is challenging. The major efficiency concern in the case of a user
authentication protocol is the user verification task of the protocol performed on
the resource constrained sensor node’s side. Indeed, the outside users are equipped
with the resourceful devices to query sensor nodes data which can perform expensive
computations. The major challenges faced in designing a secure as well as efficient
authentication protocol for WSN, as discussed in [LPW06, Per01], are revised here
in the context of user authentication as follows:
• Efficient verification. Since the sensor nodes are resource constrained devices
with limited computation, the verification overhead of the user authentication
information should be small.
• Low communication. Due to the scarce battery power, a protocol with low
communication overhead is needed for low power sensor nodes.
• Instant and distributed user authentication. In order to avoid the high commu-
nication overhead and in-network traffic congestion, the user authentication
protocol should enable every receiver node to verify a user authentication
request message locally without the involvement of any third party as soon as
the message has been received.
• Scalability. The above mentioned WSN business applications have a poten-
tially large number of outside users to compensate the deployment expenses
of the large scale sensor networks. The user authentication protocol should
be independent of the number of outside users as well as the verifier nodes.
It should also allow to add new users and delete the ones whose access time
period has expired. At the same time, it should empower every newly added
sensor node to act as a verifier.
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• Session key establishment. Due to the radio communication, anyone can
overhear the valuable or confidential data in transit. Hence, the user
authentication protocol should also facilitate the establishment of a session
key between the user and the sensor node for the safe transfer of valuable
data. The session key establishment protocol should also meet the challenges
of efficiency and scalability.
Unfortunately, most of the existing user authentication schemes for WSNs are
centralized, and hence do not provide instant, distributed user authentication.
The distributed schemes, on the other hand, are not efficient in terms of resource
consumption, also lacking scalability and key establishment features.
This chapter presents the proposed outside user authentication protocol for
WSNs using the ID-based Signature (IBS) schemes. The proposed protocol adopts
a distributed user authentication approach to provide instant authentication and
avoid the problems of centralized approaches. The IBS schemes overcome the
resource consumption of digital signature based distributed approaches. An IBS
scheme enables a sensor node to verify a signed user request message using the
user’s ID instead of user’s public key and, as a result, solves the scalability problem
by reducing the storage overhead. After successful authentication of a user, a
session key establishment between a user and a sensor node is another feature of the
proposed protocol. A key establishment (KE) protocol provides the communicating
parties with a secret and shared session key which can be used to encrypt and decrypt
the data exchanged between the parties. A session key establishment protocol is
required here for the secure communication of the sensor nodes data to the user.
This chapter also describes our ID-based one-pass session key establishment (ID-
1P-SKE) protocol which is mainly designed for WSNs.
As mentioned in previous chapter, both security and efficiency are important
aspects in making a decision to adopt a protocol for WSNs. The performance and
the security of the proposed protocol have also been analyzed in this chapter. A
cryptographic protocol must come with a security proof to attest that it satisfies
the required security properties. Since the proposed ID-1P-SKE protocol is a new
cryptographic protocol, it requires a formal security analysis. Therefore, we formally
analyze the security of ID-1P-SKE protocol using the reductionist proof technique.
The chosen IBS scheme had already been proved to be existentially unforgeable
against the chosen message and ID attacks (i.e., euf-cma-ida secure) in [BNN04]
and did not require another security analysis.
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Contribution. The major contribution made by this chapter is a complete user
authentication protocol using IBS schemes which other than user authentication
facilitates the establishment of a session key between a user and a sensor node.
Another major contribution is a new ID-based one-pass session key establishment
protocol (ID-1P-SKE) together with formal security analysis and performance
evaluation.
6.2 Options for IBS Schemes
We now discuss the IBS schemes options for our proposed outside user authentication
protocol.
6.2.1 Available IBS Schemes
Like IBOOS schemes, there are many IBS schemes available which are mainly based
on ECC or RSA signatures. However, ECC based IBS schemes are given preference
in this research work because of their efficiency advantages over RSA based IBS
schemes. We selected the most efficient IBS scheme called BNN-IBS [BNN04] to
evaluate our proposed protocol. There are some variants of BNN-IBS scheme, for
instance SLL-IBS [GG09] and the Cao’s modified version of BNN-IBS, i.e., vBNN-
IBS [CKDZ08]. The vBNN-IBS scheme has been adapted as a paring-free IBOOS
(B-IBOOS) scheme and discussed in previous chapter (Section 5.2.2) in detail. The
BNN-IBS and vBNN-IBS have the same computation complexities with the only
difference of signature sizes. The vBNN-IBS scheme modifies the BNN-IBS scheme
to reduce the signature size of the latter. The SLL-IBS scheme is not discussed here
because of its close similarities to BNN-IBS and vBNN-IBS schemes. Any of these
IBS schemes can be used for the proposed outside user authentication protocol.
6.3 Options for Session Key Establishment
Schemes
As mentioned earlier, a key establishment protocol provides a secret and shared
session key which can be used for the encryption and decryption of data. In a secure
key establishment protocol, no third party, other than the communicating parties, is
able to impersonate any of the legitimate parties participating in the protocol. This
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is called the authenticated key establishment (AKE) problem, which is harder than
the key establishment (KE) problem [BWJM97]. Designing a secure and efficient
AKE protocol for resource constrained devices like sensor nodes is a challenging
task. Before presenting the proposed ID-based one-pass session key establishment
(ID-1P-SKE) protocol, the two party key establishment options and the available
protocols are outlined in order to understand the inspirations behind designing a
new session key establishment protocol for WSNs.
6.3.1 Key Establishment Options
6.3.1.1 Two Pass Key Establishment
To establish a key between the two parties, one option is a two pass key establishment
protocol. In a two-pass key establishment protocol, two messages are exchanged
and processed in order to compute a common key since both parties exchange
their ephemeral public keys. The two-pass key establishment protocols have been
a focus of research since the introduction of a pioneering solution, Diffie-Hellman
(DH) key establishment protocol [DH76]. However, the typical DH protocol suffers
from the man-in-the middle attack (MIMA) due to the lack of authentication (of
both parties). The efforts to counter this attack have given rise to various two-
pass key establishment protocols, for instance, the secure Station-to-Station (STS)
[DVOW92] protocol. The STS protocol demands every message exchanged between
the two parties to be digitally signed. This approach reduces the chances of MIMA,
however, increases the computational requirements of a key establishment protocol,
making it costly. The high computational and communication costs of the secure
two-pass protocols make them unsuitable for use in several applications that require
low-cost one-way communication, for instance, email, SMS and store-and-forward
applications (where the receiver cannot reply immediately or do not reply at all),
and low-power mobile environments, for instance, wireless sensor networks (where
low communication cost is critical).
6.3.1.2 One Pass Key Establishment
To satisfy the resource constraints of sensor nodes, a session key establishment
protocol with high security and a minimum amount of computation and number
of passes is required. A secure one-pass key establishment protocol is an attractive
alternative for the sensor nodes. A one-pass key establishment protocol between two
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parties is the one in which only one message is exchanged for the establishment of a
session key, i.e., only the sender (protocol initiator) generates an ephemeral private
key and computes its public part, i.e., the ephemeral public key. The sender sends
the ephemeral public key to the receiver (protocol responder). Both parties then
compute a shared session key using their own private keys, ephemeral keys and other
public information. A one-pass key establishment protocol reduces the transmission
and processing costs due to the fact that only a single message is transmitted and
processed.
This fact can be utilized in the proposed user authentication protocol to achieve
transmission cost efficiency. Since in a one-pass key establishment protocol only
one party computes and sends its ephemeral key to the other party, that single
message can be combined with the signed user authentication request message (in
user authentication phase). This helps to achieve an efficient transmission cost in the
proposed outside user authentication protocol. Rather than two separate messages,
one for user authentication and another for key establishment, a single message will
serve both jobs. It will also counter the man-in-the-middle attacks faced in a typical
two-pass Diffie-Hellman (DH) protocol. The only message exchanged between the
user and the sensor node for the key establishment will be signed by the user and
verified by the sensor node. It prevents an intruder from impersonating a user and
at the same time sending a fake ephemeral public key on behalf of the user, avoiding
the man-in-the-middle attack.
Besides the reduced transmission and processing costs, another advantage of a
one-pass key establishment protocol is its use in off-line communications. In an off-
line communication, one party (sender) is on-line whereas the other party (receiver)
may or may not be on-line. For instance, the sender of an email is on-line when he
sends an email whereas the email receiver does not need to be necessarily on-line
at that time. He can receive the email later on when he comes on-line. A one-pass
key establishment protocol is used to secure off-line communications as follows: The
sender computes its ephemeral private and public keys and the shared session key,
encrypts the message m (any confidential message) using the computed session key
and sends both the ephemeral public key and the ciphertext of m to the off-line
receiver. The receiver, when he comes on-line, computes the same shared key using
the received sender’s ephemeral public key and decrypts the received message.
This feature is particularly useful for applications where only one entity is on-line.
However, it can also benefit those applications of WSNs where the privacy of a user
query is a requirement, as described in [CYS+07]. An example of such applications
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is ocean readings data collected by a WSN. In this application, different oil business
companies who are users of the sensor nodes data may be curious to know the data
interests of each other and eavesdrop on each other’s data queries. Therefore, the
queries should also be hidden in such applications. In order to provide query privacy,
the only message sent by the user for key establishment can be combined with the
encrypted user query. If the user authentication succeeds, the sensor node computes
the session key and decrypts user query otherwise it discards the message. Here
only a single message is exchanged to authenticate a user, establish a key and send
an encrypted user query. This feature helps to achieve highly efficient transmission
cost for those applications of WSNs where the query privacy is mandatory.
6.3.2 Available Key Establishment Protocols
The existing protocols [HCK+03, JLX07, KLP+07, ZW09] for WSNs to establish a
session key between a user and a sensor node, briefly discussed in Section 3.3.2, have
several limitations. They are all either expensive for sensor nodes in terms of compu-
tation and communication costs or lack some security features. In addition, not one
of these protocols is a one-pass key establishment protocol. In recent years, a few
ID-based one-pass key establishment protocols [BJT04, OTO05, Wan05, GBGN08]
have been designed for traditional networks. However, none of these protocols
are computationally efficient as all of these require pairing computations. The
extensive use of pairing computations makes the existing ID-based one-pass key
establishment protocols quite slow and computationally expensive, particularly for
resource constrained devices like sensor nodes.
6.3.3 Proposed Key Establishment Protocol
Due to the inadequacy of the existing key establishment protocols to provide an
efficient and secure solution to the low power WSN environment, we have designed a
new pairing-free ID-based one-pass session key establishment (ID-1P-SKE) protocol
for WSNs. The proposed ID-1P-SKE protocol does not require both parties (the
initiator and the responder) to compute any pairing operation. The lack of pairing
computations makes ID-1P-SKE protocol highly efficient than the existing ID-
based one-pass schemes and therefore suitable for sensor nodes devices by providing
security with efficiency. Besides efficient computation and communication costs,
another advantage of ID-1P-SKE protocol is its same ID-based setup as used by the
BNN-IBS scheme. Consequently, using the same ID-based parameters, the sensor
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nodes can not only authenticate users via BNN-IBS scheme but also establish a
session key with them. The ID-1P-SKE protocol is described in next section.
6.3.3.1 ID-1P-SKE Protocol
The proposed ID-1P-SKE protocol has three algorithms: Setup, Key Extract and
Key Establishment.
Setup. This algorithm generates the system parameters including master public
key (mpk), and the corresponding master secret key (msk). This algorithm performs
the following steps:
(a) Specify the parameters E/Fp, q, p, P and G, where
• E/Fp is an elliptic curve E over a finite field Fp,
• q is a large prime number and p is the field size,
• P is a point of order q on the curve E and,
• G is a cyclic group of order q under the point addition “+” generated by
P .
(b) Chose s ∈R Z∗q uniformly as msk.
(c) Compute mpk as PPKG = sP .
(d) Choose one hash function H: {0, 1}∗ ×G → Z∗q.
(e) Choose one function χ: G → {0, 1}k to derive the session key where k is the
security parameter.
(f) Output the system parameters {E/Fp, q, p, P , G, PPKG, H, χ} and keep s
secret.
Key Extract . This algorithm takes msk and an ID as input and generates a
private key corresponding to that ID using the Schnorr signature. For an identity
IDi of I, this algorithm performs the following steps:
(a) Choose ri ∈R Z∗q.
(b) Compute Ri = riP .
(c) Compute ci = H(IDi, Ri).
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U I
l ∈R Z∗q
y = lsu
L = yP
σ = Signsu(L, IDu, IDi)
L, IDu, IDi, σ−−−−−−−−−−−−→
ci = H(IDi, Ri)
Si = ciPPKG +Ri V erifyIDu (L, IDu, IDi, σ)
Ku,i = ySi Ki,u = siL
SKu = χ(Ku,i) SKi = χ(Ki,u)
SK = SKu = SKi = χ(lsusiP )
Figure 6.1: Authenticated ID-based One-Pass Session Key Establishment
(d) Compute si = ci s+ ri.
(e) Output (si, Ri).
I obtains (si, Ri) via a secure channel. Here, si is the secret information whereas Ri
is public.
Key Establishment: This algorithm establishes a key between a sender
(initiator) U and a receiver (responder) I. Figure 6.1 describes the steps of the
key establishment.
(a) U chooses at random l ∈R Z∗q as ephemeral private key and
• computes y = lsu,
• computes the ephemeral public key as L = yP ,
• signs L together with IDu and IDi as σ = Signsu(L, IDu, IDi).
Here Signsu(L, IDu, IDi) is a signature signed by U with its private key su
and an ID-based signature (IBS) using the same ID-based setup as used by ID-
1P-SKE, for instance, the secure BNN-IBS scheme. Computing y from L is the
Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm (ECDL) problem, which is intractable.
(b) U sends the signed ephemeral public key to I.
• U −→ I: {L, IDu, IDi, σ}.
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(c) I first verifies σ using IDu.
• V erify
IDu
(L, IDu, IDi, σ).
The successful verification implies that the ephemeral public key is actually sent
by U , and hence I accepts it. Otherwise the protocol is terminated at this stage.
Next, I computes the shared secret Ki,u as
• Ki,u = si L{
= siyP
= silsuP
}
and deletes L.
(d) U computes the same shared secret Ku,i as
• ci = H(IDi, Ri)
• Si = ci PPKG +Ri
• Ku,i = y Si{
= ysiP
= lsusiP
}
U then deletes L, l and y.
(e) Both parties then compute the shared session key as
SK = χ(Ku,i) = χ(Ki,u) = χ(l su si P ),
where χ is the key derivation function defined in Setup.
The session key at this stage is ready to be used for exchanging encrypted data.
However, there are chances that at the end of a secure run of a key establishment
protocol, the receiver of the last message may not compute the key. Indeed, in any
key establishment protocol, the sender of the last message cannot make sure whether
or not his last message is received by the other party. He may successfully finish
the protocol with a key output. Although the adversary is not able to learn the
computed key, the receiver might not receive the sender’s last message, and hence
might not be able to compute the key. The assurance against this scenario is achieved
via an authenticated key establishment protocol with key confirmation (AKC). This
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is usually achieved by adding a key confirmation message to an authenticated key
establishment protocol after the key has been established. To add this feature to
ID-1P-SKE protocol, the Key Establishment algorithm proceeds as follows:
(f) After key computation, I performs the following steps:
• Computes the XOR of its computed key SKi with IDu and IDi as follows:
E = (SKi ⊕ IDu ⊕ IDi).
• Encrypts E with SKi using a secure symmetric encryption algorithm, i.e.,
E ′ = EncSKi(E) and sends E
′ to U .
(g) After U receives E ′, he performs the following steps:
• Decrypts E ′ using his computed key SKu to obtain E, i.e., E =
DecSKu(E
′).
• Checks whether E ?= (SKu ⊕ IDu ⊕ IDi).
The successful verification implies that both parties have computed a shared session
key. Since U does not expect to receive any message from I to compute the key, he
does not need to send a key confirmation message to I.
Comments. In WSNs, the outside user is the initiator and the sensor node is the
responder of the protocol. A sensor node can send the key confirmation message to
the user together with the encrypted query results. However, the key confirmation
part is optional in WSN environment and can be skipped since after receiving last
message from user, the sensor node sends the encrypted query results to the user
which provides implicit key confirmation. In addition, key confirmation can be
replaced with the time out option. In time out option, a time-out value is set up for
the user. The user waits for the feedback from the sensor node until the time-out
value expires. If he does not receive any feedback after the time-out value expires,
he resends his last message to the sensor node or restarts the protocol. A detailed
application of the proposed ID-1P-SKE protocol in WSNs environment together
with the four phases of System Initialization, Key Generation, User Registration
and Key Establishment has been discussed in [YRW11] and given in Appendix B.
Other than WSNs, the proposed ID-1P-SKE protocol can be used in any other low
power application environment. For instance, RFID tags can use it to authenticate
a RFID tag reader and establish a key between the tag and the reader.
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6.4 Proposed Outside User Authentication
Protocol
In the proposed outside user authentication protocol, a user first registers himself
to the base station and obtains his private key and other system parameters. After
that, whenever he wants to access data from sensor nodes, he sends a signed request
to the sensor nodes in his communication range who verify his signed request locally
using his ID. If the verification succeeds, the sensor nodes and the user both compute
a session key for further communication. This session key enables the user to send
encrypted queries, if query privacy is required, to the sensor nodes and obtain
confidential data from them. Whether the user query is processed by a single sensor
node or a set of sensor nodes is related to the topic of query processing in wireless
sensor networks, which is not a part of this research. We now present the proposed
scheme for user authentication using IBS scheme, which consists of six phases,
i.e., System Initialization, Key Generation, User Registration, User Authentication,
Session Key Establishment and User Revocation. Like authenticated broadcast by
sensor nodes protocol, the first two phases of this scheme are also performed only
once before the deployment of the sensor network. The details of the protocol are
explained as follows:
System Initialization: Again the base station plays the role of a private key
generator (PKG) and initializes the system in the proposed user authentication
protocol. Let SKBS be the master secret key of the base station, only known to the
base station. The base station calculates the corresponding master public key PKBS
known to everyone. The base station also sets up other public system parameters
(SP ) which include PKBS.
Key Generation: In this phase, the base station calculates the private keys of
all sensor nodes corresponding to their IDs using the master secret key SKBS and
other system parameters in the same way as in first authentication scheme. For a
sensor node I with identity IDi, the corresponding private key DIDi is computed as
DIDi ← KE(IDi, SKBS)
The ID, private key, system parameters and other related information (if any) are
stored on individual sensor nodes before the deployment of sensor network. Hence,
every sensor node I stores {IDi, DIDi , SP}.
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User Registration: This phase is performed every time when a new user is
added to the system. In this phase, a user U with identity IDu registers with the
system. The base station computes his private key DIDu as
DIDu ← KE(IDu, SKBS)
The user obtains his private key and other system parameters from the base station
through a secure channel. Hence, every user receives {IDu, DIDu , SP}. The user
also obtains the IDs and other public information, if any, of the sensor nodes in his
communication range.
User Authentication: In order to query sensor nodes data, the user sends his
signed request to the sensor nodes in his range who verify the legitimacy of the user.
User Request : Let U be the user with identity IDu and N be the number of
sensor nodes in his range. U signs his authentication request message RM together
with the current time stamp TS using an IBS scheme and his private key DIDu as
σ = Sign(〈RM,TS〉 , DIDu)
U sends his authentication request message RM along with his authentication
information which is the time stamp TS, his IDu and the signature σ to N sensor
nodes in his communication range i.e.,
{RM,TS, IDu, σ}.
To sign a user request message, the BNN-IBS scheme or any other secure and efficient
IBS scheme can be used here.
Authentication: On receiving a user request, a sensor node I first checks the
time stamp TS to filter out a replayed request message. If it is a fresh one, the
sensor node verifies the user U ’s signature using his identity IDu and other system
parameters stored on it as
0/1← V erify(〈RM,TS〉 , IDu, σ, SP )
If the verification succeeds, the sensor node proceeds with the session key estab-
lishment, otherwise it terminates the protocol and stops further computation and
communication at this stage.
Session Key Establishment: To provide a secure transmission of data from
sensor nodes to a user, a session key needs to be established after successful user
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authentication. However, because of a one-pass session key establishment protocol
it is possible to carry out the key establishment phase in parallel to the user
authentication phase in the proposed outside user authentication protocol. In the
proposed user authentication protocol, the only message that needs to be exchanged
for the one-pass key establishment is combined with the user request message in user
authentication phase.
In user authentication phase, U also computes his ephemeral key EK and signs
it together with his authentication request message RM as
σ = Sign(〈RM,TS,EK〉 , DIDu)
U now sends {RM,TS,EK, IDu, σ} to the sensor node I. If U ’s signature is
valid and user authentication succeeds, both I and U compute the session key SK
using the key derivation function χ as SK = χ(IDi||IDu||Siu). Here Siu is a common
secret computed by both parties using EK and their private keys. At this point, the
session key SK is ready for encrypting data. To establish a session key, the proposed
ID-based one-pass key establishment protocol i.e., the ID-1P-SKE protocol or any
other efficient and secure ID-based one-pass key establishment protocol can be used.
User Revocation: User revocation is divided in two cases: revoking a user
with expired access time period and revoking a malicious user. These two cases
are treated differently. To handle the first case, at the time when the base station
calculates the private key for a user U , the access expiry time ET of the user is used
as a parameter to calculate the private key as follows:
DIDu ← KE(〈IDu, ET 〉 , SKBS)
In user authentication phase, the user U sends his access expiry time ET together
with his other authentication information {RM,TS, IDu, σ} to the sensor node. On
sensor node’s side, IDu and ET are both used to generate the public information
corresponding to user’s private key in order to verify his signature. It binds the
correctness of user’s corresponding public information to the correctness of both his
IDu and ET . After user’s access time period expires, if he sends a signed request
together with a fake ET , it will not pass signature verification since the public
information generated from his IDu and fake ET will not correspond to his private
key and will be invalid.
In the second case, the base station issues an authenticated revocation list
containing the malicious users’ IDs. The sensor nodes store it until the malicious
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user’s expiry time is passed. Thus, if next time a malicious user attempts to access
data from sensor nodes, the sensor nodes reject his request without going through
the authentication process. After his access time period ET expires, he is not able
to successfully authenticate himself to the system. In WSNs, the case of malicious
users is not very common. Therefore, storing the IDs of a few malicious users until
their access time period expires will impose only a reasonable storage overhead on
sensor nodes. To efficiently handle the storage, user’s access time period can be kept
short so that the sensor nodes do not store malicious users’ IDs for a long time.
After that time period only the private keys of the legitimate users can be updated
for the next time period. However, the duration of this period can be decided
depending on how frequently the event of malicious users occur. Moreover, the base
station, as suggested in the first authentication scheme, can periodically update
system parameters and secret keys of all legitimate users excluding the malicious
ones. However, this option might be costly.
6.5 Performance Evaluation
The performance of the proposed protocol is evaluated in two steps. In first step, we
evaluate the efficiency of an IBS scheme and the proposed ID-1P-SKE protocol on
sensor nodes. In second step, we analyze the performance of the proposed outside
user authentication protocol using IBS schemes.
6.5.1 Performance of IBS Schemes and Session Key
Establishment
In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed outside user authentication
protocol, we considered the most efficient pairing-free BNN-IBS scheme and the
ID-1P-SKE scheme among the available schemes. Since the sensor nodes are more
resource-constrained than the users (more specifically, the devices held by the users),
we pay more attention to the efficiency of the protocol on the sensor node side than
on the user side. In the proposed protocol, a sensor node only plays the role of
a signature verifier to verify the signed user requests. Thus, the main factor to
evaluate the user authentication cost is the signature verification cost of the BNN-
IBS scheme. We have already adapted a variation of the BNN-IBS scheme (vBNN-
IBS) as an IBOOS scheme (B-IBOOS) for the first authentication protocol. The
modified B-IBOOS scheme was implemented on MICA2 sensor nodes to obtain the
126 CHAPTER 6
signature generation and verification costs where the signature generation consisted
of the oﬄine phase and the online phase, as explained in Section 5.4.1.6. Combining
the computation costs of the oﬄine and the online phases of B-IBOOS scheme
gives the total computation cost of the signature generation for BNN-IBS scheme.
The signature verification cost of BNN-IBS scheme is the same as in B-IBOOS
scheme. The memory cost of BNN-IBS scheme will, however, decrease in the case of
user authentication protocol because the sensor nodes do not store the code of the
signature generation algorithm of BNN-IBS scheme now. They only need to store
the code of the signature verification algorithm to verify the signed user requests.
The performance of two different implementations of B-IBOOS scheme has
already been discussed in detail in Section 5.4.1.6. Since the sensor nodes only need
to store the signature verification code, the memory consumption is not an issue
in this case. Therefore, the first implementation of B-IBOOS scheme is considered
here to evaluate the proposed protocol.
6.5.1.1 Computation Cost
Using the results from Table 5.3, the Table 6.1 gives the computation cost of the
BNN-IBS scheme.
Time (s) Energy (mWs)
Sign 0.32 9.59
Verify 1.044 31.33
Table 6.1: Time and Energy Consumption of BNN-IBS Scheme
The establishment of the session key on sensor nodes side using the ID-1P-
SKE protocol adds only one point multiplication in computation cost. As discussed
in preceding chapter, one point multiplication computation takes only 0.295s on
MICA2 sensor node. Table 6.2 gives the computation cost of the key establishment
on sensor nodes side using the ID-1P-SKE protocol.
Time (s) Energy (mWs)
ID-1P-SKE 0.295 8.85
Table 6.2: Time and Energy Consumption of ID-1P-SKE Scheme
Hence, the total computation cost of the user authentication (the BNN-IBS
signature verification cost) and the key establishment (ID-1P-SKE cost) on sensor
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nodes is given by the Table 6.3. To the best of our knowledge, the BNN-IBS scheme
and our proposed ID-1P-SKE scheme are the most efficient available IBS and the
one-pass session key establishment schemes which enable a resource constrained
sensor node to authenticate an outside user and establish a session key with him
only in 1.339s without incurring any storage overhead.
Time (s) Energy (mWs)
User Authentication 1.044 31.33
Key Establishment 0.295 8.85
Total 1.339 40.18
Table 6.3: Total Time and Energy Consumption of User Authentication and Session
Key Establishment
6.5.1.2 Communication Cost
In the proposed user authentication and session key establishment protocol, only
one message is exchanged to authenticate a user and establish a key with him. The
only message exchanged contains the signature and the ephemeral public key of the
user. Using the same security level and curve parameters as used in the evaluation
of B-IBOOS scheme, the size of BNN-IBS signature will be (2×(2×163)+160 bits)
812 bits whereas the size of the ephemeral public key will be (2×163 bits) 326 bits,
a group element of the form (x, y). Hence, the total message size will be about
1154 bits or 144 bytes including IDs (16 bits). However, it reduces to 124 bytes if
vBNN-IBS scheme is used here instead of BNN-IBS scheme.
6.5.2 Performance of the Proposed Protocol
We now evaluate the performance of the proposed outside user authentication
protocol using IBS schemes. To the best of our knowledge, the proposed protocol is
the first solution to the problem which does not only address the user authentication
but also provides the session key establishment feature. The proposed protocol
uses the ID-based signature schemes to authenticate users, ensuring security with
efficiency. The proposed outside user authentication protocol using the IBS schemes
does not only meet the design challenges highlighted in the beginning of this chapter
but also provides some extra features as follows:
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6.5.2.1 Distributed User Authentication
The proposed protocol adopts a distributed approach to authenticate outside users.
It means the legitimacy of a user is verified locally by the sensor node who receives
the user request rather than a third party. Hence, the proposed protocol avoids the
in-network traffic congestion, the communication overhead and authentication delay
of the centralized user authentication schemes.
6.5.2.2 Storage Efficiency
The sensor nodes store the users’ passwords in password based authentication
schemes and the users’ IDs and public key pairs in digital signature based
authentication schemes, of all users. In the proposed protocol, the sensor nodes
do not need to store any user specific authentication information for the verification
of user authentication request. The sensor nodes preloaded with their own public
and private information and the system parameters can verify the legitimacy of any
outside user of the sensor nodes data. Therefore, the proposed protocol achieves the
goal of storage efficiency.
6.5.2.3 Computation Efficiency
In the proposed protocol, the ephemeral public key of the user is sent together with
the signed user authentication request. Only one signature verification is required
to authenticate a user and the ephemeral public key of the user. There is no need to
authenticate the ephemeral public key separately in order to avoid accepting a fake
ephemeral public key. Hence, the user authentication and session key establishment
together attains computation efficiency.
6.5.2.4 Communication Efficiency
Only a single message is exchanged to authenticate a user and establish a key with
him. Thus, the proposed protocol reduces the communication overhead. Moreover,
the ID-based signature schemes do not require an outside user to send a public key
or a certificate with a user request message which further reduces the communication
overhead without increasing storage overhead.
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6.5.2.5 Multiple Users
Like in the case of proposed authenticated broadcast by sensor nodes protocol,
the ID-based signature schemes handle the problem of public keys and certificates
management in the proposed user authentication protocol. Therefore, the proposed
protocol using the ID-based signatures facilitates the maximum number of outside
users of the sensor nodes data.
6.5.2.6 Scalability
New users as well as new sensor nodes can be added to the WSN easily at any
time. New users simply need to register themselves to the base station and
obtain the required information whereas new sensor nodes are preloaded with the
required information. Having the required information (ID, private key and system
parameters), a new user can send a signed user authentication request to any sensor
node in the network whereas a new sensor node can verify the signed user request
message sent by any outside user of the sensor nodes data. The sensor nodes do
not need to store any user specific information of every outside user. It removes the
restriction on the number of outside users. Therefore, the proposed protocol meets
the scalability challenge.
6.5.2.7 Session Key Establishment
The proposed protocol also features an efficient session key establishment where only
one message is being transmitted and processed to authenticate a user and establish
a key, achieving both the communication and the computation efficiency.
6.6 Security Analysis
This section first reviews the security of the IBS schemes i.e., the BNN-IBS scheme,
and then analyzes the security of the proposed session key establishment protocol
i.e., ID-1P-SKE protocol. In the end, the security of our outside user authentication
protocol using the IBS scheme is discussed.
6.6.1 Security of the IBS Schemes
We consider the security of the BNN-IBS scheme, the most efficient IBS scheme.
The BNN-IBS scheme has been shown to be existentially unforgeable against the
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chosen message and ID attacks (i.e., euf-cma-ida secure) in [BNN04] and does not
need another security proof. Therefore, we do not analyze here the formal security
of the BNN-IBS scheme.
6.6.2 Security of the Session Key Establishment
In session key establishment, we analyze the security of the proposed ID-based one-
pass authenticated key establishment (ID-1P-SKE) protocol which has been used to
evaluate the outside user authentication protocol. The security of the ID-1P-SKE
protocol has been analyzed using the reductionist proof techniques.
6.6.2.1 Desirable Security Properties
Informally, a one-pass key establishment protocol is desired to achieve the following
security properties identified by [BWJM97] and improved by [OTO05].
Unknown Key-Share . An entity A cannot be coerced into sharing a key with an
entity B when A believes that the key is shared with some other entity C.
Known Session Keys . The knowledge of the previous session keys does not
enable an adversary to compromise other session keys.
Key Control . Neither of the participating parties should be able to force the
session key to be a pre-selected value.
Key Compromise Impersonation . The compromise of an entity A’s long-term
private key allows an adversary to impersonate A but it should not allow adversary
to impersonate other entities in the presence of A.
Forward Secrecy . If the long-term private keys of one or more entities are
compromised, it should not affect the secrecy of previously established session keys.
According to [OTO05], one-pass key establishment protocols cannot achieve
the two security properties identified by [BWJM97], namely Key Compromise
Impersonation and Forward Secrecy. The reason is that an adversary Ad, who has
compromised a receiver B’s long-term private key and eavesdropped one message
from A, will be able to compute the session key. Ad will then be able to impersonate
(only) A to B, launching Key Compromise Impersonation attack. The adversary can
also reveal the previously established session keys in the same way, compromising
Forward Secrecy. Therefore, [OTO05] redefined these two security properties for
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one-pass key establishment protocols as Sender’s Key Compromise Impersonation
and Sender’s Forward Secrecy.
Sender’s Key Compromise Impersonation . The compromise of a sender A’s
long-term private key allows an adversary to impersonate A but not other entities
in the presence of A.
Sender’s Forward Secrecy . The compromise of a sender’s long-term private key
does not affect the secrecy of previously established session keys.
6.6.2.2 Security Model
We now describe the security model, introduced by [GBGN08], for ID-based one-
pass authenticated key establishment protocols. This model, say (ID-eCK) model, is
in fact the extension of extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) [LLM07] model for two-
pass AKE protocols to the ID-based one-pass AKE settings. The formal definition
of the (ID-eCK) model is based on the following game involving a challenger C and
an adversary Ad:
A protocol pi is modeled as a collection of parties (probabilistic polynomial time
(PPT) turing machines) running the proposed AKE protocol, representing a real
time scenario. All the communication among the parties is controlled by a PPT
adversary Ad. For any arbitrary identities, Ad can also obtain corresponding private
keys from the PKG to add fictitious parties. All of these parties, including both the
honest parties and the fictitious parties, are activated by Ad which can run multiple
instances of the protocol at each party. A particular instance of the AKE protocol
executed by a party is called a session. A legitimate instance of an AKE protocol
between two parties consists of two sessions; a session (sid) initiated at initiator
and a matching session (sid∗) at responder, where (sid) and (sid∗) are the session
ids. A matching session1 may not exist, if the communication sent by the responder
is corrupted by the attacker Ad. The attacker Ad is allowed to make the following
queries during the game which are answered by the challenger C:
• Send(IDi, IDj,msg): Sends a message msg to IDi on behalf of IDj. The
response from IDi is returned to Ad. An empty message λ activates IDi as an
initiator. A non-empty message makes the role of IDi to be that of a responder.
1In case of one-pass protocol, there is only one message transmitted during the protocol, i.e.,
from the initiator. The initiator takes the empty string λ as input and transmits the message msg
and the responder takes msg as input and transmits λ.
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For one-pass AKE the session identifier is the tuple (IDi, IDj,msg, role),
where role is either initiator or responder.
• Long-Term Key Reveal(IDi): Reveals the long-term private key of an
honest party IDi.
• Ephemeral Key Reveal(sid): Reveals the ephemeral key of possibly
incomplete session sid.
• Reveal(sid): Reveals the session key of the session sid which is a completed
session.
• Extract(IDi): Returns a long-term private key corresponding to any arbitrary
identity IDi selected by adversary to add a dishonest party.
The Long-Term Key Reveal query and the Extract query both reveal the long-
term private keys. However, the former returns the long-term private key of an
honest party IDi whereas the latter returns the the long-term private key of a
dishonest party IDi which allows adversary to add fictitious party corresponding to
its chosen ID i.e., IDi. In addition to the above queries, Ad is allowed, at any later
stage, to make a Test(sid) query to a completed session. In response to this query,
a challenge value α is given to Ad.
• Test(sid): The challenger flips a fair coin b ∈R {0, 1}. If b = 1, it returns
the session key held in the session sid otherwise it picks a random value
sampled from the session key distribution space {0, 1}k (where k is the security
parameter) and returns it to Ad.
The Test query may be made only once. The Ad’s job is now to guess b. Ad
continues the experiment after the Test query. It outputs its guess b′ in an attempt
to distinguish the session key from the random string. The experiment terminates
as soon as Ad outputs its guess by calling the Guess(b′) query.
• Guess(b′): If b′ = b returns 1, otherwise 0.
Ad wins the game, if the selected test session is clean and he guesses the challenge
value correctly, i.e., b′ = b.
Clean Session. Let sid be a session activated at IDi and sid
∗ be the matching
session activated at IDj (sid
∗ may not exist). Let ski and skj denote the long-term
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private keys of IDi and IDj respectively. Let eski and eskj be the ephemeral private
keys of IDi and IDj in sessions sid and sid
∗ respectively. A session sid is not clean,
if any of the following conditions holds:
• Ad reveals the master secret key of the PKG.
• IDi or IDj is a dishonest party whose private key is obtained by the adversary
via Extract query.
• Ad reveals the session key of sid or sid∗ (if sid∗ exists).
• A matching session sid∗ exists and
– If sid is an initiator session, Ad reveals both ski and eski or it reveals
skj.
– If sid is a responder session, Ad reveals ski or both skj and eskj.
• A matching session sid∗ does not exist and
– Ad reveals ski or skj.
In all other cases, the session is considered as clean. In order to win the game,
the adversary Ad must keep the session clean until the end of the experiment. The
advantage of adversary Ad in distinguishing the real session key from a random value
is defined as
AdvAdpi = Pr[SucAd ]− 12 ,
where Pr[SucAd ] is the success probability of Ad. Informally, we say that an ID-
based one-pass AKE protocol is secure if no adversary can learn anything about
a session key held by two uncorrupted entities IDi and IDj. The security of an
ID-based one-pass AKE protocol, in the above model, is formally defined as follows:
Definition 6.1. (ID-eCK Security). An ID-based one-pas AKE protocol is (ID-
eCK)-secure if the following two conditions hold.
• If two honest parties complete matching sessions, they compute the same
session key.
• For any PPT adversary Ad, AdvAdpi is negligible.
134 CHAPTER 6
6.6.2.3 Security Analysis of ID-1P-SKE Protocol
The security analysis of the proposed ID-1P-SKE protocol includes the formal
security proof using the ID-eCK security model and a discussion about how the
security properties listed in Section 6.6.2.1 are achieved by the ID-1P-SKE protocol.
a) Security Proof
The security of the proposed ID-1P-SKE protocol is reduced to the hardness of
Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem. We proceed to show that the
proposed ID-1P-SKE protocol is secure in the random oracle model assuming that
the CDH problem is hard in G.
Theorem 1. Suppose that CDH assumption holds in G. Then the proposed ID-
1P-SKE protocol is (ID-eCK)-secure (in the sense of Definition 6.1) with χ and H
modeled as random oracles.
Proof. If two honest and uncorrupted parties IDi and IDj complete matching
sessions successfully, then IDj must have received IDi’s ephemeral public key. So
both parties establish the same session key as shown in Figure 6.1. Thus, the first
condition of Definition 6.1 holds. To prove the second condition, let us assume by
contradiction that there exists a PPT adversary Ad with running time t(k), who
has a non-negligible advantage  against the ID-1P-SKE protocol. Then we need to
construct an algorithm C to solve the CDH problem which uses Ad as a subroutine.
Since χ is modeled as a random oracle, after the Test query, Ad can distinguish a
session key from a random string only in three ways:
1. Guessing Attack. Ad correctly guesses the session key.
2. Key Replication Attack. Ad creates a session, not matching to the test
session, but that has the same session key as the test session. Ad then learns
the test session key by querying the session that has the same key.
3. Forging Attack. Ad computes (lsisjP ) used in the test session and queries
χ to derive the session key.
Since χ is a random oracle, the probability of guessing the output of χ is O(1/2k),
which is negligible. Since two non-matching sessions have different communicating
parties and ephemeral keys information, the key replication attack is equivalent to
finding a collision for χ which has a negligible probability. Therefore, the probability
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of key replication attack is also negligible. Thus, the first two ways can be ruled
out. The rest of the section will analyze the forging attack.
Let 〈P, aP, bP 〉 be the CDH instance given to the CDH challenger C. C’s goal
is to compute abP . C executes the ID-1P-SKE protocol with the adversary Ad and
modifies the data returned by the honest parties in a way that if Ad breaks the
security of the proposed ID-1P-SKE protocol, C can solve the CDH problem. To
execute the simulated ID-1P-SKE protocol, C picks s ∈R Z∗q uniformly as master
secret key (msk), computes the master public key (mpk) PPKG = sP and gives PPKG
to Ad. C randomly picks a set of identities {ID1, ID2, ..., IDn} for n users. Assume
Ad activates each of these users m times at most (n and m both are polynomials in
security parameter k). C randomly selects ts as the test session which Ad will chose
to perform the Test query. Similarly, C picks the parties IDA and IDB randomly
from the set {ID1, ID2, ..., IDn}. C will be correct in its guess, if Ad chooses ts
session activated at IDA with IDB as the test session. C replies to queries of Ad as
follows:
S Query. C maintains a list LS. On input IDi, it first checks the list to make sure
if there is a value corresponding to IDi. If there is a value in the list, it returns that
value, i.e., Si and Ri, to Ad. Otherwise it picks two numbers si, ci ∈R Z∗q, computes
Si = siP and Ri = Si − ciPPKG and returns them. C stores the tuple (IDi, Ri, Si,
ci, si) in LS. For IDB, it sets SB = bP and RB = SB − cBPPKG, where cB ∈R Z∗q,
and stores the tuple (IDB, RB, SB, cB, ⊥) in LS.
H Query. C checks the list LS and returns the value of ci corresponding to the
input of IDi and Ri.
χ Query. C similarly maintains another list Lχ. On a query, it randomly picks a
value from the session key distribution {0, 1}k and returns it to Ad. The input and
the output both are stored in the list Lχ.
Send(IDi, IDj, msg). This query is handled as follows:
1. The role of the IDi is initiator, i.e., msg = λ.
• If i = A, j = B and the session is ts, C selects la ∈R Z∗q, retrieves sa from
LS, computes La = lasa(aP )
1 and returns La to Ad.
• If i = B, C randomly selects β ∈ Z∗q, computes Lb = βP and returns Lb
to Ad. C stores β in the list maintained for session sid.
1Note that (laa) produces another random number.
136 CHAPTER 6
• For all other cases, C chooses li ∈R Z∗q and returns Li = lisiP .
2. The role of the IDi is responder, i.e., msg 6= λ.
• C accepts the session marking it as completed.
Extract/Long-Term Key Reveal(IDi). C first checks the list LS to see if there
is an entry corresponding to IDi. If there is, it retrieves si from the list and returns
it to Ad. Otherwise, it makes S query, retrieves si from LS and returns it to Ad. In
case of Extract query, it also returns the corresponding Ri. On Extract or Long-Term
Key Reveal query with input IDB, C aborts its execution.
Ephemeral Key Reveal(sid). If this is the ts session between IDA and IDB,
C outputs “fail”. The Ephemeral Key Reveal query is not handled at IDB for all
sessions. For all other cases, C returns the ephemeral private key selected while
answering the Send query.
Reveal(sid). This query is handled as follows:
• If this is the ts session between IDA and IDB, C aborts its simulation.
• If this session is at IDB, C retrieves β and returns the value of χ(βSj).
• For all other cases, C returns the session key with its knowledge of private and
ephemeral private keys.
Test(sid). The Test query is replied as follows:
• If this is not the ts session between IDA and IDB, C outputs “fail”.
• If ts is not a clean session, C aborts its simulation.
• Otherwise C has to return the session key for session sid or a random value
from the session key distribution after tossing a coin. The session key between
IDA and IDB would be of the following form:
SKAB = χ(lasaaSB) = χ(lasaabP ),
which requires solving the CDH instance 〈P, aP, bP 〉. Hence, C returns a
random value from the key distribution.
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Solving the CDH Problem. If Ad can distinguish a real session key from the
given random value with a non-negligible probability, then it must have issued a
χ query to compute session key with the input (lasaabP ). Now C can answer the
CDH challenge with (lasaabP )/(lasa) = abp. If Ad’s guess is right, then C’s answer
is correct.
Time Analysis. If Ad with running time t, asking qχ, qH , qS, qsend, qex, qs, qep and
qr queries (all polynomials in k) to χ, H, S, Send, Extract, Long-Term Key Reveal,
Ephemeral Key Reveal and Reveal oracles respectively, has non-negligible advantage
in breaking the security of ID-1P-SKE scheme, then the CDH problem can be solved
in running time t′ ≤ (t + (2qS + qsend + qr)tm), where tm is the time to compute
a scalar multiplication in G and is a constant. A qS query computes two scalar
multiplications whereas qsend and qr both queries compute one scalar multiplication
each.
Probability Analysis. Similar to the probability analysis given in [GBGN08], C’s
probability of success involves three parts:
Firstly, C outputs “fail”, if Ad issues an Ephemeral Key Reveal query at IDB. As
there are m(n− 1) maximum possible sessions at IDB (including the test session),
the probability of Ad of not asking this query is Pr[I] = 1 - m(n−1)mn(n−1) = n−1n .
Secondly, C outputs “fail”, if Ad does not choose ts as test session, foreseen by
C. The probability of not occurring of this event is Pr[II] = 1
mn(n−1) .
Thirdly, the success probability of Ad making the right guess without asking the
χ query is Pr[III] ≤ 1
2
.
Let Pr[χ] be the probability that Ad asks the χ query. The success probability
of Ad is then
Pr[SucAd ] = Pr[SucAd|χ]Pr[χ] + Pr[III]
≤ Pr[SucAd|χ]Pr[χ] + 12
≤ Pr[χ] + 1
2
hence,
Pr[χ] ≥ Pr[SucAd ]− 12
Let SucC be the probability that C is able to solve the CDH problem which is
only possible if Pr[χ] 6= 0. If Pr[χ] 6= 0 and qχ is the number of χ queries made by
Ad, then the probability that C picks the correct κ from the list Lχ to solve CDH
problem is given as Pr[IV ] = 1
qχ
.
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The success probability of C when Ad asks χ query is then given as
Pr[SucC|χ] = Pr[I ∩ II ∩ IV ]
= n−1
n
1
mn(n−1)
1
qχ
= 1
mn2qχ
The success probability of C in solving the CDH problem is then given as
Pr[SucC] = Pr[SucC|χ]Pr[χ]
≥ 1
mn2qχ
(
Pr[SucAd ]− 12
)
As described earlier, the advantage AdvAdpi of Ad in distinguishing the real session
key from a random string is  which is (Pr[SucAd ] − 12) (by the ID-eCK model).
Therefore,
Pr[SucC] ≥ mn2qχ
Since  is non-negligible, it means C can solve CDH problem with non-negligible
probability; a contradiction to the CDH assumption. Hence, our assumption that
there exists a PPT adversary Ad with a non-negligible advantage  against the ID-
1P-SKE protocol is wrong and we can conclude by contradiction.
b) Security Properties of ID-1P-SKE Protocol
We now discuss how the informal security properties listed in Section 6.6.2.1 are
satisfied by the ID-1P-SKE protocol. The ID-eCK model ensures the security
properties of Unknown Key Share, Sender’s Forward Secrecy and Known Session
Key while it does not handle the two security attributes of Key Control and Sender’s
Key Compromise Impersonation.
Unknown Key Share. If a protocol is (ID-eCK)-secure, then it is resilient against
the Unknown Key-Share attack. For instance, if A establishes a session key with
D while he believes that he has established a key with B then there is a session t∗s′
between IDA and IDD, other than the test session ts between IDA and IDB, which
also holds SKAB. It means that there are two different sessions which hold the
same session key SKAB. Since ts and t
∗
s′ are not matching sessions, Ad can make
the Reveal(t∗s′) query to learn SKAB before the Test(ts) query and can break
the security of the protocol with non-negligible probability. Moreover, if Ad learns
SKAB through unknown key share attack with non-negligible probability, then the
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key replication attack is also possible with non-negligible probability because there
are two different sessions with the same session key. Informally, the ephemeral
public key signed with A’s private key assures B that the key is established with A.
The value of SB, computed from B’s public information, assures A that the key is
established with B.
Known Session Key. In ID-eCK model, the Known Session Key attack is
captured by allowing adversary to reveal the session key of any session other than the
test session. Each session has a different ephemeral key which is uniformly chosen
from Z∗q at random which makes the session key of each session computationally
independent. If Ad reveals any previous session key via Reveal query that key
would be of the form χ(lisisjP ) which is fully computationally independent of the
key χ(lasaabP ) for the test session. Due to the computational independence of
session keys for each session, from the knowledge of one session key nothing can be
implied about the value of the other session keys.
Remark 1. If the attacker learns a previous session key between A and B (ID-eCK
model does not allow it) and replays the corresponding message from A (including
A’s signature) to B for that session, he would be able to impersonate A to B as B
cannot differentiate a replayed message. This attack (faced in all one-pass protocols)
can be handled by including time-stamp in the message [CBHVS09].
Sender’s Forward Secrecy. This security attribute is reflected in the ID-eCK
model by allowing the adversary to reveal the long-term private key of the sender
in test session. Adversary is also allowed to reveal the ephemeral key of the sender
in ID-eCK model. However, if the adversary reveals both the long-term private
key as well as the ephemeral key of the sender in a session, he can reconstruct the
shared secret and can compute the session key. Hence, ID-eCK model excludes this
combination for the test session. Informally, if Ad reveals the sender A’s long-term
private key sa through Long-Term Key Reveal query, eavesdrops the ephemeral
public key La and obtains SB from C, Ad still faces the CDH problem of computing
(lasaabP ) from sa, La and SB, where La = lasa(aP ) and SB = bP .
Key Control. This property is not captured by the ID-eCK model. However,
informally we see that the receiver B cannot control the session key SKAB since the
ephemeral public key La is computed by the sender A. A, too, cannot control the
session key since it is computationally impossible to find a la ∈ Z∗q for a preselected
value of shared secret KAB. However, it is possible for A to influence the value of
the session key which is unavoidable in all one-pass key establishment protocols.
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Sender’s Key Compromise Impersonation. The sender’s key compromise
impersonation (S-KCI) resilience (not implied by (ID-eCK)-security) is related to
authentication. The S-KCI attack succeeds for majority of the one-pass AKE
schemes due to the fact that they do not include a sender verification mechanism
[CBHVS09]. In ID-1P-SKE protocol, the ephemeral public key is signed by the
sender A providing sender verification. If Ad has compromised the sender A’s long-
term private key, he can sign ephemeral public key on behalf of A and impersonate
A to other entities. However, he cannot sign the ephemeral public key on behalf
of any other entity (other than A), when it has compromised A’s long-term private
key. Hence, it makes impossible for the adversary to impersonate other entities to
A. Consequently, the ID-1P-SKE protocol achieves S-KCI resilience. Including the
responder’s ID in the signed message further avoids the possibility of an attacker
re-using A’s signature from a protocol run between A and a different entity.
6.6.3 Security of the Proposed Protocol
6.6.3.1 Security Properties Achieved
We now explain how the security properties listed in Section 4.3 are achieved by the
proposed outside user authentication protocol.
Authentication . The proposed protocol provides the required authentication,
i.e., the proof a user’s legitimacy. The required authentication is achieved via the
signed user request which is signed by a user using his private key and a secure IBS
scheme, giving a proof of the user’s identity. This proof of user’s identity is validated
by verifying the signed user’s request message by the sensor nodes. The successful
signature verification implies that the request sender is the actual legitimate user of
the sensor nodes data. The successful signature verification also yields the fact that
the ephemeral public key is actually sent by the claimed user and the session key is
actually established with a legitimate user. It helps to avoid the man-in-the-middle
attack faced in typical Diffie-Hellman style key establishment protocols.
Message Integrity . The proposed protocol using IBS schemes ensures message
integrity since any changes made in the contents of a user request message can be
detected through the signature verification. Any modified user request message will
not pass the signature verification process.
Verification . The proposed distributed user authentication protocol enables
every sensor node in the sensor network to verify the legitimacy of any outside
6.6 SECURITY ANALYSIS 141
user of the sensor nodes data efficiently. The sensor nodes only need the user’s ID
information sent along with the user request message to verify the signed request
message. The sensor nodes do not need any other user specific information, for
instance passwords or public keys, in order to be able to verify a signed user request.
Moreover, the experimental results of BNN-IBS scheme proved the fact that it is
possible for the resource constrained sensor nodes to verify a message signed using
an efficient IBS scheme.
Freshness. Every user request contains a timestamp and only the request
messages with the fresh timestamps are verified and accepted by the sensor nodes.
Thus, the proposed protocol provides freshness.
Confidentiality . The proposed protocol does not only provide user authen-
tication but also preserves the confidentiality of the sensor nodes data in transit.
The session key established between a sensor node and a user after successful user
authentication, establishes a secure communication channel between the user and
the sensor node. This helps to securely transfer the sensor nodes data only to
legitimate users by hiding it from the eavesdroppers.
Availability . In centralized user authentication schemes, a third party
providing authentication represents a single point of failure. If the third party fails,
the whole protocol collapses. In the proposed user authentication protocol, even if a
few sensor nodes fail, the user requests are still processed by the other sensor nodes.
6.6.3.2 Countermeasures to Security Attacks
This section discusses how the security attacks listed in Section 4.4 are countered
by the proposed user authentication and session key establishment protocol.
1. Impersonation Attack. The proposed user authentication protocol uses the
secure IBS schemes providing strong authentication and message integrity.
The secure IBS schemes make it impossible for an illegitimate user to sign
a user request message on behalf of a legitimate user or modify a valid user
request message sent by a legitimate user. The reason is that it is hard to
compute a valid message signature pair without the knowledge of the legitimate
user’s private key in the presence of an existentially unforgeable signature
scheme. Hence, it is hard for the attacker to impersonate a legitimate user.
2. DoS Attack. The proposed user authentication protocol adopts a distributed
approach to authenticate outside users where a user’s legitimacy is verified
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locally by the sensor nodes. This local verification prevents the traffic
congestion and the DoS attack usually faced in centralized user authentication
schemes.
3. Message Replay Attack. The proposed protocol uses timestamps which provide
freshness and ultimately resist message replay attacks. The sensor node first
checks the time stamp before signature verification to avoid the verification
of a replayed user request message from a previous legitimate session. A
time threshold is setup depending on the transmission delay imposed by
the communication channel between the user and the sensor node, leaving
a potential attacker little time to mount a replay attack.
6.7 Comparison with Existing Protocols
None of the existing schemes provide both features of user authentication and session
key establishment. Therefore, the proposed outside user authentication protocol is
compared separately with the existing user authentication schemes and the session
key establishment schemes. We first compare the proposed ID-1P-SKE protocol
with the existing session key establishment (SKE) protocols and then the proposed
outside user authentication protocol using BNN-IBS scheme with the existing user
authentication protocols for WSNs.
6.7.1 Comparison with Existing SKE Protocols
The performance of the proposed session key establishment (ID-1P-SKE) protocol is
discussed in two ways: firstly, by comparing it with the existing session key establish-
ment protocols for WSNs in Table 6.4 and Table 6.5 and secondly, by comparing it
with other ID-based one-pass session key establishment protocols in Table 6.6. The
factors used to evaluate the performance are the number of complex cryptographic
operations including pairing computation, point multiplication and exponentiation
operations (computation overhead), total number of messages exchanged in each
protocol run (communication overhead) and the memory requirements (storage
overhead). Since the sensor nodes are more resource-constrained than users (more
specifically, the devices held by users), we consider the efficiency of the protocols on
the sensor node side rather than on the user side.
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For ∼80-bit security, in an efficient and optimized implementation on a standard
MICA2 sensor node, one pairing computation takes 1.90s [OAG+11] and one point
multiplication takes 0.295s (our results). In usual implementations of pairing, one
exponentiation in GT costs about the same as four point multiplications in an
additive group [CMS08]. Since the overheads of hash operation and arithmetic
operations in Z∗q are very small compared to the above mentioned expensive
cryptographic operations, we only consider the expensive cryptographic operations
for performance comparison. In all tables, P denotes one pairing computation,
H denotes one hash function evaluation, M denotes one point multiplication or
exponentiation in G and E denotes one exponentiation in target group GT .
6.7.1.1 SKE Protocols for Wireless Sensor Networks
This section compares the proposed ID-1P-SKE protocol with the existing session
key establishment protocols for WSNs proposed by Huang et al. [HCK+03], Kim
et al. [KKLL07], and Zhang et al. [ZZR09]. These protocols have already been
discussed in Section 3.3.2. Table 6.4 and Table 6.5 show the comparison results.
a) Computation Overhead
In the scenario of WSNs, it is highly desirable for a security protocol to have
low computational overhead on resource constrained sensor nodes. In Huang et
al.’s key establishment protocol [HCK+03], the computation overhead on a sensor
node is the verification of a signed certificate to extract user’s public key and the
computations of three point multiplications to compute the session key. The user
authentication, however, is achieved via key confirmation messages. For comparison
purpose, we assume that the certificate verification requires the verification of an
ECDSA signature. The ECDSA signature is considered more efficient to compute for
sensor nodes than RSA signature because of shorter key and signature sizes. ECDSA
requires two point multiplications as expensive operations to verify a signature.
Hence, the total computation overhead of Huang et al’s protocol will be five point
multiplications. Kim et al.’s protocol [KKLL07] requires sensor nodes to compute
three point multiplications and one exponentiation in GT . Zhang et al.’s protocol
[ZZR09] brings down the computation cost of [KKLL07] by one point multiplication
without providing user authentication. Our proposed protocol ID-1P-SKE requires
a sensor node to compute only one point multiplication to compute the session
key and one signature verification to authenticate the user. For comparison with
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Key Establishment User Authentication Time (s)
Cost Cost
User Sensor Node Sensor Node Sensor Node
Huang et al.
4M + 3H 3M + 3H ECDSA 2M 1.48
[HCK+03]
Kim et al.
2P + 1M + 1E + 2H 3M + 1E + 2H
Implicit
NA 2.07
[KKLL07] verification
Zhang et al.
2P + 1M + 4H 2M + 1E + 3H
Not
NA 1.77
[ZZR09] supported
Our scheme 3M + 1H 1M BNN-IBS 3M 1.18
Table 6.4: Computation cost comparison of ID-1P-SKE protocol with the existing
session key establishment protocols for WSNs
[HCK+03] and [KKLL07], we assume that the secure and efficient ID-based signature
scheme BNN-IBS [CKDZ08] is used for user authentication in ID-1P-SKE protocol.
BNN-IBS requires three point multiplications for signature verification. It is clear
from Table 6.4 that the overall computational load of the proposed protocol is still
lower than the computational loads of both [HCK+03] and [KKLL07]. Moreover,
the key computation cost is lower than the key computation cost of [ZZR09]. At
the same time, the proposed protocol has stronger security properties as compared
to the other protocols, as we shall discuss later on in this section.
b) Time Consumption
We now compare the estimated total computation time taken by a sensor node to
authenticate a user and establish a session key. The results of this time analysis are
also given in Table 6.4. Huang et al.’s protocol [HCK+03] requires a sensor node to
compute five point multiplications, and hence takes about 1.48s on it. Kim et al.’s
protocol [KKLL07], on the other hand, computes three point multiplications and
one exponentiation in GT . Considering the fact that the exponentiation in GT costs
equal to four times a point multiplication costs, the estimated computation time
cost is about 2.07s for their protocol. Zhang et al.’s protocol [ZZR09] requires
a sensor node to compute two point multiplications and one exponentiation in
GT for key computation (this protocol does not provide user authentication) and
consumes about 1.77s on a sensor node. Considering the ID-based signature scheme
BNN-IBS [CKDZ08], the total estimated computation time for the proposed ID-
1P-SKE protocol is about 1.18s for four point multiplications. This implies that
compared with the protocols proposed by Huang et al., Kim et al., and Zhang et al.,
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Messages Exchanged
Key Establishment Key Confirmation
Huang et al. [HCK+03] 4 2
Kim et al. [KKLL07] 3 1
Zhang et al. [ZZR09] 3 NA (Does not support)
Our scheme 1 1
Table 6.5: Communication cost comparison of ID-1P-SKE protocol with the existing
session key establishment protocols for WSNs
the ID-1P-SKE protocol reduces the total computation time for the authenticated
key establishment on a sensor node by 20%, 33%, and 43%, respectively, without
mentioning that Huang et al.’s and Zhang et al.’s protocols are quite weak in security
as shown in the end of this section. In addition, note that the proposed protocol
also improves the performance of a user by 25%, 82%, and 75% over Huang et al.’s,
Kim et al.’s and Zhang et al.’s solutions, respectively. As improving the efficiency of
the user side is not our focus in this research, we do not discuss this issue in detail.
c) Communication Overhead
To achieve network resource efficiency and minimum latency, the number of messages
exchanged between the sensor node and the user should be as small as possible.
Huang et al.’s protocol [HCK+03] and Kim et al.’s protocol [KKLL07] exchange
six and four messages, respectively, for key establishment and user authentication.
The key confirmation messages are compulsory to provide user authentication in
their protocols. Zhang et al.’s protocol [ZZR09] exchanges three messages for the
key establishment. Our proposed protocol ID-1P-SKE exchanges only one message
for both the key establishment and the user authentication. Hence, the proposed
protocol causes very low communication overhead than the other three protocols for
WSNs as shown in Table 6.5.
d) Storage Overhead
The storage overhead of the proposed ID-1P-SKE protocol is similar to the other
considered protocols and is not very high. The proposed protocol does not require
sensor nodes to store any user credentials (IDs, public keys, certificates etc.), and
hence provides storage efficiency. The only storage requirement is the sensor node’s
ID, its corresponding ID-based key and the system parameters which are required
in all ID-based schemes.
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e) Performance Versus Security Comparison
As discussed earlier in Section 3.3.2, Huang et al.’s protocol [HCK+03] is not secure
since a user can easily learn a sensor node’s private key after one run of the protocol
with the sensor node. This is a severe security attack against a key establishment
protocol which cannot be tolerated, no matter how efficient a protocol is. Another
drawback is the DoS attack caused by the delayed user authentication. On the
other hand, Zhang et al.’s protocol [ZZR09] does not support user authentication
at all allowing any adversary to establish a session key and obtain sensor nodes
data. Hence, these two protocols lack the required security. Kim et al.’s protocol
[KKLL07] also suffers from the DoS attack caused by the delayed user authentication
wasting sensor node’s resources. Our protocol authenticates a user at the first step by
verifying the signed user’s ephemeral public key and the time stamp. Furthermore,
it is not possible for any participant or any adversary to learn any participant’s
private key.
However, an adversary can cause a sensor node to verify a fake signature in our
protocol wasting its resources. To see how serious this attack is when compared to
the DoS attack in Kim et al.’s protocol, we assume the secure and efficient ID-based
signature scheme BNN-IBS [CKDZ08] used for signing the user’s ephemeral public
key in our protocol. To detect a fake ephemeral public key sent by an adversary,
a sensor node will perform three point multiplications in our protocol and three
point multiplications and one exponentiation in GT in Kim et al.’s protocol. Before
a user is authenticated, four messages will be exchanged in Kim et al.’s protocol
while only one message will be exchanged in our protocol since after receiving the
first message from the user the sensor node can find out the fake ephemeral public
key and terminate the protocol. To sum up, the DoS attack in our protocol is far
less harmful than in Kim et al’s protocol saving both the communication and the
computation costs. Therefore, the proposed ID-1P-SKE protocol provides better
performance versus security than the existing session key establishment protocols
for the WSNs.
6.7.1.2 ID-based One-Pass SKE Protocols
In this section, by comparing the proposed ID-1P-SKE protocol with the existing
ID-based one-pass session key establishment protocols proposed by Benit et el.
[BJT04], Okamoto et al. [OTO05], Wang [Wan05], and Gorantla et al. [GBGN08],
we show that a significant efficiency improvement achieved by our protocol is its
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Key Establishment Cost Time (s)
User Sensor Node Sensor Node
Benit et al. [BJT04] 1P + 2M + 1H 1P + 1H 1.90
Okamoto et al. (II) [OTO05] 1P + 3M + 2H 1P + 1M + 2H 2.195
Wang [Wan05] 1P + 3E + 2H 1P + 2E + 2H 4.260
Gorantla et al. [GBGN08] 1P + 2M + 1H 1P + 1M + 1H 2.195
Our protocol 3M + 1H 1M 0.295
Table 6.6: Comparison of ID-1P-SKE protocol with existing ID-based one-pass key
establishment protocols for traditional networks
very low computation and time costs. Note that the existing ID-based one-pass key
establishment protocols are not in fact designed for WSNs. What we are showing
here is that these protocols do not suit WSNs due to their low performances and
high costs. Table 6.6 compares our protocol with the existing protocols by listing
the key establishment costs for both sides of each protocol and the time cost for the
sensor node side. The proposed protocol is computationally efficient on the sensor
node’s (responder’s) side requiring only one point multiplication but no pairing
computation, contrary to existing protocols. One pairing computation on a standard
MICA2 sensor node takes 1.9s versus 0.295s for a point multiplication, and hence
consumes resources equal to about six point multiplications. Due to the absence of
pairing computations on both sides, our protocol provides much better performance
than the existing protocols. Table 6.6 also shows the estimated time that a sensor
node consumes if the existing protocols are applied in WSNs. This time is computed
using the time costs for the expensive operations of point multiplication in ECC
based schemes (0.295s), exponentiation in GT (1.18s) and pairing computation (1.9s)
and ignoring the hash function computations. Although the point multiplication
operation in pairing based schemes takes longer to compute than in pairing-free
ECC based schemes, we assume the same time cost of the point multiplication for
both the existing pairing based schemes and our pairing-free ID-1P-SKE scheme. It
is clear from Table 6.6 that our proposed protocol is almost six times faster than
Benit et al.’s protocol [BJT04], which is the best existing ID-based one-pass key
establishment protocol in terms of efficiency on the sensor node’s side. Moreover, if
we also count the user authentication cost (BNN-IBS signature verification cost of
three point multiplications), our protocol still outperforms all the existing protocols
with the total time of 1.18s. Note that not all the existing protocols provide user
authentication, for instance, not Benit et al.’s protocol. To sum up, our proposed ID-
1P-SKE protocol is the most suitable ID-based one-pass session key establishment
148 CHAPTER 6
protocol for WSNs. Other than WSNs, it can also be used for other application
environments where the responder is a resource constrained device.
6.7.2 Comparison with Existing User Authentication
Protocols
This section compares the proposed outside user authentication protocol using IBS
schemes with the existing distributed digital signature based user authentication
schemes for WSNs. Only two of the existing user authentication schemes use the
distributed approach to authenticate outside users, RRUASN [BGR05] and DP2AC
[ZZR09]. None of them provide session key establishment. The details of these
schemes are given in Section 3.3.1. The RRUASN scheme uses ECDSA signature
to verify outside users whereas DP2AC scheme uses RSA signature. For comparison
purposes, we assume the pairing-free BNN-IBS scheme for our proposed outside user
authentication protocol.
In RRUASN, user authentication involves verification of two ECDSA signatures
by the sensor nodes as expensive operations; one to verify the signed certificate and
second to verify the signed user request. The signed certificate to extract public key
is sent along with every user request increasing communication overhead. DP2AC
involves one RSA signature verification and verification of token re-usability. A
major issue with this scheme is the storage overhead. In this scheme, every used
token is stored on more than one sensor node in the network. Consider a larges scale
sensor network of say 60,000 sensor nodes arranged in the form of a grid. Suppose
every used token is stored on at least 245 sensor nodes forming one vertical line in
the grid. Assuming a token size = 10 bytes and number of used tokens T = 10,000,
the overall storage overhead on the sensor network is about (10 × 10000 × 245 =)
24500,000 bytes (roughly 23925 KB) which is considerable for resource constrained
sensor nodes. Another issue with this scheme is the communication overhead per
user request to verify a used token. Every new token is sent to at least 245 sensor
nodes forming one horizontal line in the sensor network for re-usability checking.
Therefore, the total verification time cost of this scheme is the RSA signature
verification time plus transmission time (TT ) to send a token to a set of sensor
nodes for re-usability check and get a feedback from them. Moreover, this scheme
can work well only if the sensor nodes are arranged in a grid forming horizontal
and vertical lines. The proposed outside user authentication scheme using an IBS
scheme, i.e., BNN-IBS, involves only one signature verification, consisting of three
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Schemes Signature Verify Time (s) Storage Session Key
(s) Bytes
Existing Distributed User Authentication Schemes
RRUASN [BGR05] ECDSA 1.26 0 No
DP2AC [ZZR09] RSA 0.47 + TT α 10×T β No
Proposed Distributed User Authentication Scheme
Proposed BNN-IBS 1.044 0 Yes
α TT is transmission time to send a token to a set of sensor nodes for re-usability checking
β T is the number of used tokens
Table 6.7: Comparison of proposed user authentication scheme with existing
distributed user authentication schemes for WSNs
point multiplications, by the sensor nodes to authenticate a user.
The actual implementation results of the existing schemes on real sensor nodes
are not available. However, for comparison purposes, we estimate the cost of these
schemes by considering the costs of signatures used in these schemes on MICA2
sensor nodes. The signature verification on MICA2 for BNN-IBS scheme takes
about 1.044s (our result) and for ECDSA takes 0.63s [ADLO10]. One RSA signature
verification with 1024 bit key size takes about 0.47s on MICA2 sensor nodes [PLP06].
Using these facts, Table 6.7 gives the cost of all schemes. It is clear from Table 6.7
that the proposed user authentication scheme using an IBS scheme consumes less
time as compared to RRUASN without transmitting any certificate and eliminates
the storage and communication overhead of DP 2AC. It also provides the session
key establishment between the user and the sensor node whereas none of the existing
user authentication schemes deal with the key establishment problem.
6.8 The Proposed Authentication Framework: A
Single Solution
As mentioned previously, there are three types of broadcast/multicast authentication
problems in WSNs.
• Base station to sensor nodes authentication
• Outside user to sensor nodes authentication
• Sensor node to other sensor nodes authentication
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The authentication framework proposed in this thesis focuses on sensor node
to other sensor nodes broadcast authentication and outside user to sensor nodes
authentication. However, using the proposed authentication framework and the
same ID-based setup, the base station to sensor nodes broadcast authentication
can also be handled by the proposed framework. The base station can be
authenticated in the same way as an outside user is authenticated in the proposed
user authentication protocol. However, after successful authentication there is no
need to establish a session key between a sensor node and the base station since
each sensor node already shares a unique individual key with the base station.
Therefore, the protocol is terminated after authentication. Moreover, there is no
need for the base station to send an ephemeral public key. It is easy to differentiate
the base station from other outside users since every sensor node stores the ID of
the base station. The sensor nodes do not need to store any additional parameters
to authenticate broadcast messages from the base station. With this addition,
the proposed authentication framework can address all three types of broadcast
authentication problems faced in WSNs.
The most efficient available pairing-free BNN-IBS scheme and our adapted B-
IBOOS scheme both use the same system parameters. Moreover, the signature
verification process is the same in both signature schemes. Hence, using the same
private keys and ID-based setup the sensor nodes can sign broadcast messages as well
as authenticate broadcast messages from the base station, outside users and other
sensor nodes in the sensor network. The sensor nodes do not need to store different
parameters for different authentication types. In addition, the proposed ID-1P-SKE
scheme also relies on the same system parameters as used by the BNN-IBS and
B-IBOOS schemes. Consequently, the sensor nodes can also establish a session key
with outside users using the same parameters. This makes the proposed framework
a single efficient and detailed solution to handle authentication problems as well as
the session key establishment problem. Furthermore, our proposed authentication
framework is the most efficient and secure as compared to the existing individual
authentication solutions for WSNs.
6.9 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, the proposed outside user authentication and session key establish-
ment protocol and its performance and security evaluations have been presented.
The existing user authentication schemes for WSNs are either prone to security
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attacks or expensive for sensor nodes. Moreover, they lack one or the other security
feature of user authentication and key establishment, and hence cannot provide a
complete solution to the problem requiring separate protocols for user authentication
and session key establishment. Compared to the existing user authentication
schemes for WSNs, the proposed protocol provides both the user authentication
and the session key establishment after successful user authentication. The
proposed protocol uses the ID-based signatures to authenticate a user which
handles the problem of public keys and certificate management faced in WSNs
environment. The performance analysis confirmed the suitability of the proposed
protocol using IBS schemes for resource constrained sensor nodes. Moreover, the
performance comparison of the proposed protocol with the existing distributed
user authentication protocols for WSNs showed the proposed protocol a better
option for WSNs, demonstrating the particularly low computation overhead of the
proposed protocol as compared to the existing protocols. Scalability is another
prominent feature of the proposed protocol. The performance vs security comparison
of the proposed ID-1P-SKE protocol with the existing session key establishment
protocols for WSNs proved the proposed ID-1P-SKE protocol a best solution for
the problem, demonstrating a very low computation and communication overheads
while achieving the high level of security. The proposed authentication framework
provides a single efficient solution to all three broadcast authentication problems
faced in WSNs.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
Chapter Overview: This chapter summarizes the major
contributions of the thesis. It also highlights the avenues for
future research which could be conducted to extend the proposed
authentication framework.
Wireless sensor networks are a unique class of ad hoc networks typically
consisting of tiny low-cost resource constrained devices. These resource constrained
devices are usually deployed in an open environment to sense and communicate
data to a destination over a wireless medium. The wireless communication and the
deployment nature of the WSNs open the door to a variety of security attacks in
addition to the security attacks faced by traditional networks. On the other hand,
the limited resources of the sensor nodes pose a hurdle in applying complex security
solutions which are tailored to traditional networks.
This thesis contributes to the active research area of broadcast authentication
in WSNs by considering both sensor nodes broadcast authentication and outside
user authentication which also facilitates the base station to sensor nodes broadcast
authentication. A traditional mean to provide authentication, i.e., a digital
signature, consumes considerable time and energy on resource constrained sensor
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nodes. Moreover, public key and certificate management is another issue faced
while applying digital signatures in a WSN environment. Public keys and certificates
are either sent with every singed message (increasing transmission and processing
overheads) or stored on each sensor node (increasing storage overhead and reducing
scalability). The MAC based authentication schemes are efficient on sensor nodes,
however they fail to provide a solution to the broadcast authentication problems.
To tackle these problems, a novel authentication framework for WSNs has been
proposed in this thesis giving a solution to the above mentioned authentication
problems.
7.1 Summary of the Thesis Contributions
To recapitulate, the specific contributions of this thesis are:
1. Authentication framework. An authentication framework for WSNs using
ID-based signature schemes has been proposed. The proposed authentication
framework is comprised of two authentication protocols; one for broadcast
by sensor nodes authentication and the other for outside user authentication.
The outside user authentication protocol also facilitates the base station to
sensor nodes broadcast authentication. These authentication protocols can
be applied in WSNs independently tackling individual security problems to
achieve different level of security. However, deployed as a unified framework,
they ensure a high degree of security with efficiency, providing a single solution
to all three authentication problems in WSNs using the same ID-based setup.
An important feature of the framework is its re-usability. Once new IBS
and IBOOS schemes are available, which are more efficient than the currently
available schemes, the framework can be re-used with the new schemes for
efficiency improvement.
2. First time handling of sensor nodes broadcast authentication. Earlier
work in authentication in WSNs focused on two types of broadcast authentica-
tion problems only: the base station to sensor nodes and the outsider user to
sensor nodes. It completely ignored the third type of broadcast authentication,
i.e., the sensor nodes to other sensor nodes broadcast authentication. Our
research work highlights for the first time the problem of authenticated
broadcast by sensor nodes, particularly for time critical applications of WSNs.
We describe real application scenarios where the problem is important. We
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also highlight the need for a solution and propose a solution to the problem.
Our proposed solution enables sensor nodes to broadcast authenticated real-
time messages without the involvement of the base station.
3. First time application of OOS in WSNs. MAC based authentication
schemes are efficient to compute on sensor nodes, however, they fail to provide
a solution to the problem. Digital signatures, on the other hand, take longer
to compute on resource constrained sensor nodes which does not suit the
time-critical applications of WSNs. The proposed broadcast by sensor nodes
authentication protocol proposes to use online/oﬄine signature schemes for
the first time in WSNs. The IBOOS schemes enable a sensor node to sign and
broadcast a message as soon as possible to respond to a time-critical event by
performing the most time consuming computations of message signing before
the time-critical event happens. Moreover, performing the expensive oﬄine
phase by some other powerful device and re-using the oﬄine signature to sign
more than one message can reduce the cost of a signature scheme for sensor
nodes bringing significant efficiency achievements.
4. First time implementation of OOS on sensor nodes devices. To the
best of our knowledge, it was the first proposal of applying online/oﬄine
signatures to the WSNs environment, a cryptographic primitive new to sensor
nodes devices. In order to evaluate the performance of IBOOS schemes on
real sensor nodes devices, a few IBOOS schemes were implemented and their
performance was evaluated. This was the first implementation of IBOOS
schemes on real sensor nodes. The experimental results proved the IBOOS
schemes efficient for resource constrained sensor nodes.
5. Adaption of an IBS scheme to a pairing-free IBOOS scheme. The
implementation results of the first IBOOS scheme were too expensive for sensor
nodes. However, the reason was the expensive pairing based cryptography
and not the IBOOS scheme itself. In order to obtain a pairing-free IBOOS
scheme, we have securely transformed an IBS scheme to an IBOOS scheme.
The implementation results of the transformed B-IBOOS scheme were very
efficient, enabling a sensor node to sign a message only in 0.025s. This time cost
is quick enough considering the resource constrained nature of sensor nodes
devices. The two different implementations of the adapted IBOOS scheme
provide a trade-off between computation cost and the memory consumption.
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Compared with the existing digital signature based authentication schemes
for WSNs, the proposed broadcast authentication scheme using pairing-free
B-IBOOS scheme was the most efficient and secure solution to the problem.
6. A session key establishment protocol (SKP) for WSNs. The existing
session key establishment protocols for WSNs were either expensive or prone to
security attacks. The existing ID-based one-pass key establishment protocols
for traditional networks were all pairing-based, and hence expensive for sensor
nodes. Thus, a new secure and efficient ID-based one-pass authenticated
session key establishment protocol (ID-1P-SKE) was designed mainly for
WSNs to establish a session key between a resourceful user and a resource
constrained sensor node. However, it can be used for any other similar
application environment where the key is established between a powerful
initiator and a resource constrained responder.
7. Formal security analysis of SKP. The security of the proposed crypto-
graphic ID-1P-SKE protocol was formally analyzed using the reductionist
proof technique. The security analysis of the protocol proved the proposed
protocol secure not only for WSNs environment but also for any other similar
application environment.
8. User authentication together with session key establishment. The
proposed user authentication protocol, compared to the existing user authen-
tication protocols, not only authenticates the outside users but also establishes
a session key between the user and the sensor node after successful user
authentication. This key establishment is mandatory for the secure exchange
of valuable sensor nodes data and in some cases for the exchange of encrypted
user queries to provide query privacy. The ID-based signatures handle the
problem of public key and certificate management, hence providing scalability.
Compared with the existing distributed user authentication schemes for WSNs,
the proposed user authentication scheme using the pairing-free BNN-IBS
scheme was the most efficient, secure and a complete solution to the problem.
7.2 Future Research Directions
The research that has been undertaken for this thesis has successfully met the
research aims and the time span proposed. However, the investigated research
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area of outside user authentication has been spotted as an appealing aspect
of WSNs along which additional research could be conducted. The proposed
outside user authentication protocol deals with the user authentication and session
key establishment. For future research, we suggest to extend the proposed
authentication framework by including the user access control according to user’s
access privileges or attributes as a part of outside user authentication. Experimental
evaluation of the proposed authenticated broadcast by sensor nodes protocol is also
in our list of future work. Besides this, we have an interest in further exploring
the efficient pairing-free ID-based signature schemes for WSNs and application of
the proposed framework to other areas in WSNs as well as to other networks. This
section briefly outlines these areas of future work.
7.2.1 Extension of the Authentication Framework
Sensor nodes in a WSN usually collect a variety of data. Different users of a WSN
may be interested in different types of data and may have different access privileges
due to the data security and privacy. For example, in an army application a major
have access to more sensitive data than a soldier. Therefore, there is a need of
a mechanism to restrict a user’s access to sensor nodes data according to user’s
access privileges or attributes, known as attribute based user access control. Like
user authentication and session key establishment, access control is also a part of
user’s access to sensor nodes data task. The attributes based user access control in
WSN is enforced to grant a user the right to access only the data for which he is
an authorized user. To control a user’s access according to his attributes, a sensor
node should be able to differentiate between users, which ultimately requires some
user specific information on the sensor node’s side. Storing user specific information
for every user on sensor nodes would be impractical for a large scale sensor network
due to the limited storage capability of a sensor node. On the other hand, sending
user credentials with a user request would require some kind of verification.
A common approach to handle an attribute based user access control is to
combine confidentiality (encryption) with user access control. Attribute-based
encryption (ABE) [SW04], a generalization of ID-based encryption (IBE) [BF03],
helps in this regard to link encryption to some user attributes. In attribute-based
encryption, data intended for a user is encrypted based on attributes or privileges
assigned to that user by an authority. Only users that have the required attributes
are able to decrypt the data, ensuring confidentiality with access control. However,
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attribute-based encryption is not computationally efficient for resource constrained
sensor nodes due to the fact that the computational cost of encryption grows linearly
with the number of attributes assigned to users.
To cope with this problem, we propose to modify the ID-based encryption to
achieve an inexpensive alternative to attribute-based encryption. As mentioned
before, in ID-based schemes the private keys corresponding to IDs are computed by
a PKG. Our idea is to associate the set of attributes assigned to a user to his private
key. The corresponding computed public information is then automatically linked
to the same set of attributes. Data is encrypted using a user’s public information
and decrypted using his corresponding private key. Consequently, only a user with
the corresponding private key (computed using his assigned set of attributes by the
PKG) is able to decrypt the data.
To develop this idea, we started looking for a pairing-free IBE scheme.
Unfortunately, the existing secure and efficient IBE schemes [BF03, Lyn02] rely
on pairing computations. In the next step, we tried to design a pairing-free
IBE scheme from a pairing-based IBE scheme which could be used for WSNs.
Our attempt to design a pairing-free IBE scheme was inspired by a pairing-based
authenticated encryption scheme with CCA (Chosen Cipher Attack) security and
reduced ciphertext size presented in [Lyn02]. This is an in process work lacking the
formal security and performance evaluations of the designed IBE scheme.
7.2.2 Experimental Evaluation of the Proposed
Authenticated Broadcast by Sensor Nodes Protocol
During this research, we performed some experiments where we implemented a few
IBOOS schemes on sensor nodes for our proposed authenticated broadcast by sensor
nodes protocol. An IBOOS scheme is a cryptographic primitive which has not been
used for sensor nodes. The purpose of our experiments was to see whether it was
possible for the sensor nodes to compute IBOOS schemes and how efficient they were
to compute on real sensor nodes. Our experimental results (discussed in chapter 5)
showed their suitability and performance on sensor nodes answering both questions.
In future, we are interested in evaluation of the proposed authenticated broadcast
by sensor nodes protocol either by implementing on real sensor network or through
simulation. These experiments will be helpful in order to estimate the overheads
introduced by the protocol when deployed in a large scale wireless sensor network.
The storage requirement of the protocol on a sensor node remains constant and
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does not increase with the increase in number of broadcast senders or receivers.
The experimental results will help to evaluate the communication and computation
overheads introduced by the protocol.
7.2.3 Pairing-free IBS and IBOOS Schemes
Pairing-free IBS and IBOOS schemes are another interesting areas which could be
further explored. Pairing based cryptography is resource hungry and does not suit
the resource constrained application environments such as wireless sensor networks.
There is a need to design new efficient pairing-free cryptographic schemes for such
application environments. The existing pairing-based cryptographic schemes can
also be investigated for possible transformations to obtain efficient pairing-based
schemes for WSNs.
7.2.4 Other Applications of the Authentication Framework
The proposed authentication framework can be used in WSNs to handle other
problems. For instance, data aggregation in WSNs can also benefit from the
proposed framework. Data aggregation is an in-network processing of the data
collected by the sensor nodes while forwarding it to the base station. The main goal
of data aggregation is to gather and aggregate data in an energy efficient manner
to increase network lifetime. An aggregator node computes the simple operations of
sum, average, minimum or maximum of the data gathered from other sensor nodes
before forwarding it to the other aggregator node on the way to the base station.
It helps to reduce the size of raw data and save network resources like bandwidth
and battery power. Secure data aggregation protocols must satisfy the security
requirements of source authentication as well as data confidentiality, integrity and
freshness [OX09]. The IBOOS schemes and the proposed IBE scheme can be further
studied to provide a secure data aggregation protocol accommodating all needed
security requirements.
Other than WSNs, the proposed framework can also be studied to apply in
other networks. For instance, the vehicular ad-hoc network is a candidate network
which can benefit from the proposed framework. In vehicular ad-hoc networks
described in [BHUW08], the proposed authentication protocols can provide a
secure communication between vehicles and between vehicles and the roadside
infrastructures which include sensor nodes. Mobile ad-hoc networks can also be
explored as a potential candidate.
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Appendix A
Experimental Details
A.1 MICA2 Hardware Details
A MICA2 [Cro] sensor node consists of a wireless module, sensor boards and a PC
interface board. The compulsory parts of a MICA2 sensor node we used in our
experiments are a wireless module and a PC interface board. We did not use any
sensor board since our experiments did not require any sensing.
A.1.1 Wireless Module
A MICA2 wireless module is a combination of a micro-controller, a radio transceiver
and a battery pack (usually 2xAA batteries). Sensor board is attached to the wireless
module which adds up the sensing ability to MICA2 wireless module. The MICA2
motes come in three models according to their radio frequency bands: MPR400
(915 MHz), MPR410 (433 MHz), and MPR420 (315 MHz). All models utilize a
powerful ATmega128L micro-controller and a Chipcon CC1000 frequency tunable
radio transceiver with extended range. ATmega128L is a low power micro-controller
which runs TinyOS (operating system for sensor nodes) from its internal flash
memory. A MICA2 mote has 128KB in-system programmable flash and 4KB SRAM
with a clock speed of 7.3828 MHz. The MICA2 wireless module we selected for our
experiments was MPR400CB. The reason is that MPR400CB operates on 868 MHz
frequency band which is a license-free band for Europe. Figure A.1 shows a MICA2
(MPR4x0) sensor node without an antenna. A sensor board is connected to the mote
through the 51 pin connector shown in the figure. In order to program MICA2, it
is connected to the PC or laptop through a PC Interface Board.
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Figure A.1: A MICA2 (MPR4x0) wireless module without an antenna [Cro].
A.1.2 PC Interface Board
We selected a serial PC interface board to program sensor nodes, i.e., MIB510CB
serial interface board. The other options are USB or Ethernet interface boards. The
MIB510 interface board, shown in Figure A.2, is a multi-purpose interface board.
It supplies power to the wireless module through an external power adapter option
while wireless module is attached to it. In addition, it serves two main purposes: it
allows the user to (re)program any sensor node by plugging the node directly into
the base and it operates as a part of the root node interface giving the PC a data
passage onto the radio based sensor network.
Figure A.2: Top view of MIB510 Serial Interface Board [Cro].
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A.1.3 Hardware Configuration
We developed and debugged our software programs on a laptop. These programs
were then installed on MICA2 nodes. In order to install a program on a mote,
the wireless module (MPR400CB) shown in Figure A.1 is attached to the PC
interface board (MIB510CB) shown in Figure A.2 through the 51 pin connector.
The MIB510CB board is then connected to the PC through a serial port (RS-232).
The details of this whole procedure are given in [AAKC06].
A.1.4 Programming a Node
Programming a mote requires the operating system TinyOS to be installed on laptop.
We installed TinyOS on our laptop on top of Fedora (Linux). To compile a program
for MICA2 in TinyOS, the command is as follows:
make mica2
This command generates an executable file in the same directory and helps in
debugging the program. There is a special command used to install a program on
MICA2 nodes which compiles the program and then uploads it to the node.
make mica2 reinstall mib510,/dev/USBx
Here mib510 is the PC interface board mounted on /dev/USBx. We followed the
step by step procedure of installing TinyOS and programming a MICA2 sensor node
given in [AAKC06]. The results of our experiments have already been discussed in
detail.
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Appendix B
ID-based One-Pass Session Key
Establishment Protocol
B.1 Proposed ID-1P-SKE Protocol for WSNs
This section presents detailed application of the proposed ID-1P-SKE protocol in
WSNs. The proposed ID-based one-pass authenticated key establishment protocol
has four phases: System Initialization, Key Generation, User Registration and Key
Establishment. The first two phases are performed once, before the deployment of
the sensor network. In an ID-based cryptosystem, a private key generator (PKG)
computes the private keys corresponding to IDs. In our scheme, the base station
plays the role of PKG and computes the private keys for sensor nodes and users.
System Initialization: In this phase, the Setup algorithm of ID-1P-SKE runs
on the base station (before deployment) and generates the system parameters,
including master public key (mpk), and the corresponding master secret key (msk)
using a security parameter k. This algorithm performs the following steps:
(a) Specify the parameters E/Fp, q, p, P and G, where
• E/Fp is an elliptic curve E over a finite field Fp,
• q is a large prime number and p is the field size,
• P is a point of order q on the curve E and,
• G is a cyclic group of order q under the point addition “+” generated by
P .
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(b) For msk s ∈R Z∗q, compute mpk as PPKG = sP .
(c) Choose one hash function H: {0, 1}∗ ×G → Z∗q.
(d) Choose one function χ: G → {0, 1}k to derive the session key where k is the
security parameter.
(e) Output the system parameters {E/Fp, q, p, P , G, PPKG, H, χ} and keep s
secret.
Key Generation: In this phase, the Key Extract algorithm of ID-1P-SKE runs
on the base station (before deployment) and computes the private keys of all sensor
nodes. This algorithm takes msk and a sensor node’s ID as input and generates
a private key corresponding to that ID using the Schnorr signature. For a sensor
node I with identity IDi, this algorithm performs the following steps:
(a) Choose ri ∈R Z∗q.
(b) Compute Ri = riP .
(c) Compute ci = H(IDi, Ri).
(d) Compute private key as si = ci s+ ri.
(e) Output (si, Ri), where si is secret while Ri is public.
The IDs, corresponding private keys and system parameters are stored on sensor
nodes before the deployment. Hence, every sensor node I stores {IDi, si, Ri} and
system parameters.
User Registration: This phase is repeated every time when a new user is
registered with the system. In this phase, the Key Extract algorithm runs on the
base station and computes the private key su for the new user U corresponding to his
identity IDu in the same way as computed for sensor nodes in the Key Generation
phase. The base station, who runs this algorithm, sends the private key to the
user via a secure channel. Hence, every user U obtains {IDu, su, Ru} and system
parameters. To establish a session key with a sensor node, the user also needs the
ID and corresponding R information of the sensor node. Therefore, he also obtains
the {IDi, Ri} pairs of the sensor nodes in his communication range.
Key Establishment: In this phase, a session key is established between a user
and a sensor node for the secure transmission of sensor nodes data to the user. Here,
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the Key Establishment algorithm of ID-1P-SKE is described between a user U and
a sensor node I. Figure B.1 describes the steps of the protocol.
User U Sensor Node I
l ∈R Z∗q
y = lsu
L = yP
σ = Signsu(L, IDu, IDi, TS)
L, IDu, IDi, TS, σ−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
ci = H(IDi, Ri)
Si = ciPPKG +Ri V erifyIDu (L, IDu, IDi, TS, σ)
Ku,i = ySi = (lsusiP ) Ki,u = siL = (silsuP )
SKu = χ(Ku,i) SKi = χ(Ki,u)
SK = SKu = SKi = χ(lsusiP )
Figure B.1: Authenticated One-Pass Session Key Establishment Protocol
(a) The user U chooses at random l ∈R Z∗q and computes y = lsu and L = yP . U
signs the ephemeral public key L together with IDu, IDi and TS as follows:
σ = Signsu(L, IDu, IDi, TS). U then sends [L, IDu, IDi, TS, σ] to the sensor
node I in his communication range. Here TS is the current time stamp to avoid
a replay attack and σ is a signature signed by U using his private key su and an
ID-based signature (IBS) scheme with the same ID-based setup as used by the
ID-1P-SKE protocol, for instance the secure BNN-IBS scheme.
(b) The sensor node I first checks the time stamp TS to avoid the verification
of a replayed message. If this is a fresh message, I verifies the signature
σ as V erify
IDu
(L, IDu, IDi, TS, σ). The successful signature verification
implies that the message is actually sent by the user U , and hence I accepts
it. Otherwise the protocol is terminated at this stage. Next, the sensor node I
computes the shared secret Ki,u as
Ki,u = si L (= si l su P )
and deletes L.
(c) The user U computes the same shared secret Ku,i as
168 CHAPTER B
ci = H(IDi, Ri)
Si = ci PPKG +Ri
Ku,i = y Si (= l su si P )
U then deletes L, l and y.
(d) Both parties then compute the shared session key as
SK = χ(Ku,i) = χ(Ki,u) = χ(l su si P ),
where χ is the key derivation function. The session key at this stage is ready to
be used to exchange encrypted data.
The security of the ID-1P-SKE protocol and its performance in WSN environ-
ment have already been discussed with outside user authentication protocol.
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